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Traditionally, the corporate governance scholarship has emphasized heavily the 
“dispersed shareholder regimes” in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
although “controlling shareholder regimes” constitute the vast majority of the world’s 
economy.  Since there have been few systematic studies concerning controlling 
shareholder regimes (in particular, controlling shareholder regimes in developing 
countries), they have remained in a black box.  With this concern in mind, in this 
dissertation, I proposed various analytical frameworks for understanding the 
corporate governance of controlling shareholder regimes that, improperly, have been 
overlooked for a long time.  In the first chapter of my dissertation, entitled 
Reenvisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders 
and Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, I proposed theories to explain why 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders “voluntarily” embrace each other 
in an emerging capital market while the legal system in that jurisdiction does not 
require controllers to protect investors.  In the second chapter, entitled Controlling 
Shareholders – “Roving” v. “Stationary,” I explored two types of controlling 
shareholders (i.e., “roving” and “stationary” controllers) and delved into why an 
economy with stationary controllers is better in terms of corporate governance and 
more likely to be prosperous than an economy with roving controllers.  In the third 
chapter, entitled Transplanting a Poison Pill to a Controlling Shareholder Regime, I 
analyzed how a poison pill would affect the market for corporate control and the 
corporate governance of controlling shareholder regimes.  In this dissertation, I have 
proposed many unconventional analyses and views on controlling shareholder 
regimes (in some cases, the concepts may be counterintuitive from the perspective of 
the conventional corporate governance scholarship).  I hope that my research will 
guide scholars in a theoretical way to understand the various aspects of law and 
economics related to corporate governance that mostly have not been recognized or 
that have been misunderstood in the standard scholarly studies of corporate 
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REENVISIONING THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER REGIME:  
WHY CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AND MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS EMBRACE EACH OTHER 
 




“Law and finance” literature, which was revolutionized by four prominent 
economists – La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (hereinafter “LLSV”) 
– explained that the origin of a given country’s legal system and the quality of its law 
enforcement are statistically correlated with patterns of share ownership, the cost of 
capital, and other corporate governance variables.1  LLSV’s series of studies showed 
that controlling shareholder regimes exist in those jurisdictions where the legal 
systems do not protect minority shareholders from dominant shareholders’ diversion 
                                                 
* J.S.D. Candidate, Columbia University School of Law; LL.M., Columbia University School of Law.  
I would like to thank my supervisors and mentors at Columbia University School of Law, Professors 
Merritt B. Fox, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Curtis J. Milhaupt, and Katharina Pistor for their invaluable advice 
and insightful comments.       
 
1 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, Law And 
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The 
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of private benefits of control.2  To be sure, this view opened a new and insightful 
paradigm to analyze international corporate governance.   
On the other hand, however, LLSV’s studies have been criticized because 
many puzzles remain unsolved by their account, and the conclusions based on 
accounts by LLSV type of law and finance perspectives are misleading in some 
respects.3  For example, Professor Gilson claims that LLSV depend on a simplified 
syllogism that is insufficient to explain all controlling shareholder systems. 4   In 
particular, he raises important questions (hereinafter “Gilson’s riddle”5) that neither 
LLSV nor the law and finance literatures explain – if laws are too poor to protect 
investors, as LLSV explain, then why do we observe any minority shareholders at all 
in countries with poor shareholder protection; and why is the value of minority shares, 
as well as the number of minority shareholders, in such jurisdictions not zero?6 
The purpose of my Article is, in theoretical ways (rather than via case study) 
to offer potential answers for Gilson’s riddle, which remains unexplored.  Emerging 
                                                 
2  Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2006); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). 
 
3 See e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Do Norms Matter? – A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
2151, 2154 (2000) (Professor Coffee suggests that although LLSV have shown a statistically 
significant correlation between strong capital markets and certain specific legal protections that tend to 
characterize common law legal systems, correlation does not prove causation.  He points out 
“multicollinearity” problem as well); Milhaupt, supra note 1 at 2124 (Professor Milhaupt states that 
the (LLSV) empiricists may have reversed the actual chain of causation between law and corporate 
governance – in other words, law and its enforcement may not determine the structure of corporate 
groups; rather, important corporate and financial groups in a given society may drive the development 
of legal institutions and enforcement practices by affecting the demand for law, at least in part through 
the creation and destruction of norms). 
 
4 Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational 
Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633 (2007).   
 
5 “Gilson’s riddle” is coined by Professor Merritt B. Fox when I discussed my Article with him. 
     
6 Gilson, supra note 4.   
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countries usually lack investor-friendly corporate and securities laws as well as 
effective court systems.  In addition, these countries’ market mechanisms do not 
function properly – for example, the market for corporate control is practically 
nonexistent.  Further, there are many cases of looting and “tunneling”7 by controlling 
shareholders in these countries, and these practices of unfair self-dealing are not 
thoroughly investigated or regulated by the authorities.  Nonetheless, a significant 
amount of public shareholders participate in so-called “bad-law countries,” and some 
bad law countries are even exemplary in economic development.  These phenomena 
are “anomalies” that LLSV have not acknowledged properly, and in order to explain 
these anomalies, we should rely on other analytical frameworks often overlooked by 
contemporary commentators, such as the informal (non-legal) institutions and hidden 
incentives of constituencies in a corporation. 
With these aims, this Article proceeds as follows.  Part  I sets out the basic 
definitions of controlling shareholders regimes and the separation of ownership and 
control in the controlling minority structure (CMS).  It briefly explains how the 
asymmetric information problem, coupled with controllers’ private benefits of 
control,8 would potentially destroy the capital market in a country with insufficient 
shareholder protection.  Then, Professor Gilson’s “product market-based account”9 is 
introduced, which is the seminal work explaining Gilson’s riddle – why the capital 
market in a developing country has a large number of public minority shareholders.  
                                                 
7 Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. 22 (2000).   
 
8 In addition, I explore why diversion of corporate value to controlling families (e.g., self-dealing) is so 
problematic in countries with ineffective commercial laws. 
 
9 See Gilson, supra note 4.     
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Subsequently, I raise several questions on the general application of this account and 
suggest the possibility that the product market-based account may lose some 
explanatory power when there is a large discrepancy between a controller’s cash flow 
rights and voting rights.  
In turn, in Parts  II and  III, I propose two alternative hypotheses to the product 
market-based account, answering the conundrum of why a controller in a bad-law 
country needs external equity capital even if newly issued stocks are sold at a huge 
discount.  In Part  II, I argue that non-pecuniary private benefits of control (psychic 
utility of a controller such as leadership, fame, reputation, social and political 
influence), which have not been analyzed in detail by extant literature,10 may explain 
the riddle.  To a controlling shareholder, building a large business empire is an 
overarching personal means to magnify her non-pecuniary benefits.  I argue that, to 
this end, a controller inevitably has to rely on the equity issuance despite the pecking 
order of corporate finance.  In addition, I show, empire-building based on equity 
capital may bring in handsome economic benefits to a controller in various ways.  In 
that sense, reliance on the stock market is not that costly and may even be beneficial 
to a controller, based on her personal payoff.   
                                                 
10 Most of the extant literature on corporate governance has focused on a controller’s pecuniary private 
benefits of control – i.e., minorities’ extraction, such as (unfair) self-dealing or sale of control.  
However, a controller seeks to gain non-pecuniary private benefits of control from running a 
corporation as well.  Then, a model assuming that a controller maximizes her pecuniary benefits is not 
precise, although it explains very important features of a controlling shareholder regime.  A more 
precise model should be based on the notion that a controller maximizes her “utility” arising from non-
pecuniary benefits – such as social prestige, reputation, psychic utilities, and social influence, 
including political power – as well as pecuniary benefits.  Put differently, a controller’s utility function 
can be expressed as [U = U (pecuniary benefits, non-pecuniary benefits)] where “U” stands for the 
controller’s utility function.  
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Subsequently, in Part  III, I propose that having a broad base of minority 
shareholders is beneficial to a controlling shareholder in efficiently expropriating 
pecuniary benefits.  Even if the controlling shareholder takes a small amount of 
pecuniary benefits from each non-controlling shareholder, the sum of extraction from 
a large number would be huge.  Therefore, despite the cost disadvantage of equity 
financing, the controller has reasons to rely on the stock market.11   
As discussed in Parts  II and  III, it is necessary to analyze the standpoint of a 
controlling shareholder to sell their shares to public investors.  By itself, though, this 
would be insufficient because transactions in the stock market would not take place 
unless non-controlling shareholders had reasons to purchase shares from a controlled 
corporation.12  As Alfred Marshall famously said, “Supply and demand curves are 
like scissor blades that intersect equilibrium.”  In the context of Gilson’s riddle, a 
controller and minority shareholders – as a seller and a purchaser – embrace the other 
party by reciprocal interactions since both can gain economic “surplus” through 
transactions in the capital market.  Consequently, both parties accept market terms 
and conditions despite the insufficient investor protection (which is disadvantageous 
to non-controlling investors) and equity discount (which is disadvantageous to a 
controller).   
                                                 
11 On the flip side, another merit of having a large number of public shareholders is that even a large-
scale “tunneling” might not aggravate the welfare of individual minorities.  Why?  As to “private 
benefits of control,” what public shareholders care about most is not the total amount of a controller’s 
diversion from a corporation but their individual damage.  Thus, when the controller has a large 
number of public shareholders, she could take a great deal of pecuniary private benefits by levying a 
small extraction on many individual non-controlling shareholders.  In that sense, it is possible that 
minority shareholders may prefer a controller with less cash flow rights who can “dilute” expropriation 
across a large number of minorities, given the insufficient protection of investors.  My article will deal 
with this issue in depth later. 
   
12 As far as I know, surprisingly there are very few (i.e., almost none) systematic studies explaining 
minority shareholders’ standpoint when a controlling shareholder offers equity issuance in a 
developing country.   
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Focused on this point (i.e., Marshall’s scissor blades), Part  IV explains why 
minority shareholders are willing to participate in the capital market despite the 
ineffectiveness of the legal protection that is available.  To this end, a series of 
unconventional explanations are put forward: (1) the “stationary controller” account; 
(2) limited opportunities of other investment account; (3) minorities’ behavioral 
finance account; (4) “minorities might not be damaged” account; (5) foreign 
minorities account; (6) minorities’ free-ride account; and (7) the government’s 
subsidy account.  Most well-functioning capital markets in less developed economies 
are likely to be subject to at least some of these accounts discussed.   
For example, as to (2) limited opportunities of other investment account, 
perhaps non-controlling shareholders in developing countries are not allowed to 
invest abroad.  Even without such capital regulations, they may find it difficult to 
invest abroad for many reasons, including “familiarity bias,” which makes many 
investors have a bias towards their own domestic markets.  In addition, many non-
controlling shareholders are not suited for international diversification, which requires 
investors to bear additional risk if they do not have hedging tools.  Also, until recently, 
access to financial intermediaries that pool funds and invest abroad on behalf of 
investors has not been readily available to public investors in many developing 
countries.  Finally, Part  V summarizes and concludes.  
As Professor Fox precisely comprehends my points in a succinct way, “Two 
people must dance tango, not one.”13  The message in this Article is that when two 
parties – a controlling shareholder and minority shareholders – realize that their 
interwoven relationship creates symbiosis and mutual hostage, their cooperation is 
                                                 
13 Discussion with Professor Merritt B. Fox.     
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often compelled and strengthened, and economic development ensues.  That is why 
we can observe some exemplary economies in bad-law countries that have functional 
capital markets.   
However, if conditions that have persisted to date are to change in the future, 
it is possible that the symbiotic relationship between a controller and non-controlling 
shareholders would no longer be stable in these countries.  For example, as the 
process of globalization continues to gain momentum, non-controlling shareholders 
have more opportunities and options to diversify their assets internationally.  As a 
result, a domestic controller’s ability to keep public investors in her controlled 
corporation could be diminished.  This is another reason why controlling shareholders 
in developing countries need to “voluntarily” improve corporate governance for their 
own sake, although they are not legally required to do so.14          
     
      
I. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS REGIME 
 
Berle and Means’ model assumes that large-scale enterprises could only raise 
sufficient capital to conduct their operations by attracting a large number of equity 
investors;15 however, contemporary empirical evidence finds, even at the level of the 
largest firms, that Berle and Means’ model is largely limited to the United States and 
                                                 
14 Discussion with Professor Jeffrey N. Gordon. 
  
15 John C. Coffee Jr. The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 642 (1999). 
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Great Britain.16  In developing countries, where controlling family shareholders often 
run conglomerates and business groups,17 minority shareholders are poorly protected 
within formal legal structures, such as corporate and securities laws and judicial 
systems.   
 
1. Controlling Shareholder Regimes – Controlled Structure (CS) and 
Controlling Minority Structure (CMS)  
  
Most corporate governance literature presumes that, in the model controlling 
shareholder regime, a large block-holder controls a corporation by owning a majority 
of shares.  In other words, voting rights and cash flow rights are generally aligned – 
this type of controlling shareholder ownership is referred to as the “controlled 
structure” (CS). 18   Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the CS is not the only 
representative form of controlling shareholder systems in the world.  There is another 
significant pattern of controlling shareholder ownership where a controlling 
shareholder wields a significant percentage of voting rights even though she holds a 
small percentage of equity.  Since a controlling shareholder is also a minority 
                                                 
16 Id. at 642; La Porta et al., supra note 2 at 474 (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer find that “the 
Berle and Means corporation is far from universal, and is quite rare for some definitions of control”); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership & 
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (authors argue at present, publicly traded companies in the 
United States and the United Kingdom commonly have dispersed ownership, whereas publicly traded 
companies in other economies generally have controlling ownership).          
 
17 In less developed countries, controlling shareholders of large corporations are usually states or 
family shareholders. La Porta et al., supra note 2.  Please note that in this Article, I focus on family 
controlling shareholders in developing countries rather than those in developed countries.               
 
18 Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and 
Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, 
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). 
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shareholder in terms of the quantity of equity stake she owns, this regime is referred 
to as the “controlling minority structure” (CMS).19   
How is a controller able to exercise control while retaining only a small 
fraction of the equity claims on a company’s cash flow?20   Professors Bebchuk, 
Kraakman and Triantis explain that such a radical separation of control and cash flow 
rights can occur in three principal ways: through dual-class share structures, stock 
pyramids, and cross-ownership ties.21   In fact, it is not uncommon that a control 
family wields majority voting power although a controlling family holds less than 10 
percent of the economic rights.22  In the CMS, it can be said that the control family’s 
voting rights are effectively leveraged. 
In sum, holding a majority of common shares and economic interest is not a 
necessary condition to exercise control, as seen in the CMS.  Rather, when we refer to 
“control,” we mean the status with a significant holding of “voting” rights 23  – 
although it is often possible that a shareholder with less than a majority of the voting 
rights (e.g., 40%) can wield effective control, in this Article for the purpose of 
simplicity, a “controller” is defined as a shareholder with more than 50 percent of the 





21 Id.   
 
22 For example, many controlling shareholders in Korean chaebols effectively control business groups 
with 5 – 10% of equity ownership by means of intra cross-shareholding.    
 
23 According to Delaware court, a U.S. controlling stockholder has the voting power to: (a) elect 
directors; (b) cause a break-up of the corporation; (c) merge it with another company; (d) cash-out the 
public stockholders; (e) amend the certificate of incorporation; (f) sell all or substantially all of the 
corporate assets; or (g) otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation and the public 
stockholders’ interest. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1994).  
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voting rights.  Table 1 summarizes the two aforementioned patterns of controlling 
shareholder systems in the world. 
 
Table 1: Comparison between the Representative Forms of the Controlled 
Structure (CS) and the Controlling Minority Structure (CMS) 
 




A Controller’s  
Cash Flow Rights (“α”) 
More than 50%  
(0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1) 
Less than 50 %  
(0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5) 
A Controller’s  
Voting Rights More than 50% More than 50 % 
Voting Leverage 
Mechanism None (for the pure CS) 
-  Stock Pyramiding 
-  Dual-Capital Structure 
-  Cross-Shareholding 
         
 
2. Asymmetric Information and Lemon Market Problem    
 
A well-performing securities market would be built on information provided 
by disclosure24 and efficient regulations.  In a bad-law country, though, investors 
suffer from insufficient disclosure system and lack of transparency, not to mention 
inefficient legal infrastructure.  The securities market then becomes highly vulnerable 
to the “lemon” market problem 25  due to the asymmetry of information between 
sellers (i.e., corporate insiders of issuers) and buyers (i.e., investors).  In a corporation 
where there is the potential for a controlling shareholder to be actively involved in 
                                                 
24 For the more explanation on the mandatory disclosure and its related discussion, see generally 
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999).    
 
25 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 
Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).   
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transactions tainted with conflict of interest, the controlling shareholder knows that 
the fundamental value of the company has been damaged due to tunneling.  
Prospective investors in the securities market, however, do not know whether the firm 
is involved in such misconduct and, if so, to what degree.  Investors can only use 
market statistics to judge the quality of prospective purchases. 26   Consequently, 
investors discount the prices they will offer for the shares of all companies.  As 
Professor Black explains, this ensures that investors receive a fair price, on average.27   
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story.  Knowing this, issuers have the 
incentive to issue poor-quality securities since the returns for good quality accrue 
mainly to the entire group whose statistics are affected rather than to the individual 
issuer.28  In response, issuers with good quality (i.e., companies not associated with 
tunneling) have no incentive to issue, and only issuers with bad quality (i.e., 
companies associated with an enormous amount of tunneling) participate in the 
securities market.  In other words, due to the asymmetric information, an adverse 
selection problem starts to emerge.        
So, how will those investors who only know the average quality of companies 
react?  They discount the issuance of securities by companies more deeply on average, 
and even those companies that are relatively good would feel pressure to leave the 
market because the price determined by the application of the deeper discount to all 
issuers is too cheap for them and well below the fair value of their securities. 
                                                 
26 Id. 
 
27 Bernard Black, The Core Institutions That Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 BUS. LAW. 1565, 
1567 (2000).  
 
28 Akerlof, supra note 25 at 488.  
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Ultimately, only companies with the worst quality (i.e., companies associated 
with the most egregious form of expropriation) remain in the market in the self-
enforcing process of Gresham’s law – the bad drive out the good, the worse drive out 
the bad, and the worst drive out the worse from the market.  Accordingly, the adverse 
selection problem is reinforced, which leads to market failure and the securities 
market may come close to collapsing if there are no measures to correct this vicious 
circle.29  Consequently, in theory, in a country with poor investor protection, we will 
not be able to observe a significant number of minority shareholders and a well 
developed securities market. 
This undesirable situation in a developing securities market would also be 
expected under the “pecking order theory”30 of the corporate finance.  According to 
this theory, given asymmetric information between corporate insiders and prospective 
investors, firms use internal financing when available and choose debt over equity 
when external financing is required31 because the cost of equity is the highest out of 
all of the financing sources available.32  In a jurisdiction where public investors are 
not well protected, the worsened information asymmetry reinforces equity’s 
                                                 
29  In extreme cases, Professors Khanna and Palepu explain that the market breaks down and no 
transactions occur. Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, The Right Way to Restructure Conglomerates in 
Emerging Markets, 77 HARV. BUS. REV. 125 (1999).    
 
30 As to the pecking order theory, see Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing 
and Investment decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 
187 (1984).   
 
31 Corporate insiders will use internal funds first.  When they need external funds, they choose debt 
over equity.  Thus, funding through the stock market is the last resort to corporations. See generally, 
RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 
496 (8th ed., McGraw-Hill 2008); Myers & Majluf, supra note 30.    
 
32 Gilson, supra note 4. 
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placement at the bottom of the pecking order.33  Therefore, controlled corporations 
should pay a substantially higher price for equity given the bad shareholder protection 
discount.34 
   
3. Reputation and the Product Market-Based Account  
 
Given what the lemons and pecking order theories predict, why in reality are 
corporations in bad-law countries willing to raise capital through the equity market 
(although the frequency is low) and have a significant number of public minority 
shareholders? 35  To explain this phenomenon, Professor Gilson approaches from a 
“product market” perspective rather than from a “capital market” perspective.36  He 
explains that fair treatment of minority shareholders serves as evidence of a 
corporation’s integrity, including its commitment to performing its contractual 
obligations — if controlling shareholders treat minority shareholders fairly, 
controlling shareholders will be viewed as honest trading partners in the product 
market.37  Then, “… [M]inority shareholders play the role of reputational canaries, 
whose value is that they help credibly convey to potential traders that the corporation 
                                                 








37 Since it requires that some extraction of private benefits of control must be given up, this signal is 
costly and therefore credible. Gilson, supra note 4, at 648.  Professor Gilson also says that “… [It is] 
not because the treatment of minority shareholders affects the controlled corporation’s ability to raise 
additional equity capital but because bad behavior will degrade its reputation in the product market.” 
(emphasis is added). Gilson, supra note 4, at 637.  
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is an honest trading partner.”38  In sum, “The decision to have minority shareholders 
then can be explained not by the need for capital …, but as a way of developing 
reputation that will be valuable in the product market …”39  Indeed, this “product 
market-based account” is a creative paradigm shift40 and a path-breaking research 
that attempts to solve Gilson’s riddle.  As with most pioneering theories, however, 
there are some inquiries to which the product market-based account might not give 
clear answers in special circumstances.   
Professors Gordon and Milhaupt raises another question that is associated 
with the product market-based account’s indirect path of a controller’s signaling – if 
the reputation of the controlled corporation in the product market is the primary 
concern of a controller, why would she not show her integrity and honest directly in 
the product market rather than treat minority shareholders fairly in the capital market 
and send off this signal to the product market?41  In addition, I am skeptical about the 
product market-based account’s explanation that trading partners are interested in 
knowing a corporation’s treatment of minority shareholders.  What trading partners 
are concerned about is not a corporation’s treatment of minority shareholders but a 
                                                 
38 Gilson, supra note 4 at 648. 
 
39 Id. at 648.  In this “repeated game”, the controlling family’s fair treatment of minority shareholders 
works as a credible signal of its honesty to its trading partners in “product markets.” Id.  In addition, 
Professor Gilson explains that if the family-controlled corporation does not cheat in easy ways of 
exploiting shareholders, the controlling family shareholders also will not cheat its customers. Id. at 648.    
 
40 The product market-based account is a paradigm shifting explanation since it views a controller’s 
willingness to issue new shares to public investors at a discounted price from the product market 
perspective rather than from the capital market perspective.    
 
41 During the conversation with Professors Jeffrey N. Gordon and Curtis J. Milhaupt, they provided 
this view.   
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controller’s treatment of trading partners. 42   In sum, as opposed to the product 
market-based account, it seems that the reason why a controlling shareholder 
voluntarily protects minority shareholders is not to attract a corporation’s trading 
partners in the product market.  
According to the product market-based account, “… [T]he treatment of 
minority shareholders is visible to a company’s potential trading partners at a low cost, 
perhaps because such exploitation is covered by the local newspapers.”43  A related 
question is whether we can trust the integrity and efficiency of the “local newspapers” 
in developing countries where we are concerned about the integrity and efficiency of 
large corporations and the legal systems.  In fact, the press is often under the direct or 
indirect influence of large corporations in these countries; a corporate group that 
consists of more than a score of affiliated corporations may have a media corporation; 
even if a corporate group does not have such a corporation, the group has enormous 
influence on the existing media industry by sale of advertisements to the press; 
therefore, it is commonplace that local newspapers are biased towards family 
controllers.   
More generally, it might be difficult for potential trading partners in the 
product market to notice the corporation’s treatment of minority shareholder easily 
and effectively.44  Even to large institutional investors that are experts in interpreting 
                                                 
42 A corporation’s treatment of minority shareholders might work as a (indirect) signal showing how a 
corporation would treat its trading partners.  However, this signal is less significant compared to the 
corporation’s more apparent behaviors to its trading partners.  If trading partners know the 
corporation’s trustworthiness through the past transaction records, why do they need to know whether 
the corporation treats its minority shareholders fairly?     
 
43 Gilson, supra note 4 (emphasis is added).   
 
44 Professors Jeffrey N. Gordon and Curtis J. Milhaupt have pointed out this question as well.   
 
                               16
information from public corporations, examining a particular controller’s treatment of 
investors is costly.  By and large, trading partners in the product market are less able 
to interpret capital market information efficiently than institutional investors – trading 
partners are experts on the product market, not on the capital market.45  How then can 
we expect that trading partners recognize the signal at a low cost?    
Furthermore, the product market-based account is not fit for explaining an 
export-oriented developing economy – many successful emerging markets fall into 
this category – where a corporation has foreign trading partners. 46   It might be 
difficult for trading partners in the “foreign product” market to be able to effectively 
observe and examine a corporation’s conduct in the “domestic capital” market.   
One may argue that newspapers in (developed) foreign countries report about 
a controller’s treatment of minority shareholders in a bad-law jurisdiction.  If this is 
the case, then the problem of the independence of the local press is solved – foreign 
trading partners may be able to receive relevant information on a controller’s integrity 
from a distinguished and independent press in a developed country in a more neutral 
manner.   
Perhaps, sophisticated business newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal or 
Financial Times delve into the macroeconomic environment and general 
characteristics of a particular developing country; however, it is highly unlikely that 
those newspapers would examine “one particular” controller’s treatment of minority 
                                                 
45 If a corporate group has its own institutional investor as an affiliated firm, it is possible that other 
affiliated firms in that corporate group (which are trading partners of another corporation) have better 
information on another corporation.  Even in this case, those trading partners (other affiliated firms in 
the corporate group) are not interested in another corporation’s treatment of minority shareholders in 
the capital market but in the corporation’s reputation and integrity in the product market.   
 
46 Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt suggested this question during the conversation. 
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shareholders in one particular developing economy.  Even if they did, the probability 
of these media writing a review of a particular controller is so low that it would be 
rational for her to ignore that possibility.  In sum, a controller in an export-oriented 
developing country hardly has reasonable grounds to send a costly signal from the 
“domestic capital” market to the “foreign product” markets.             
Moreover, imperfect industrial organizations in many developing countries 
matter.  When a corporation is located in a competitive market, the situation is more 
favorable to the trading partners of a corporation since they can use competitive 
pressure among corporations.  However, in a market where a few large corporations 
form a (quasi) monopoly in almost every product market, each large corporation has 
powerful leverage vis-à-vis trading partners – and this is a general contour of many 
developing economies.  Just as corporate law systems are ineffective, competition law 
systems are not effective in these jurisdictions.  Under these circumstances, a 
controller of a large corporation does not have to send costly signals (i.e., about the 
fair treatment of minority shareholders) in order to attract trading partners.  Put 
differently, the prevailing phenomenon in developing countries is often described as 
“Strong Controllers, Weak Trading Partners”47 – it is trading partners (rather than a 
controlling shareholder) that should send the costly signals that they are credible, if 




                                                 
47 This expression is borrowed from Professor Mark J. Roe’s book. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, 
WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (Princeton University 
Press 1994).   
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4. When Cash Flow Rights and Voting Rights Are Significantly Detached     
 
Depending on the pecking order theory 48  (i.e., that the cost of equity is 
substantially higher than the cost of debt to a “corporation” in a developing country), 
the product market-based account concludes that a controller’s decision to rely on the 
equity market is not explained through capital market-based account.49  Rather, it 
hypothesizes that a corporation sends off the signal of its integrity to trading partners 
in the product market (by showing that the corporation treats minority shareholders 
fairly) even if that signaling incurs financial cost (i.e., issuing stocks at the discounted 
price) in the stock market.  Let us explore this reasoning by paying attention to the 
following questions.  When issuing stocks at the discounted price, who will ultimately 
bear the extra financial costs, and how much?  Who makes the decision on the capital 
structure of a corporation, and what matters most to her? 
To be sure, if the cost of equity is much higher than the cost of debt, then a 
corporation has no good reasons to issue new equities in the capital market.  However, 
in fact, the ultimate and real cost-bearer is not a fictitious legal person i.e., a 
“corporation,” 50  but natural persons, “shareholders” of the corporation.  As a 
decision-maker of a corporation, it is plausible that a controlling shareholder does not 
                                                 
48 The trade off theory and the pecking order theory are two competing models to explain the finance 
decisions of firms. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Financing Decisions: Who Issue Stock? 76 J. 
FIN. ECON. 549 (2005).  According to the trade off theory, debt financing has trade off effect – while it 
has tax benefits, it increases financial distress.      
 
49 Professor Gilson explains that the decision of family controlled corporations to issue new equities 
cannot be explained by a capital market perspective but by a product market perspective. Gilson, 
supra note 4. 
 
50 See e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 12 (Harvard University Press 1996) (explaining that “The ‘personhood’ of a corporation is a 
matter of convenience rather than reality); Gilson, supra note 4 (pointing out “A corporation is just a 
long-lived piece of paper on which appears the corporation’s charter.”) 
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care much about the welfare of the “corporation,” which is a collective entity 
consisting of all shareholders, as long as the corporation is sustainable.  Rather, she 
takes into consideration more seriously the cost of equity financing that she has to 
tolerate privately, which is not so high under the (deep) CMS, where her economic 
interest in a corporation is low.   
Let us elaborate upon a controller’s payoff in external finance.  Suppose that a 
controlling shareholder in a developing country manages a corporation, and her 
economic interest in that corporation is α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1).51  She wants to raise X dollars 
through external funding, either debt or equity issuance.  Suppose that the 
fundamental value52 of the debt and equity securities which she considers to issue is 
X and Y dollars, respectively.  Here, Y is larger than X since the cost of equity 
finance is much higher than that of debt finance.  In other words, even if the 
fundamental value of equity is Y dollars, the corporation would receive less, i.e., only 
X dollars – equity would be sold to the public at discounted price as the conclusion of 
the pecking order implies.  Therefore, the additional cost of equity that the 
“corporation” should bear is (Y – X) if the corporation chooses to finance from the 
equity market.  The personal cost of the “controller” in selecting the equity finance is, 
however, only α (Y – X)53 – since α is a number between 0 and 1, α (Y – X) is less 
                                                 
51 For example, when a controlling shareholder’s economic interest is 10, 50, 100 percent, α is 0.1, 0.5, 
1 respectively.     
 
52 In principle, the fundamental value is the price that would prevail if the market consisted entirely of 
rational investors who possessed all available information (i.e., the price that would prevail in a truly 
efficient market). See Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, Artyom Durnev, Law, Share 
Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 331, 349 & n.47 
(2003). 
 
53 As aforementioned, α is between 0 and 1 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1).    
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than (Y – X).54  The rest of the additional expense, which is (1 – α) (Y – X), will be 
borne by all of the public shareholders.   
According to the conventional controlled structure (CS) model, a controlling 
shareholder will take most benefits and costs occurring in any decision and 
transaction made in a controlled corporation because the controller holds the vast 
majority of the cash flow rights.  Here, the economic incentives of the “corporation” 
and the “controller” are generally aligned.  For example, when a controlling 
shareholder holds 90 percent of the economic interest of a corporation (i.e., α is 0.9), 
she should bear 90 percent of the additional cost of capital, i.e., 0.9 (Y – X).  Under 
these circumstances, if a decision-maker of a controlled corporation (i.e., a controller) 
decides to choose equity financing that costs more than debt financing, then it is 
possible that the decision would not be made based on a capital market rationale. 
Instead, it is plausible that a product market rationale – for example, building a 
reputation of integrity in the product market – may justify raising equity capital in this 
more costly way.55            
A limitation of the above explanation is, however, that this view is incapable 
of explaining another subset of controlling shareholder regimes – namely, the 
controlling minority structure (CMS).  Since the cash flow rights and voting rights of 
controlled corporations are significantly separated in the deep CMS, the economic 
incentive of the “corporation” and the “controller” can be substantially detached.  
                                                 
54 α (Y – X) is equal to (Y – X) only when α is 1.  In this case, a controlling shareholder contributes all 
(100 %) of the equity capital to the corporation.        
 
55 Another reason that a controller may rely on equity financing, which costs more than debt financing 
is that the additional cost of equity financing is not out-of-pocket cost, but mostly opportunity cost.  
Since opportunity cost tends to be neglected to a greater extent than out-of-pocket cost, a controller is 
less likely to care about the additional cost of equity financing.   
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When a controller manages a (deep) CMS-style corporation (i.e., when α approaches 
to zero), a controller’s personal burden is only a small part of a corporation’s cost.  
Obviously, a self-interested controller’s criteria for judgment when deciding the 
method of finance is not the corporation’s cost, (Y – X), but her personal cost, α (Y – 
X).  Therefore, the fact that the cost of equity finance is much higher than that of debt 
finance to a corporation does not significantly constrain a CMS controller’s desire to 
raise equity capital. 56   A controlling shareholder can simply make minority 
shareholders pay the most extra cost of equity financing.   
For instance, suppose that a controlling shareholder holds only 5 percent of 
cash flow rights of a business group – which, in fact, is not uncommon in countries 
with the CMS.  When a corporation raises expensive external equity financing, the 
cost will be shared across all shareholders on a pro rata basis.  Hence, when a new 
equity is issued to the public, the controlling shareholder has to bear only 5 percent of 
additional cost.  Almost all of additional cost of equity (i.e., 95%) would be borne by 
minority shareholders. 
In sum, the question at issue should not be why a “corporation” in a 
developing country has minority shareholders even if the cost of equity to a 
“corporation” is substantially higher than the cost of debt by (Y – X).  The more 
precise question is why a “controller” in a developing country has so many minority 
shareholders even if the cost of equity to a “controller” is still (slightly) higher than 
the cost of debt to her by α (Y – X).57  A controller’s choice of equity finance is not 
                                                 
56 Of course, it is true that a controlling shareholder in the CMS should bear some personal cost, even if 
it is not huge compared to a controller in the CS.       
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very irrational even from the capital market perspective when a corporation’s 
collective interest and a controlling shareholder’s private interest are separate (i.e., 
when α is small).  This implies that the product market-based account becomes less 
compelling as an explanation of Gilson’s riddle in deep CMS regimes.   
 
5. Where Are We Headed?  
       
One may argue that, to a controller, equity finance is still more expensive than 
debt financing, even when her economic interest in a corporation is significantly low.  
For instance, if a controller has 5 percent of ownership in a corporation, she has to 
bear 5 percent of additional equity cost.  Even if equity financing is slightly (i.e., 
5 %) more expensive than debt financing, in theory, an economically reasonable 
controller would always choose debt financing over equity financing as long as the 
benefits from equity or debt financing are exactly same – she does not have any 
reason to pay even a dime more for the same.  Then, why in reality does a controller 
issue new shares in the stock market if not frequently? 
  One possible answer is that a controller’s additional cost of equity financing 
is not out-of-pocket cost but opportunity cost.  Since opportunity cost tends to be 
neglected to a greater extent than out-of-pocket cost, a controller may have little 
concern about the relatively small amount of the additional cost of equity financing.  
Another hypothesis – which is a main argument in this Article – is that a controller 
would attain personal benefits that outweigh her personal costs when relying on the 
                                                                                                                                           
57 Please note that α (Y – X) is always less than (Y – X) except when a controlling shareholder’s 
economic interest of the corporation is 100 percent (α = 1).   
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new equity issuance.  In short, equity financing and debt financing are not same to a 
controlling shareholder.  The next two Parts (Parts  II and  III) will explore these 
hidden benefits that a controller can enjoy through issuing equities and having many 
minority shareholders.   
    
 
II. WHY A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER NEEDS 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: THE EMPIRE-BUILDING 
ACCOUNT 
 
This Part explores the characteristics of “empire-building” 58 in developing 
countries and its relations with equity-financing, non-pecuniary benefits, and 
pecuniary benefits including economic rent.  A controller has an incentive to raise 
capital from the stock market and have a significant number of minority shareholders 
because having more minority shareholders is required (see Part  II Section  2) or 
advantageous (see Part  II Section  3 &  4) to the controller.  
 
1. Empire-Building and Non-Pecuniary Private Benefits of Control  
 
In the most literature, a controlling shareholder is assumed to maximize her 
“wealth” – therefore, pecuniary private benefits of control are of primary interest to 
                                                 
58 Empire-building is a phenomenon that a top decision maker of a corporation expands the size of the 
corporation.  As to the phenomenon of empire-building, Professors Shleifer and Vishny explain that 
“Greater costs are incurred when managers have an interest in expanding the firm beyond what is 
rational, reinvesting the free cash, pursuing pet projects, and so on.” Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
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academia.  More precisely, however, a controlling shareholder’s aim is to maximize 
the “utility” arising from non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., social prestige, reputation, 
psychic utilities, and social influence including political power) 59  as well as 
pecuniary benefits.  Empire-building is an important source of utility since corporate 
insiders may create both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits by enlarging the size 
of corporations. 60   In relation to non-pecuniary benefits in particular, there are 
several significant points (which are not covered well by the extant literature) when 
exploring the impacts of empire-building on the corporate governance practices of 
developing countries.       
First of all, in many developing countries, a small number of corporations – 
and as a result, a small number of controlling shareholders – dominate the entire 
economy, 61  which is markedly different from the United States.  For example, 
although Microsoft is one of the largest corporations in the United States, it is too 
“small” to dominate the largest market in the world – as a result, Bill Gates is only 
“one of many” successful business people in the economy.  In contrast, although the 
                                                 
59 As a proverb goes, even in the business world “Money is not everything.”   Professor Gilson should 
be credited as one of the first scholars who seriously take into consideration the importance of non-
pecuniary private benefits of control to a controller. See Gilson, supra note 2.      
 
60 Managers often desire to expand the influence of their business by managing large corporations.  In 
particular, the empire-building account explains that managers in an acquiring corporation tend to pay 
a higher takeover premium to a target corporation since managing a larger corporation is more 
beneficial to managers.  For example, according to Professors Shleifer & Vishiny, “Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny find that bidder returns tend to be the lowest when bidders diversify or when they buy 
rapidly growing firms.” Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 58; Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny, Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions? 45 J. FIN. 31 (1990).  As widely known, to 
managers, an economic rationale of managing a large corporation is that their compensation is related 
to the size of the corporations they manage.  In addition, they can attain more psychic satisfaction by 
ruling a larger “empire.”            
 
61 See e.g., Alice H. Amsden & Takashi Hikino, Project Execution Capability, Organizational Know-
How and Conglomerate Corporate Growth in Late Industrialization, 3 Industrial Corporate Change 
111 (1994). 
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largest corporation in a developing country is not comparable to Microsoft in terms of 
any economic indicator, it may account for a significant portion of a relatively small 
market, and so a handful of business tycoons may command the economy.  Due to 
their unchallenged position, controllers of large corporations in less developed 
countries are highly respected and envied, so that they can enjoy immense reputation, 
social prestige and other psychic utilities (including the “jealousy of others”).  This 
tendency can be amplified more in countries with business “groups” because the 
economic power is more concentrated among fewer controllers who dictate dozens of 
large affiliated firms.  In short, being a controller in a large corporation or business 
group is psychologically rewarding – the larger a corporation (or a corporate group) 
is, the more non-pecuniary benefits a controller can attain.           
In addition, controllers are often treated as national leaders – the 
disproportionately large economic power of controlling shareholders makes it 
possible that, by various means, they have direct social influence and even political 
power among people in the street and the government. 62   In many authoritarian 
regimes, which are usually developing countries, it is true that the government is 
above the business.  However, if a few business people are key players in the market, 
they can talk directly and personally with the government as its leading partners 
despite the hierarchy that is generally established between the government and 
business. 63  In extreme cases, business elites of large corporations could become the 
                                                 
62 To the contrary, managers in large U.S. corporations form strong lobbies as a group, such as 
Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but managers are seldom influential in 
making policies individually.   
 
63 It is true that, in many developing countries, government–business relationships are vertical (with 
government supremacy).  However, as a particular corporation’s (or a business group’s) economic 
importance has grown in a domestic market, the relationship has become more equal even if the 
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highest political figures in their countries.  Notable examples are Taksin in Thailand 
and Berlusconi in Italy – Italy is recognized by many scholars as a country with 
insufficient investor protection,64 which is a jurisdiction at issue of this Article.   
Moreover, the length of tenure as a corporate decision-maker makes empire-
building far more attractive to controlling shareholders in developing countries than 
to CEOs in the United States.  In the United States, in general the term of a typical top 
manager lasts for several years.65  In that sense, a business empire is “leased” to her 
for a short duration.  In contrast, a controlling shareholder in a country with poor 
investor protection usually remains a dictator of a corporation for her entire life, if she 
wishes.  In addition, since a controller’s children will inherit her capacity after she 
retires or dies, the tenure of a controlling family shareholder is practically infinite.  As 
                                                                                                                                           
government’s supremacy is formally maintained.  The case of Korea is noteworthy.  The military 
government selected a handful of business people and supported them since the 1960s.  It was almost 
unimaginable for controllers in business groups to speak out against the government until the end of 
the 1980s.  Nonetheless, it can be said that, even during this period, business elites were influential to 
the government because the government needed economic development in order to compensate for the 
lack of political legitimacy.  Thus, it may be fair to say that the relationship was a “symbiosis” despite 
the formal hierarchy.  Since then, the government has become more captive to large business groups 
because their economic power has grown enormously and the government’s punishment of them could 
adversely affect the macro-economy, which the government has feared.  In addition, democratization 
in Korea limited the government to using its stick (rather than carrot) against business elites.  
Moreover, since an incumbent president is not allowed to run for the next election under the current 
constitution, the power of even an incumbent president in relation to business circle has been 
significantly weakened.  Also, since politicians are in need of campaign funds, they are not free from 
policy suggestions from business elites.  Consequently, large business groups – more precisely, family 
controlling shareholders of these groups – could ultimately speak out against the government.                       
 
64 Although Italy is one of G-7 economies, it has been seen as a bad-law jurisdiction. See e.g., Shleifer 
& Vishny, supra note 58; Gilson, supra note 2.   
 
65 Quoting Booze Allen Hamilton study, Professor Gordon explains that the average CEO tenure in the 
United States in 2001 is 7.3 years.  As for the average fired CEO tenure in the same year is 4.6 years. 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors In the United States, 1950 - 2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Price, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).      
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such, a controller is conceived as “owning” a business empire as her personal 
“property.”66   
In this respect, a top manager of a large public corporation in the United 
States is analogous to a “consul” in ancient Rome.  Although she is influential and 
may be the sole decision-maker in a corporation, she has to leave the office in a fixed 
number of years – ultimately, Rome is not her empire but a people’s republic, even if 
the republic is under her dictatorship.  To the contrary, a controlling shareholder in a 
developing country is comparable to the “emperor” (or “princeps” i.e., the first citizen 
like Augustus) of Rome.  She can stay in office as long as she is alive, and eventually 
her children will succeed her throne – thus, Rome will be maintained as her 
“dynasty.”  In that sense, it may be even improper to call a corporation in the United 
States “empire” as long as dictatorship does not last over one generation. 67     
Under these circumstances, it is obvious that building a larger empire will 
provide more glory (i.e., non-pecuniary private benefits) to a controller in a 
controlling shareholder regime than to a top manager in the dispersed shareholder 
regime.  In addition, it is plausible that a CEO of a widely held firm does not have 
sufficient incentive to expand the territory of the empire in the last period of her term 
since the fruits of her effort will accrue to the next “consul” to whom the current one 
has no biological relationship.  In contrast, in developing countries, a controlling 
                                                 
66  Since a controller holds only a part of shares, it is not precise that a controller “owns” the 
corporation (or corporate group) as her personal “property.”  What I mean here is that from the 
“positive” standard a controller in a developing country in fact wields her decision-making power in a 
corporation to the fullest extent as if a corporation is her own property.   
 
67 While a controlling family shareholder builds a “real empire,” even the most powerful CEO in a 
dispersed shareholding firm rules only a “pseudo empire.”  If a current CEO is not able to appoint her 
child as the next CEO, how can we call this firm an “empire”?     
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shareholder may have an equal incentive to pursue empire-building throughout her 
life since the expanded empire will ultimately belong to her children. 
  
 
2. External Equity Financing is Essential for Empire-Building 
        
So far, I have explained that, in a developing country, a controlling 
shareholder can attain a significant part of non-pecuniary benefits by empire-building.  
How, then, is empire-building embodied in a concrete way, and what are the 
implications of empire-building in relation to equity finance?   
 
(a) A Balance Sheet Analysis       
 
In general, “large corporations” are meant to be “corporations with large 
assets.”68  From an accountant’s perspective, as the size of the assets (i.e., the left side 
of balance sheet) increases, the sum of the debt and equity (i.e., the right side of 
balance sheet) should increase to the same extent since both sides of a corporation’s 
balance sheet are equal.  When external capital is required by a corporation, a 
controlling shareholder may initially prefer to rely on debt (especially bank loans) 
according to the pecking order theory.  During this period, as assets increase, so does 
                                                 
68 What is a “large” corporation?  The definition of a large corporation may vary.  A large corporation 
might be a corporation with a large number of “employees,” large “sales” or “assets.”  Generally, in 
developing countries, the number of employees and the magnitude of sales and assets are highly 
correlated with each other.  In that sense, it can be said that the size of the assets is a good proxy for 
measuring how large a corporation is. In this Article, therefore, when I mean by a large corporation, it 
is a corporation with a large size of assets.    
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debt to the same extent, and thus the size of the equity remains.  Consequently, a 
growth strategy that depends solely on debt financing raises the leverage ratio of a 
business group.  As the debt-equity ratio deteriorates, however, the financial distress 
costs increase.69   
Perhaps, “high” leverage may still be sustainable by a corporation even if it 
creates enormous inefficiency in the capital structure.  However, at some point, a 
controller’s choice to base her empire-building strategy solely on debt financing is 
generally impractical for two reasons: (1) the financial distress costs of “extremely 
high” leverage far exceed the benefits such that the corporation is unable to endure; 
and (2) the debt market would no longer make loans to the corporation due to the fear 
of default even if the corporation is in search of another debt.  Inevitably, a 
controlling shareholder who seeks empire-building eventually “has to” turn to equity 
financing from outside investors in the stock market.   
Under these circumstances, a “repeat controller” whose child is expected to 
inherit ought to be concerned about the next equity issuances – thus, she has an 
incentive to voluntarily protect minority shareholders at least to some degree.  True, 
the frequency of equity issuance is rare in a controlling shareholder system. 70   
However, the interval between equity financing which looks “long” to a dispersed 
shareholding firm’s CEO who can remain in that post for only several years is 
actually “short” to a controlled firm’s dominant shareholder whose time horizon is 
infinite.  In sum, the decision to have minority shareholders can be explained by the 
                                                 
69 According to the trade off theory of debt-equity, financial distress costs would increase as debt-
equity ratio increases.  See Brealey, Meyers, and Allen, supra note 31.   
 
70 See Gilson, supra note 4.   
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need for capital in the stock market (as opposed to the product market-based 
account),71 if analysis takes into consideration dynamism, such as the growth of a 
corporation over a long (or infinite) time horizon through dynastic succession.             
One may argue that although the above explanation is true in some situations, 
a controlling shareholder will not rely on external equities when the new equity 
threatens her interest as a controller; as a controller’s cash flow rights are diluted by 
the new equity issuance, her voting rights are injured as well, and she may eventually 
lose her control over the corporation.  As such, a controlling shareholder would not 
think about the option of going to the equity market in the first place.  Perhaps, this 
argument is relevant in the controlled structure (CS) regime where a typical 
controlling shareholder is required to have a majority of shares to have control over a 
corporation; here, a controller may decide to issue new shares as long as she is able to 
participate in this capital-raising as a dominant investor who can maintain the 
majority shareholder’s position after the new equity issuance; she would not let the 
corporation issue new shares, however, if she does not have enough money to 
participate in the new equity issuance, since new issuance would reduce her equity 
holding under the critical level for control.     
This concern, however, is not very meaningful to a controlling shareholder in 
the controlling minority structure (CMS).  In the CMS, a decrease in cash flow rights 
does not necessarily dilute a controller’s voting rights in the same proportion, since a 
controlling shareholder is effectively able to entrench her control position through 
                                                 
71 “The decision to have minority shareholders then can be explained not by the need for capital …, 
but as a way of developing reputation that will be valuable in the product market…” (emphasis is 
added). Gilson, supra note 4 at 648.    
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voting leverage devices.72  Since a CMS controller’s voting rights are not critically 
reduced by new equity issuance, equity financing is generally seen as a safe means to 
attain the goal of empire-building.     
    
 
(b) A Simple Model: A Controller’s Cash Flow Rights and Empire-Building        
   
To what extent, then, can a controlling shareholder enlarge her business when 
she raises capital from the stock market?  If an algebraic relation between the size of 
assets and a controller’s economic interest exist, what does that tell us?  For these 
answers, suppose that a controlling shareholder contributes money as an equity 
capital to her controlled corporation, where her economic interest in the corporation is 
denoted as α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1).  Her equity capital is worth A dollars.  When the total worth 
of equity capital in the corporation is E dollars, a controller’s personal equity capital 
(i.e., Α) is equal to α E – hence, E is equal to (A / α).  Note that the debt-to-equity 
ratio is expressed as λ (for example, when the debt-to-equity ratio is 400 percent, λ is 
4); then, the size of the assets of the corporation is equal to (1 + λ) (A / α); this 
implies that the size of the assets (which is the proxy of the non-pecuniary benefits) 
and the economic interest of a controller have a reciprocal relationship, given λ and 
A.  Table 2 summarizes above information.  
 
 
                                                 
72 Generally, there are three voting leverage devices – stock pyramids, dual-class share structures, and 
cross-ownership ties. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 18.       
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Table 2: Reciprocal Relationship between Size of Assets and Economic Interest 




- A : the worth of equity capital that a controller contributes to the corporation 
- α : the economic interest of a controller 
- E : the total value of equity capital in the corporation  
- λ : the debt-to-equity ratio of the corporation (e.g., λ = 4 → debt-to-equity ratio = 
400%)   
 
 The Size of the Assets of the Corporation  
 
A = α E         Thus, E = [A / α ] 
Assets = Equity + Debt = E + λ E = (1 + λ) E = (1 + λ) [A / α] 
 
- There is a reciprocal relationship between the size of the assets of the corporation and 
the economic interest of a controller, when the debt-to-equity ratio and the worth of 
equity capital that a controller contributes are constant. 
 
- Since the size of the assets of the corporation is a proxy for the magnitude of non-
pecuniary private benefits of control, the above reciprocal relationship can be 
interpreted in such a way that the non-pecuniary private benefits of control increase 




A numerical example explains the relationship between the size of assets and 
the economic interest of a controller in a more concrete way.  Suppose that there are 
three corporations with three controlling shareholders who invest the same amount of 
money – 50 million dollars in each corporation.  Three controllers hold 100 percent, 
50 percent, and 5 percent of common stocks in corporations, respectively – apparently, 
the first controller runs a CS-style corporation, whereas the third runs a CMS-style 
corporation.73  Then, the total equity of each corporation should be 50 million dollars, 
100 million dollars, and 1 billion dollars, correspondingly.  If each corporation is 
                                                 
73 The second controller runs either a CS or a CMS corporation since her economic interest in a 
corporation is 50 percent.  Remember that in this Article, a CS corporation is defined as a corporation 
where a controller’s economic interest is more than 50 percent.  A CMS corporation is a corporation 
where a controller’s economic interest is less than 50 percent.      
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allowed to finance debts by 400 percent equity-to-debt ratio (i.e., λ = 4), the total 
assets of each corporation will be 250 million dollars, 500 million dollars, and 5 
billion dollars, respectively.   
 Although these three controllers contribute the same value of capital, the third 
controller attains the largest non-pecuniary benefits because she runs the largest 
corporation.  Put differently, in consideration of non-pecuniary private benefits, the 
optimal choice for a controller is to maintain the least cash flow rights in the 
corporation as long as her control is assured, other things being equal.  In addition, it 
is noteworthy that non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., psychic utility of a controller such as 
leadership, fame, reputation, social and political influence) are private benefits – 
although most of the assets (99%) consist of other people’s money (i.e., equity and 
debt) in the third corporation, 74  the only person who is able to consume non-
pecuniary benefits exclusively is the third controller.  The lesson is clear.  Having 
more external capital from the equity market is ultimately beneficial to a controller in 
that it increases the territory (i.e., the assets) of her empire – the more equity capital a 
controller has in her controlled corporation, the more debt she can bring in as well, 
and the larger corporation she would run, which provides more non-pecuniary 
benefits to her. 75      
                                                 
74 In Corporation 3, a controller’s capital contributed is 50 million dollars.  Since she holds only 5% of 
equity, the total amount of equity in Corporation 3 is 1 billion dollars.  If the corporation’s leverage 
level (i.e., debt-to-equity ratio) is 400%, as assumed in this example, this would mean that in addition 
to the 1-billion-dollar equity, there is a 4-billion-dollar debt.  Thus, a controller’s equity (50 million 
dollars) is only 1% of the corporation’s total assets, 5 billion dollars (the sum of equity and debt).      
 
75 Equity financing is essential for attaining more debt from outside.  Suppose that the debt-to-equity 
ratio is maintained at 400%.  Then, when a corporation issues 1 million dollars of new equities, it is 
entitled to have additional 4 million dollars through subsequent debt financing.  As the sum of equity 
and debt increases, the size of firm (the asset size) increases as well – through this empire-building, a 
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In the numerical example, the third controller who has 95 percent of equity 
from minority shareholders has an empire that is 20 times larger than that of the first 
controller who has no minority shareholders at all – according to the aforementioned 
general model, the size of the assets that the first controller manages is (1 + λ) (A / 1), 
whereas that of the third controller is (1 + λ) (A / 0.05), which is equal to 20 (1 + λ) 
(A / 1).  Therefore, ceteris paribus, a controller in a developing country may have an 
incentive to attract minority shareholders since her non-pecuniary benefits are a 
positive function of the value of equity capital she collects from public shareholders.  
Table 3 shows a summary of this point.                 
 
Table 3: Relationship between a Controller’s Economic Interest in a 
Corporation and the Size of the Corporate Empire that She Can Control 
 
 




Amount of a Controller’s 
Equity 
$ 50 million $ 50 million $ 50 million 
Controller’s Economic 
Interest in a Corporation 
100 % 50 % 5 % 








Total Equity of a 
Corporation 
$ 50 million $ 100 million $ 1 billion 
Total Debt of a 
Corporation76 
$ 200 million $ 400 million $ 4 billion 
Total Asset Size 
(Sum of Equity and Debt) 
$ 250 million $ 500 million $ 5 billion 
 
A controller in Corporation 3 can “rule” an empire 20 times larger than that of a controller in 
Corporation 1.  Accordingly, a controller in Corporation 3 can enjoy much more non-
pecuniary private benefits than a controller in Corporation 1 although they both invest the 
same amount of equity in the corporations.   
 
                                                                                                                                           
controller’s non-pecuniary benefits increase.  As a result, equity financing is a solid foundation for 
debt financing and non-pecuniary benefits.   
 
76 The assumption is that the financial leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio is 400%. 
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3. Empire-Building and Inefficiency    
 
Under the ideology of the “shareholder capitalism,” 77  the purpose of a 
corporation is to maximize the wealth of shareholders.  Consistent with this view, 
Milton Friedman opined that to increase a corporation’s profit is indeed its “social 
responsibility.” 78   In reality, however, we often encounter cases where corporate 
insiders put their interest before shareholders’ interest and deviate from the normative 
standard of profit maximization.  In addition, according to the business judgment rule, 
79 directors/managers are required to act only reasonably (not perfectly) in the best 
interest of shareholders.  
The conventional thought on the business economics and corporate 
governance views empire-building as an important example of corporate insiders’ 
aberration from the ideal norm of the shareholder capitalism. 80   Since empire-
building is seen as the reckless expansion of a corporation, it is understood to be the 
strategy of pursuing size maximization by adopting even negative NPV (net present 
                                                 
77 On the other hand, according to another ideology, i.e., “stakeholder capitalism,” the purpose of a 
corporation is to balance welfare of all stakeholders in a corporation such as creditors, employees, 
suppliers, consumers, and even community.      
 
78 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, N.Y. Times Sunday 
Magazine, September 13, 1970.   
 
79 The business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was 
in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 
80 Empire-building of corporations is embodied by diversification through conglomerates or business 
groups.  The prevailing view in the economics, management, and corporate governance is that 
corporate diversification destructs corporate value.  See e.g., Morck et al., supra note 60; Larry H. P. 
Lang & Rene M. Stulz Tobin’s Q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. 
ECON. 1248 (1994).           
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value) projects – hence, the normative standard of the profit maximization is 
sacrificed.  In sum, it is a common sense in advanced economies that unrelated-
diversification depresses profitability.81   
Managers in the United States in the 1960s were preoccupied with 
“conglomeration” – this third wave of M&A is thought to cause a significant level of 
inefficiency in the economy through unrelated-diversification.  Subsequently, the 
fourth wave of M&A in the 1980s was mainly designed to rectify the inefficiency 
problem by divestiture – since then, in running business, “focus” rather than 
“diversification” has been established as the business norm in advanced Western 
countries.82     
On the other hand, in most emerging countries, whether it be the grupos in 
Latin America, the business houses in India or the chaebol in South Korea, business 
groups still play a prominent role in the economy.83  According to established thought 
in advanced economies, these business confederations that are based on unrelated-
diversification suffer great inefficiency as a result of value destruction.  If this 
evaluation is true, all shareholders including a controller are damaged by a 
controller’s reckless pursuit of empire-building.  Why, then, does a controller keep 
unrelated-diversification?  The answer is related to the disproportional features of a 
controller’s personal payoff scheme in empire-building.       
                                                 
81  Tarun Khanna & Jan W. Rivkin, Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups in 
Emerging Markets, 22. Strat. Mgmt. J. 45, 45 (2001).    
 
82  For the general explanation of this Western norm, see e.g., Khanna & Palepu, Why Focused 
Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 41 (1997); Khanna & Palepu, 
supra note 29.            
 
83 Khanna & Palepu, supra note 82.   
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Let us note NPB as the equivalently capitalized dollar value of incremental 
non-pecuniary benefits from empire-building that a controller can enjoy – even if 
market value for non-pecuniary benefits is not set, a controller has her own reserve 
value for non-pecuniary benefits.  It cannot be overemphasized that a controller is 
thought to take all NPB no matter how much economic interest she has in a 
corporation.  On the other hand, the dollar value of incremental inefficiency from 
expanding the empire is defined as INEF.  As opposed to NPB, INEF is shared 
among all shareholders according to their pro-rata economic interest in a corporation.  
As a result, the amount of dollar value in economic inefficiency that a controlling 
shareholder has to bear personally in pursuit of empire-building is α INEF, where α 
is a controller’s economic interest in a corporation (0 ≤ α ≤ 1).  In sum, costs arising 
from empire-building are proportionally borne by all shareholders whereas all 
benefits accrue to a controller.     
From a controller’s point of view, when NPB is expected to be larger than α 
INEF, seeking the expansion of business or unrelated-diversification is personally 
beneficial even if the strategy of empire-building creates no value for all shareholders.  
As such, she would choose to enlarge the empire until the private marginal benefit 
(NPB) is equal to the private marginal cost (α INEF) although it destroys the value of 
the corporation.  Intuitively, a controller may find it more attractive to pursue 
unrelated-diversification or empire-building when her economic interest (α) in a 
business group is small – then it is more likely that NPB is larger than α INEF.  
Accordingly, it is probable that a controller in the deep controlling minority structure 
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(CMS) has greater willingness to pursue the empire-building strategy than a 
controller in the deep controlled structure (CS).   
Notwithstanding, there are some mechanisms in which a controller in the deep 
CMS might not pursue empire-building even if minority shareholders absorb the most 
inefficiency that empire-building creates.  First, when huge inefficiency arising from 
the excessive empire-building would ultimately threaten the survival of the 
corporation, a controlling shareholder cannot help stopping the expansion of her 
business – otherwise, she would lose everything, her empire itself, and would not 
enjoy the private benefits any longer.  For example, as a firm pursues inefficient 
expansion, the firm’s profit gradually decreases.  Nonetheless, it could be still a 
sustainable empire-building for a while.  When the profit of a corporate group reaches 
some point below zero (i.e., when total revenues are less than total costs),84 however, 
a controller should be concerned about whether she keeps to pursue inefficient 
unrelated-diversification.  If the corporate losses accumulate continuously due to the 
reckless empire-building, ultimately the corporation would become unviable soon or 
later.  Even if the incremental personal benefit of a controller from the expansion is 
still larger than the incremental personal cost (i.e., even if NPB is larger than α 
INEF), she does not have a choice to keep building the costly empire.        
Second, given the necessity of continuing finance from the equity market for 
growth, a controller with a long-term horizon has an incentive to be careful in 
                                                 
84 In this sense, a corporation under a controller in the CMS system can be analyzed by the prism of the 
bureaucracy model in the public choice theory (e.g., Niskanen model) – rational bureaucrats have an 
incentive to maximize, rather than optimize, their budgets and/or the size their bureaucracy in order to 
enhance their power.  Similarly, if a controller does not hold a significant economic interest in a 
corporation, she has an incentive to maximize the corporation’s budget (and/or expand the size of 
corporation) irrespective of efficiency.     
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reviewing projects in the first place in order to satisfy the existing and prospective 
shareholders.  If they are not satisfied, existing shareholders would sell their shares, 
and prospective shareholders would not invest their money when a corporation needs 
external capital.  Accordingly, a chain reaction would occur: the economic interest of 
a controller in a corporation (α) would increase; in turn, the total amount of the equity 
capital of the corporation would decrease, resulting in the reduction of debt capital 
and, ultimately, the size of assets.   
If a controller’s time horizon is relatively short, then she would have no 
reason to voluntarily stop pursuing inefficient empire-building as long as her personal 
benefit (i.e., NPB) is larger than her personal cost (i.e., α INEF).  Since the chain 
reaction aforementioned will generally take time, a short-sighted controller would not 
care about the end result of the chain reaction, (i.e., reduction of the size of assets) in 
the “future” which lies beyond her horizon.  However, when a controller deems her 
time horizon as infinite in consideration of family inheritance, the upshot of the chain 
reaction is precisely inimical to the interest of a size-maximizing controller.  With this 
fear, a controller may voluntarily stop inefficient expansion of the business at some 
point even if there is no other constraint in the market.  In sum, to a family controller 
who is “immortal,” growth should be accompanied by profitability since a 
controller’s desire for empire-building are compromised by potential investors who 
pursue profits.   
Indeed, any decision-maker in a corporation wants to be a captain of a “large 
ship.”  Since a top manager in a widely held corporation in the 1960s (when 
conglomeration was a business trend in the United States) served for a relatively short 
 
                               40
tenure, it is probable that she was not much concerned about how well the ship (i.e., 
profitability of a corporation) would fare in the future, after she retired.  In contrast, 
since a family controller in a controlled corporation stays onboard the ship eternally, 
it might be plausible that she would generally have more reasons to care about the 
future condition of the ship – therefore, a controller has sufficient reasons to abstain 
from inefficient empire-building or pursue even efficient one.     
Then, a more positive story may be possible for a business group in a 
developing economy that is built on the unrelated-diversification; in pursuing empire-
building, it is plausible that family business groups with even deep CMS have reasons 
to search for profitability as well as growth; accordingly a far-sighted family 
controller would review more carefully the question of whether the expansionary 
project creates positive NPV; if a controller succeeds, unrelated-diversification does 
not incur the inefficiency cost.  Thus, it is true that the performance of diversified 
business entities is not always poor – the experience of the value-destructive 
conglomeration in the United States might not apply to business groups of other 
countries with unrelated-diversification.85   
 
 
4. Other Benefits of Empire-Building through Diversification  
 
                                                 
85 Khanna & Rivkin, supra note 81 at 45.  In addition, Professors Khanna and Palepu explain “Our 
statistical analysis comparing groups and independent companies in India – and a similar analysis on 
South Korean companies that Tarun Khanna conducted with Yishay Yafeh – suggests that many 
groups add little or no value to their operations.  The largest and most diversified groups, however, do 
add a good deal of value – perhaps because only these groups have the scale and scope to perform the 
kind of functions we have described.” Khanna & Palepu, supra note 82 at 50.        
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In the end of the previous Section, I suggested, it is possible that a controller 
may pursue efficient empire-building in some cases although empire-building tends to 
lead to inefficiency.  Then, what is “efficiency” in empire-building?  In this Article, 
efficient (inefficient) empire-building is defined as a business expansion that is 
beneficial (detrimental) to a “corporation” i.e., the entire shareholders as a group.  
Since the reference group when it comes to the efficiency of empire-building is a 
“corporation” rather than a society, it is noteworthy that efficient empire-building 
might be even harmful to the society.   
Then, what – if any – are the benefits of conglomeration or business groups to 
shareholders?  In other words, what are the sources of efficiency in empire-building?  
One of compelling defenses for forming business groups is that they help to resolve 
the problems caused by the absence or poor functioning of institutions 86  that 
managers in advanced markets take for granted.87  For instance, given that there is no 
efficient capital market in developing countries, business groups can add value by 
having their own “internal” capital markets. 88   Groups can also add value by 
developing a common group brand that represents world-class quality and customer 
service – this type of brand name is extremely valuable in export-oriented 
economies.89  In this respect, it can be said that business groups which are seen as 
indulging in their passion for empire-building may generate efficiency for their 
                                                 
86 The examples of well functioning institutions in developed economies are an efficient capital market 
and an efficient labor market. 
 
87 Khanna & Palepu, supra note 29 at 129.  See also Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, supra note 82.   
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shareholders, as opposed to the well-established Western view that conglomeration is 
inefficient.     
Another justification for empire-building might be that diversification at the 
level of the firm or the group is capable of increasing corporate value by smoothing 
corporate earnings over the business cycle.90  However, by diversifying their own 
investment portfolio, shareholders can smooth corporate earnings in the capital 
market more easily91 – rational investors do not put all of their eggs in one basket, or 
they employ experts in finance who pool money and diversify portfolios on their 
behalf. 92   In that respect, according to the conventional wisdom, unrelated-
diversification loses justification in protecting shareholders and conglomeration 
mainly works for the benefits of only corporate insiders including a controller by 
stabilizing cash flow streams.   
Nonetheless, I argue, there is a possibility that conglomeration may create 
values arising from diversification for public shareholders as well, as is 
counterintuitive to the firm believers of the conventional wisdom.  Traditionally, it is 
presumed that in a controlled corporation, too much of a controller’s capital is tied to 
a corporation.93  As a result, a controlling shareholder may be reluctant to take on 
                                                 
90 WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN, & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON 
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 446 (3rd ed. Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2009).   
 
91 Id. at 446.      
 
92 This “common sense” is less clear in developing countries’ capital markets; (1) often, individual 
investors do not (or cannot) use institutional investors in these underdeveloped capital markets; (2) the 
lack of public information in these economies could lead individual investors to less reasonable 
decisions in determining their portfolios.  In fact, even educated individual investors in developed 
countries sometimes fail to diversify their investment portfolio (when they do not rely on advice of 
financial planners), although they know the principle and benefits of diversification.   
 
93 “[T]here may be costs of large investors as well.  The most obvious of these costs, which is also the 
usual argument for the benefits of dispersed ownership, is that large investors are not diversified, and 
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risky but profitable projects because even one mistake can financially destroy her.  
However, this statement is true only when two conditions are met: (1) a controller 
runs one corporation that is undiversified; and (2) she holds most of the cash flow 
rights (i.e., she runs a CS corporation).  When a controller with a small percentage of 
cash flow rights can utilize voting leverage and set up a business group with dozens 
of subsidiaries (i.e., when a controller runs a CMS corporation),94 she is more willing 
to take on risky and rewarding investments because she feels secured by the cash flow 
stabilization arising from the group’s diversification.   
Then, the logic goes on; true, the direct beneficiary of the cash flow 
stabilization by conglomeration is a controller; however, taking the cash flow 
stabilization as safety net, a controller is likely to be more entrepreneurial and 
adventurous as to risk-taking; as such, non-controlling shareholders also indirectly 
benefit from active investments.  In sum, while a controller with the CS is likely to be 
risk averse, a controller with the CMS is willing to take risk.   
It is normatively true that a controller should take risk for the shareholders’ 
profit and not use shareholders as a pretext for unrelated-diversification since they 
can diversify unsystematic risks away by means of their own portfolio.  From the 
positive standpoint, however, since a controller cannot be forced to take risk, a well-
diversified business group can work as an incentive mechanism for her to be involved 
in more aggressive investments, which is eventually beneficial to minority 
                                                                                                                                           
hence bear excessive risk (see e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985)).” Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 58 at 
758.      
 
94 In short, the sentence means that “when a controller is able to use pyramiding scheme (including 
stock pyramids, dual class stock and intra-shareholding mechanisms) and set up a business group.”   
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shareholders as well unless the associated risks are too high for the expected return to 
be justified.        
Furthermore, in a developing country, it is advantageous for a large 
corporation to enlarge the size of the business with unrelated-diversification by 
obtaining economic rent.  For example, as the assets increases, a large corporation 
may have more opportunities to raise debts at more preferential terms, including cost 
of capital.  Why?  Potential reasons might be as follows: (1) a corporation with large 
assets is able to provide more securities (collateral) for the new debts to lenders in a 
less developed country, who are less able to valuate borrowers’ ability to repay debts, 
compared to lenders in a developed country; (2) as the magnitude of debt increases, 
ironically a corporation may have negotiation leverage vis-à-vis lenders when a 
debtor is large enough;95  or (3) the government simply allocates scarce financial 
resources to only large corporations, rather than best-performing corporations, in the 
form of industrial policies – when capital is insufficient (which is true in many 
developing countries), “can borrow” itself is a special treatment to a corporation that 
desperately needs external financing.  Large corporations might have more chances to 
obtain licenses to new businesses as well – the entry barrier would be set, which 
would provide large corporations with another source of windfall.  In addition, large 
corporations with monopolistic power are more likely to wield negotiation leverage 
vis-à-vis trading partners over the transactional terms.  Moreover, large corporations 
are at an advantage to attain subsidies or other preferential treatments from the 
government.            
                                                 
95 As a finance maxim goes, if you borrow 1 thousand dollars, you are only a “debtor” to a creditor – 
however, if you borrow 1 million dollars, you might be a “partner” to a creditor.   
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Let us refer to the corporation’s benefits of efficiency arising from empire-
building (e.g., economic rent) as BEN.  In relation to BEN, there are three additional 
implications.  First, BEN is economic benefits as opposed to mere psychic benefits.  
Please recall that a controller’s personal economic cost in issuing new equities is 
roughly defined as the sum of α (Y – X) and α INEF.  When BEN is taken into 
account, a controller’s personal economic cost in issuing new equities, the sum of α 
(Y – X) and α INEF can be offset or even outweighed by a controller’s personal 
economic benefit in issuing new equities, α BEN.  In other words, a controller’s net 
“financial” payoff in empire-building is determined by α {BEN – [(Y – X) + INEF]}, 
and a controller can economically benefit from having more minorities if BEN is 
larger than the sum of (Y – X) and INEF.   
Second, when non-pecuniary benefits from empire-building (NPB) are taken 
into account as well, a controller’s payoff in empire-building is determined by NPB + 
α {BEN – [(Y – X) + INEF]}.  With NPB (i.e., non-pecuniary benefits) and α BEN 
(i.e., pecuniary benefits) which are windfalls arising from running a large corporation, 
a controller has the incentive to enlarge the corporation when the sum of NPB and α 
BEN outnumbers the sum of α (Y – X) and α INEF.  For two possible reasons, the 
net effect of α {BEN – [(Y – X) + INEF]} becomes smaller as a controller pursues 
empire-building; (1) BEN and the sum of (Y – X) and INEF can be offset as 
discussed; and (2) α becomes smaller when a controller has more minorities in 
pursuing empire-building (thus, the net effect of α {BEN – [(Y – X) + INEF]} can be 
minimal).  On the other hand, NPB becomes larger as a controller has more 
minorities so that the controller’s net payoff in empire-building, i.e., NPB + α {BEN 
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– [(Y – X) + INEF]} is likely to be positive.  Under these circumstances, the 
controller has an incentive to protect minorities to some degree in order to attract 
them for the purpose of building her empire and enjoying benefits even in the case 
where BEN – [(Y – X) + INEF] is negative.             
Third, empire-building is not always detrimental to minority shareholders – it 
is possible that minorities can expect even some benefits from a controller’s empire-
building.  The conventional corporate governance scholarship has articulated that 
minorities in a developing country are “victims,” since a controller siphons off the 
corporate funds to herself at the sacrifice of minorities.  It is true in itself.  However, 
this view overlooks an important point that (1 – α) BEN – economic benefits in 
empire-building made mainly by a controller’s effort – accrues to minorities.  In other 
words, minority shareholders can free-ride on a controlling shareholder when she 
collects economic rent and share the benefits from enhanced efficiency in empire-
building.  In turn, it can be said that public investors have incentives to be non-
controlling shareholders even if there is some level of tunneling by a controller.                 
Another related topic in empire-building is the principle of being “too-large-
to-fail.”  Even the United States (which is known as a champion of laissez-faire) has 
experienced a series of bailouts for large corporations when a failure of a large 
corporation was likely to affect its economy.  Notable recent examples include 
bailouts of Chrysler, LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management), and AIG (American 
International Group).96  In many developing countries, a large corporation or business 
                                                 
96 Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath, U.S. to Take Over 
A.I.G. in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, The Wall Street Journal 
(September 16, 2008).  This newspaper article states, “Just last weekend, the government essentially 
pulled the plug on Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., allowing the big investment bank to go under 
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group constitutes a higher percentage of the domestic economy than one in the United 
States.97  Thus, there are compelling reasons that the government in an emerging 
market is more afraid of the collapse of a large corporation or business group.  For 
example, the dire consequence of a failure of Salim Group98 in Indonesia would be 
much more devastating than that of the failure of Chrysler (or perhaps even a large 
bank) in the United States.  Aware of the government’s fear of their possibility of 
failing, a large corporation’s controller may conclude that empire-building can 
function as effective “insurance” for its survival.   
In this context, minority shareholders may be used as “hostages” by a 
controlling shareholder.  If a corporation has a broad base of minority shareholders, 
then a corporation and its controller are more likely to be treated favorably by the 
government even if the government–business relationship is initially unfriendly.  For 
example, when a corporate scandal is investigated by an honest and uncorrupted 
government that is not connected with the business, the corporation can convincingly 
argue that more investigation and punishment of the corporation and its controller 
would affect the entire economy adversely – the more minority shareholders a 
controller has in a corporation, the more credible this threat may be.  Hence, a 
controlling shareholder has another reason to attract minority shareholders by 
providing some protection to minorities.   
 
                                                                                                                                           
instead of giving it financial support.  This time, the government decided A.I.G. truly was too big to 
fail.”  
  
97 For example, even though Microsoft is one of largest companies in the United States, its portion of 
the U.S. economy is very small compared to the portion of Samsung Group in Korean economy.        
 
98 Salim Group is considered the Indonesia’s representative business group that has various affiliated 
firms.  It was founded by Sudono Salim.       
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III. WHY A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER NEEDS 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: PECUNIARY PRIVATE 
BENEFITS ACCOUNT 
 
Part  II explained that having many minority shareholders is beneficial to a 
controlling shareholder with respect to empire-building.  Through empire-building, a 
controlling shareholder can attain economic rent as well as non-pecuniary benefits.  It 
partially solves the puzzle of why a controller relies on equity financing even if the 
cost of equity is higher than the cost of debt.  In Part  III, I propose that having more 
minority shareholders is beneficial to a controlling shareholder because it enables her 
to attain pecuniary private benefits more efficiently – i.e., with more equity capital, a 
controller can take more corporate assets illicitly without worsening – or even with 
improving – the welfare of individual minorities (although minorities’ welfare may be 
worsened collectively). 
 
1. Minorities’ Rate of Loss and Controllers’ Rate of Return in Extraction         
 
In a developing country, in many transactions, a controlling shareholder is 
dominant on both sides of transactions and, as a corporate decision-maker, she is able 
to determine the terms of transactions such that they are more favorable to herself at 
the exclusion of minority shareholders.  As such, a controlling shareholder often 
diverts corporate assets from a corporation to herself like a parent company in the 
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case of Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien.99  Unless a controlling shareholder is found 
liable for the breach of fiduciary duty in her jurisdiction – which is not likely to 
happen in bad-law country –, she could earn undue profits from minority extraction 
through self-dealing.  In response, although public investors understand that 
expropriation itself is given, it is natural that they are concerned about the extent of 
controllers’ expropriation. 
   
(a) A Simple Model on a Controller’s Extraction – Rates of Loss and 
Return  
 
What precisely is meant by the “extent” of a controller’s extraction, and how 
is it measured?  Perhaps, the total amount of corporate value that a controller illicitly 
transfers to herself from all of the minorities might be an important issue to minority 
shareholders.  However, rather than the collective damage of all minority 
shareholders as a single group, minorities are more interested in their own individual 
losses that are caused by a controller’s extraction when they invest a particular 
amount of money in a corporation.  In that sense, each minority shareholder is 
concerned with what I will call the minorities’ “rate of loss in extraction,” which 
measures how many cents a controller extracts from an individual minority when this 
individual minority invests one dollar in a corporation.  Against this backdrop, a 
simple model can be induced as follows.   
A controlling shareholder has a certain portion of equities in a corporation – 
whether it is the majority or not – depending on the types of ownership structures.  As 
                                                 
99 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).    
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denoted previously, the weight of her cash flow rights (i.e., a controller’s economic 
interest in a corporation) is α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1).  On the other hand, all minority 
shareholders hold the remaining portion of equities in a corporation – algebraically, 
the weight of minorities’ aggregate cash flow rights can be denoted as (1 – α).  Let us 
denote the total value of equities in the corporation as E.  As a result, the value of 
equities that the controller and minorities hold is expressed as α E and (1 – α) E, 
respectively.  In addition, let us use B to represent the amount of the pecuniary 
private benefits of control that the controlling shareholder extracts from the 
corporation at the exclusion of minority shareholders.  More specifically, B is equal 
to β E; here, β stands for the portion of corporate value that is diverted to the 
controlling shareholder (0 ≤ β ≤ 1).  For example, when a controlling shareholder 
transfers 10 percent of corporate value to herself, the value of β is 0.1.   
Recall that minorities’ rate of loss in extraction measures how many cents a 
controller extracts from an individual minority shareholder when this minority 
shareholder invests one dollar in a corporation.  Thus, minorities’ rate of loss in 
extraction can be expressed as B / [ (1 – α) E ], which is equal to [ β E ] / [ (1 – α) E ].  
Ultimately, it can be reduced to [ β / (1 – α) ].  In order to make this notation simpler, 
let us refer to minorities’ rate of loss, [ β / (1 – α) ] as δ. 
In a developing bad-law country, it is the minority shareholders’ fate that a 
controlling shareholder misuses corporate transactions in order to tunnel corporate 
value.  Minority shareholders may endure a controller’s looting as long as their rate of 
loss in extraction is set within the acceptable range.  However, if a controller 
overreaches and returns after a controller’s extraction (i.e., returns that minority 
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shareholders ultimately attain) falls too low as compensation for minorities’ equity 
investment, then minority shareholders would withdraw their investment from the 
corporation in the next stage.  As such, if a controller wishes to stay in the business in 
the next stage, she cannot determine the rate of loss in extraction arbitrarily.  
Accordingly, the value of δ (i.e., minorities’ rate of loss) is confined up to the 
maximum acceptable rate that minorities can tolerate.     
So far, we have reviewed minorities’ loss rate in extraction.  Now, let us turn 
to a controller’s “rate of return in extraction,” which measures how much a controller 
can extract from a corporation when she invests one dollar as equity in a corporation.  
According to this definition, a controller’s rate of return in extraction is expressed as 
B / (α E).  Since B is equal to β E, a controller’s rate of return in extraction is the 
same as (β E) / (α E).  Again, this formula is reduced to β / α.  Since minorities’ rate 
of loss in extraction, [ β / (1 – α) ], is replaced by δ as aforementioned, β is equal to 
[ δ (1 – α) ].  Therefore, a controller’s rate of return in extraction can be transformed 
into [ δ (1 – α) / α ]. 
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Figure 1: A Controller’s Rate of Return in Extraction 
 
Y axis: a controller’s rate of return in extraction 
X axis: a controller’s economic interest (α) (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) 
Y = [δ (1 – α) / α] 
 
What does this formula imply?  For the purpose of analyzing the effect of the 
different economic interest (i.e., cash flow rights) of controllers under ceteris paribus 
(i.e., other conditions are equal), suppose that for some reasons, two controllers 
impose the same rate of loss in extraction from their minorities.  In turn, this would 
mean that minority shareholders in each corporation would tolerate the same rate of 
loss in extraction and that δ is a constant number.  Accordingly, the rate of return in 
extraction is a function of “one” variable, α (i.e., the portion of cash flow right of a 
controller).  As a result, the formula (i.e., [ δ (1 – α) / α ]) states that as α (i.e., a 
controller’s economic interest in a corporation) decreases, the numerator, δ (1 – α) 
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increases and, at the same time, the denominator, α decreases.  In sum, as α becomes 
smaller, a controller’s rate of return in extraction increases geometrically.  The 
interpretation of this phenomenon is that a controller with small economic interest 
may attain disproportionally more pecuniary private benefits of control than a 
controller with large economic interest, despite the fact that two controllers face the 
same degree of minority shareholders’ resistance, which is measured by δ.  Therefore, 
a controlling shareholder has a financial advantage when she has more minority 
shareholders in a corporation that she controls.100 
                                                 
100  One may argue that the assumption that δ (i.e., minorities’ rate of loss in extraction) is the 
same in the above model is untrue.  Thus, according to this logic, even if α (i.e., the cash flow rights of 
a controller) becomes larger, a controller can maintain the previous level of the rate of return in 
extraction by raising δ (i.e., minorities’ rate of loss in extraction) according to the formula – recall that 
the rate of return in extraction is [ δ (1 – α) / α ].  My responses are as follows.  First, I do not assume 
that δ is same in reality.  What I merely say is that “if” δ is same, a controller’s rate of return in 
extraction increases geometrically as a controller reduces α.  In other words, I use ceteris paribus 
analysis by fixing δ as the same across corporations in order to understand the effect of reduced α on 
the controller’s rate of return.   
Second, it is still theoretically possible that δ is at least similar – if not same – across 
corporations which are comparable in terms of business, risk profiles, or managerial capacity in the 
same economy.  Why?  Suppose that two controlled-corporations (“Corporation AA” and “Corporation 
BB” respectively) are comparable except controllers’ economic interests in corporations.  Then, they 
are likely to generate the similar “rate of return in gross terms” (i.e., the rate of return before 
expropriation by controllers).  The rate of return that shareholders of two corporations care is not the 
“rate of return in gross terms” but the “rate of return after expropriation.”  If the “rate of return after 
expropriation” of Corporation AA is lower than that of Corporation BB, shareholders of Corporation 
AA will move to Corporation BB. Thus, in order not to lose minority shareholders and equity capital, 
both corporations have incentives to maintain “the rate of return after expropriation” at the similar 
level.  Then, please note that the “rate of return after expropriation” is approximately the “rate of return 
in gross terms” minus the “minorities’ rate of loss.”  Therefore, if the “rate of return in gross terms” 
and the “rate of return after expropriation” are similar among comparable corporations, the 
“minorities’ rate of loss” is similar for two corporations as well.  In other words, when a controller 
overreaches and raises δ (i.e., minorities’ rate of loss in extraction) by large-scale looting, minorities 
can withdraw their equity investment from the corporation, which is ultimately harmful to a controller 
who wants to keep a large business empire and maximize the long-run pecuniary benefits.  In this 
context, it can be said that a controller has less discretion (than we have thought) on raising the value 
of δ above a certain critical point.  Put differently, even if the value of δ is not exactly same across 
corporations, it is confined within the narrow range that is tolerable to minorities.   
In that sense, it is relatively relevant to assume that the rate of return in extraction is only a 
function of α and δ is a constant number (although in fact δ is not exactly same across corporations).  
Consequently, from the perspective of a controller, raising δ while having a high value of α is not a 
practical way to maintain the rate of return in extraction.  Moreover, even if a controller can raise the 
value of δ at her full discretion, the effect of δ on the rate of return in extraction is much smaller than 
that of α for the following reason; as α decreases, its impact on the rate of return in extraction is 
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When a corporation relies on equity finance, a controlling shareholder has to 
bear the additional cost (for example, α (Y – X)).  On the other hand, issuing the new 
equity for capital is monetarily (rather than psychologically) beneficial to a 
controlling shareholder when she is able to expropriate minorities; by having more 
minority shareholders, α (i.e., the portion of a controller’s cash flow rights in a 
corporation) will be lowered; as a result of reduction in α, a controller’s rate of return 
in extraction is enhanced so that a controller is able to gain a huge amount of 
pecuniary benefits; moreover, it should not be overlooked that the additional cost of 
equity finance, α (Y – X) decreases as the new shares are issued.101  Another beauty 
of lowering α by raising new equities from the capital market is that a controlling 
shareholder can improve the rate of return in extraction “benevolently” – in other 
words, by having more equity capital from public shareholders (i.e., lowering α by 
raising new equities from the capital market), a controller can collect more pecuniary 
benefits without aggravating individual minorities’ welfare 102  (although the 
minorities’ total welfare would be aggravated by lowering α).  Table 4 summarizes 
notations, formulas and their implications.     
 
magnified through simultaneous changes in the formula’s decrease in denominator and increase in 
numerator; in contrast, the rise of δ – even if possible – increases only the numerator part of the 
formula.   
 
101 It is because α (the economic interest of a controlling shareholder) becomes smaller when the new 
shares are issued. 
 
102 Put differently, even if the “tax rate” on individual minorities remains constant, a controller can 
have more “tax payers” by issuing new shares to public investors.  As a result, a controller can collect 
more “tax revenue” without raising the “tax rate.”   
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Table 4: Minority Shareholders’ Rate of Loss and a Controller’s Rate of Return 
in Extraction  
 
 
 Minority Shareholders’ Rate of Loss in Extraction = B / [(1 – α) E] 
(1) B / [(1 – α) E] = [ β E ] / [ (1 – α) E ] = [ β / (1 – α) ]                 
(2) Put δ = [ β / (1 – α) ] → β = δ (1 – α) 
 
 A Controller’s Rate of Return in Extraction = B / (α E) 
(1) B / (α E) = (β E) / (α E) = β / α                
(2) Since β = δ (1 – α) → A Controller’s Rate of Return in Extraction = [δ (1 – α) / α] 
(3) Therefore, as α decreases, the value of [δ (1 – α) / α] would rapidly decrease due to 
two reasons – the numerator increases and denominator decreases. 
 
(4) It can be interpreted that, as the cash flow rights of controller decrease, a controller’s 
rate of return in extraction increases geometrically. 
 
Note  
- α : the portion of cash flow rights that the controlling shareholder holds  (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) 
- (1 – α) : the portion of cash flow rights that minorities hold (0 ≤ 1 – α ≤ 1) 
- E : the total value of equities of the corporation 
- B : the value of private benefits of control that the controller can extract 
- β : the portion of corporate value that is diverted to the controlling shareholder 
- Thus, B = β E 
- α E : the value of equities that the controlling shareholder holds 
- (1 – α E) : the value of equities that minority shareholders hold 
        
 
(b) A Numerical Example – Rates of Loss and Return in Extraction  
  
A numerical example can make this explanation more concrete.  Suppose that 
there are two corporations, “Corporation A” and “Corporation B,” which are 
managed by “Controller A” and “Controller B” respectively who have more than 
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majority voting rights in each corporation.  These two corporations are comparable in 
terms of characteristics of business, risk profiles, managers’ capacity, and capital 
structure.   
However, Corporation A is a deep CS-style corporation and Corporation B is 
a deep CMS-style corporation.  More specifically, Controller A owns 75 percent of 
all outstanding common stocks of Corporation A of which the total equity is worth 
100 million dollars – thus, her invested capital in the corporation is 75 million dollars.  
On the other hand, Controller B invests 75 million dollars, which is the same amount 
of equity investment as Controller A has.  However, the cash flow rights that 
Controller B holds are only 5 percent due to the pyramiding mechanism.  Accordingly, 
the total amount of equity in Corporation B is 1.5 billion dollars, which is fifteen 
times larger than that of Corporation A.  Subsequently, suppose that these two 
controllers extract corporate value from both corporations and the same rate of loss in 
extraction (δ) is levied on minorities of both corporations.  If the extent of 
expropriation is different in the two corporations, minorities would move from the 
corporation with the higher rate of loss to the corporation with the lower rate of loss.      
Accordingly, the rate of return in extraction of Controller A is expressed as 
(0.25 δ / 0.75), which is reduced to 1/3 δ.  On the other hand, the rate of return in 
extraction of Controller B is calculated as (0.95 δ / 0.05), which is reduced to 19 δ.  
In sum, given the same amount of a controller’s capital contribution (i.e., 75 million 
dollars) and minorities’ rate of loss (i.e., δ), she can attain 57 times more pecuniary 
private benefits of control, if a controlling shareholder is able to reduce her cash flow 
rights from 75 percent to 5 percent by having more minority shareholders.  For 
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example, if minorities’ maximum acceptable rate of loss in extraction is 1 percent, 
while Controller A is able to annually extract 0.25 million dollars (i.e., 1/3 x 0.01 x 
75 million dollars) from the corporation, Controller B can extract 14.25 million 
dollars (i.e., 19 x 0.01 x 75 million dollars).  At the same time, it is noteworthy that 
Controller B’s rate of extraction is enhanced without worsening individual minorities’ 
welfare since the extraction rate that individual minorities face is the same.  In this 
sense, the pyramiding scheme of Corporation B provides Controller B with not only 
voting leverage but also a leverage of pecuniary extraction. 
        
2. A Suggestion on the Corporate Governance Scholarship   
 
It is generally known that there is a reverse relationship between the pecuniary 
private benefits of control from tunneling and a controller’s cash flow rights over her 
corporation.103  Accordingly, it is often said that the controlling minority structure 
(CMS) is more vulnerable to controlling agency problems arising from pecuniary 
private benefits of control than the controlled structure (CS).  As shown in the above 
numerical example, Controller B (a CMS controller whose α is 0.05) extracts an 
amount of pecuniary benefits from Corporation B that is 57 times larger than 
                                                 
103  See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, And Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 395 (1976).  As to a controller’s 
cash flow rights, Claessens et al. explain “We find that higher cash-flow rights are associated with 
higher market valuation, but higher control rights are associated with lower market valuation, 
especially when cash-flow rights are low and control rights are high.  This suggests expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders.” Stijn Claessens et al., Expropriation of Minority 
Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia World Bank Research Paper 2088 (1999).  In addition, an 
explanation of Shleifer and Vishny is informative as well.  They explain that “[L]arge investors might 
try to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of other investors and employees. Their ability to 
do so is especially great if their control rights are significantly in excess of their cash flow rights. This 
happens if they own equity with superior voting rights or if they control the firm through a pyramid 
structure, i.e., if there is a substantial departure from one-share-one-vote (Grossman and Hart (1988), 
Harris and Raviv (1988)).” Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 58 at 758.    
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Controller A (a CS controller whose α is 0.75) does from Corporation A.  Apparently, 
the corporate governance of Corporation B (which has CMS) is 57 times worse than 
that of Controller A (which has CS), if the degree of poor corporate governance is 
measured by the “magnitude” of a controller’s expropriation, which is the same as the 
total amount of minorities’ loss.  
However, this view (what I call “magnitude account”) overlooks an important 
point; namely, that “victims” (i.e., minority shareholders in less-developed countries) 
generally do not care about the total damages of the “class of victims” but rather their 
individual damages, which is measured by minorities’ rate of loss (δ).  From 
individual minorities’ perspective, the corporate governance of the CMS might be by 
far better and more constructive than expected; as shown in the example, when the 
total expropriation in Corporation B is 57 times larger than that in Corporation A, in 
fact, minorities’ rates of loss in Corporation A and B are same; then, it can be said 
that the quality of corporate governance in Corporation A and B is the same to 
individual minorities, which is striking to those who pay attention the total amount 
that a controller tunnel from a corporation to herself.  Moreover, if Controller B 
siphons the corporate value less than 57 times (e.g., 50 times) than Controller A does, 
this means that Controller B benevolently “discount” minorities’ rate of loss in 
comparison with Controller A104 – in this case, the CMS firm can be said to be better 
than the CS firm in terms of welfare of individual minorities.105          
                                                 
104 There are a few reasons why the rate of loss in extraction in Corporation B might be less than that in 
Corporation A.  First, Controller B may have an incentive to charge minority shareholders a smaller 
rate of loss in extraction because she is 57 times more efficient at extracting pecuniary private benefits 
from minorities than Controller A.  A reduction in rate of loss in extraction does not hurt Controller B 
very much.  Rather, it may function as a cheap insurance premium to keep the “golden goose” (i.e., 
Corporation B as money machine) alive for a longer time because minority shareholders would not 
leave Controller B if the rate of loss in Corporation B were lower than in Corporation A.  Second, the 
 
                               59
 
IV. WHY DO MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PARTICIPATE IN 
CAPITAL MARKETS WITH POOR PROTECTION? 
 
In Parts  II and  III, I analyzed, from the standpoint of a controlling shareholder, 
why she has incentives to “voluntarily” – even if there is no legal requirement – 
accept the minimum level of minority protection and attract more minority 
shareholders to invest in her controlled corporation even though the cost of equity is 
high to a controller.  Now, it is fair to ask why, from the standpoint of minority 
shareholders, minority shareholders “voluntarily” participate in a capital market 
where they are expected to be expropriated by a controlling shareholder.   
 
1. Controlling Shareholders – “Stationary” or “Roving”106 
                                                                                                                                           
large-scale stealing in a corporation with a CMS system may create public outcry and thereby pressure 
the government agencies or courts to take actions against the corporation and its controller.  In the 
above example, Controller B extracts 14.25 million dollars while Controller A extracts 0.25 million.  
Without sophisticated information transmission mechanisms, in a less-developed economy, market 
participants might not recognize the 0.25 million dollar extraction in one corporation, while they can 
more easily recognize an extraction of 14.25 million dollars.  It is true that a large corporation (in this 
example, Corporation B, which is 15 times larger than Corporation A) in a less-developed country is 
politically powerful and colludes with the government.  However, when a controller in a large 
corporation is continuously involved in a series of large-scale thefts in terms of absolute amount (even 
if minorities’ rate of loss is modest), the government might be unable to simply ignore the public 
outcry against the controller.  Therefore, in reality, it is possible that Controller B would extract less 
than 14.25 million dollars.  As a result, it is plausible that the real minorities’ loss rate in extraction 
imposed by Controller B, who is a CMS controller, is less than that imposed by Controller A, who is a 
CS controller.  
 
105 I do not say that the “magnitude account” is wrong.  What I argue is that we need to see both 
aspects, the magnitude of tunneling by a controller and the individual loss of minority shareholders.  
The conventional view on the corporate governance focuses only a controller’s magnitude of tunneling 
(i.e., the total losses of all minority shareholders) and does not take into account an individual minority 
shareholder’s loss from bad corporate governance.         
 
106  For the more explanation, see Sang Yop Kang, Controlling Shareholders – “Roving” Or 
“Stationary” (working paper).    
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In explaining the government systems, Professor Olson created the terms 
“roving bandits” and “stationary bandits.” 107   “Roving bandits” expropriate 
everything possible from victims – because roving bandits will not come to 
expropriate victims again, it is their interest to take every bit of their victims’ wealth.  
In contrast, “stationary bandits” have an encompassing interest in the continuing 
prosperity of their victims and so will take less than the roving bandits.108  As a result, 
people would exhibit more acceptance or tolerance for the stationary bandits than for 
roving bandits, irrespective of the fact that, by definition, both are essentially the 
same.109     
According to the conventional corporate governance view, a controlling 
shareholder regime in developing countries is systematically inferior to the dispersed 
shareholder regime. 110   In particular, this view emphasizes tunneling where a 
controlling shareholder can illicitly transfer substantially all assets from a corporation 
to herself if she wishes.111  Nonetheless, having the capacity does not necessarily 
mean using that capacity.  In this context, there are at least two categories of 
controlling shareholders in bad-law jurisdictions: (1) those who use their capacity to 
                                                 
107 See e.g., MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST 
DICTATORSHIP (Basic Book 2000); Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1993).     
 
108 See Olson, supra note 107; see also Noshab, Book Review on “Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing 
Communist and Capitalist Dictatorship” by Olson 
(http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002_files/no_2/review/5r.htm).   
 
109 See Olson, supra note 107 (both pieces of Olson); see also Noshab, supra note 108. 
 
110 See e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 1.    
 
111 See generally, Johnson et al., supra note 7.   
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plunder minorities (i.e., “roving controllers”); (2) and those who do not, even though 
they can (i.e., “stationary controllers”).     
Suppose that a controller has a short time horizon.  Then, it is in her best 
interest to loot quickly her controlled corporation to the fullest extent via a massive 
one-shot transaction.  As a result, she does not have any reason to come to 
expropriate minorities again because they do not hold any wealth in a corporation – 
this is why she is referred to as a “roving controller.”  While a controller may realize 
a substantial amount of the pecuniary benefits at present, she would lose future 
opportunities of expropriating minority shareholders who are defrauded by her large-
scale tunneling.  A capital market where roving controllers constitute the majority 
would not be developed well since public investors would not participate in the 
market as minorities.     
In contrast, a controlling shareholder with a long time horizon has an 
encompassing interest in the continuing prosperity of minority shareholders.  Initially, 
a controller may compare the present value of cumulative extractions in the long run 
and other benefits (e.g., psychic utilities) with the amount of a one-shot tunneling.  If 
the former (i.e., the present value of cumulative extractions in the long run and other 
benefits) is larger than the latter (i.e., the amount of a one-shot tunneling), then she 
will choose a form of theft by taking only a part of corporate value periodically – that 
is why she is referred to as a “stationary controller.”  Then, she “voluntarily” abstains 
from siphoning off substantially all of the corporate assets to herself, even if she has 
the capability to do so at present.  However, it is not because she is benevolent by 
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nature, but because she expects that being a stationary controller is ultimately more 
beneficial to her than being a roving controller.112    
For example, a stationary controller has an incentive to choose “partial” 
extractions in a way that optimizes the “tax revenue” (if we analogize a controller’s 
stealing as “taxation”) in the long run; tax revenue is the product of a tax rate and 
taxable income; a high tax rate does not necessarily generate high tax revenue, since 
tax payers have less incentive to work (i.e., taxable income will shrink).  The same 
logic applies to the relationship between an extraction rate and the amount of 
tunneling (i.e., pecuniary benefits); the amount of tunneling is equal to the product of 
an extraction rate and the extractable corporate value; thus, a high extraction rate does 
not necessarily generate a high amount of tunneling, since non-controlling minority 
shareholders would withdraw their investments (i.e., extractable corporate value will 
shrink).  As such, a rational stationary controller sets the optimal extraction rate 
carefully (generally at a moderate level) in order to maximize her “tax revenue.”113  
Faced with a rational stationary controller’s benevolent extraction, minority 
                                                 
112    For example, suppose that a controller can extract 100 million dollars at present if she takes a 
one-shot transaction to the total detriment of minority shareholders – after this transaction, the 
corporation will be left as “shell” without any valuable assets.  On the other hand, she can extract 5 
million dollars annually from the corporation by means of ongoing tunneling.  Then, she will find that 
she is better-off being a stationary controller in 20 years (if the discount rate is assumed to be zero for 
the sake of simplicity).  Therefore, she will choose to be a stationary controller as long as she believes 
that she can maintain ongoing extractions for more than 20 years.  For the more explanation, see Kang, 
supra note 106.  
         In addition, if the utility of the non-pecuniary benefits for a controller and her family is taken 
into consideration, she will find that looting based on a one-shot extraction is less attractive.  For 
example, suppose that the amount of looting from a one-shot transaction is 100 million dollars and the 
present value of sum of extractions is 80 million dollars.  As long as the utility of non-pecuniary 
benefits is evaluated to be more than 20 million dollars, a controller will be willing to be a stationary 
controller even if being a roving controller is financially more advantageous to her.  For the more 
explanation on stationary and roving controllers, see Kang, supra note 106.  
 
113 For the more explanation on a rational stationary controller’s “tax policy,” see Kang, supra note 
106.  The presence of non-pecuniary private benefits of control may alter a controller’s tax policy to 
some degree.       
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shareholders are willing to invest in a corporation run by a stationary controller as 
long as the return on the stock after “tax” is comparable to the return on investments 
in other opportunities.114   
In sum, prospective investors in the capital market prefer a stationary 
controller who is patient and benevolent to a roving controller who is short-sighted 
and ruthless.115  However, an important problem is that they do not know whether the 
controlling shareholder that they are dealing with is stationary or roving.  Under these 
circumstances, prospective investors would hesitate to participate in the capital 
market even when a truly stationary controller issues new equities due to the fear of 
dealing with a roving bandit.  Knowing this, even a sincere stationary controller 
might be discouraged to plan to issue new equities and have public minorities.  Then, 
how can a controller make prospective investors believe that she is a stationary 
bandit? 
In this context, a controlling “family” shareholder has an advantage.  Since a 
controlling family shareholder has an infinite tenure and is deemed to be a repeat 
player, prospective investors would be more likely to trust her as a stationary 
controller – investors may understand that the current family controller is unlikely to 
kill the proverbial golden goose due to the hope that it will continue to lay eggs for 
her children eternally.116   To be sure, it is impossible for investors to know the 
                                                 
114 For the more explanation for the returns of stock and other asset classes and their impact on the 
investment decision by public investors, see infra (Part  IV Section  2).   
 
115 A stationary controller is patient and benevolent because her time horizon is long and she relies on 
the partial extraction from minority shareholders.  In contrast, a roving controller is short-sighted and 
ruthless because her time horizon is very short and she depends on a large-scale one-shot tunneling 
from the corporation.   
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“intent” of a controller whether she wishes to be roving or stationary.  By reviewing 
the corporate governance “structure” (e.g., how shares are spread among family 
members, whether children of a founder are managers or directors a corporation), 
however, they can discover whether a given corporation is a “family” business.117  In 
other words, rather than scanning the mentality of the controller, it is more efficient 
for minority shareholders to observe the appearance of a corporation.118  When the 
appearance of a corporation turns out to be a family corporation, investors are more 
likely to be convinced that they deal with a repeat player, i.e., a stationary controller.  
Subsequently, investors would participate in the equity market in order to gain returns 
– games are likely to be cooperative between minority shareholders and a family 
controller.                    
  
2. Imperfect Alternative Investments119 
 
One may argue, if prospective investors are extracted by controlling 
shareholders, then they may avoid investing in the stock market, and may seek 
investment opportunities from alternative asset classes, such as bank deposits, debt 
securities, and real estate.  Theoretically, this phenomenon would be more apparent 
when investors’ risk-adjusted return of equity is lower than that of alternative 
                                                                                                                                           
116 Of course, there are many circumstances that could make it difficult for a controller to be a 
“stationary controller.”  In addition, I do not mean that a controlling family shareholder solves all the 
problems in relation to a roving control structure.  For the more explanation, see Kang, supra note 106.    
 
117 Kang, supra note 106.  
 
118 Id.   
 
119 In this Article, “alternative investments” mean investments in anything other than the stock.   
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investments.  Nonetheless, there are several perceivable reasons why prospective 
minority shareholders are unable to totally shun investing in the stock market. 
In general, while bank deposits are a very safe investment, they generate low 
returns.  Although the risk-adjusted return of bank deposits is higher than that of 
equity investment in some cases, investing solely in bank deposits is not a workable 
option for investors who need to meet a certain amount of “absolute” return.  To this 
end, at least some potential investors still choose equity investment that would 
generate higher return in absolute terms despite the fact that its “risk-adjusted return” 
is lower due to controllers’ tunneling.  As a result, investors have to reallocate their 
wealth from some bank deposits to stocks.  Investment in debt securities, such as 
government and corporate bonds, has similar problems.   
In addition, if equity investment in a developing country is impaired due to 
controllers’ extraction, it is likely that investment in other assets is not perfect and 
unscathed as well in that jurisdiction.  For example, when laws do not protect 
minority shareholders, creditors of corporations are likely to be subject to a similar 
risk.  In that case, it is even possible that the risk-adjusted return of the alternative 
investments is less than that of stocks – hence, investors have good reason to 
participate in the stock market as minority shareholders.       
Real estate is often seen as an attractive alternative to potential investors who 
are interested in the equity market.  However, the problem is that since the value of 
specific real estate generally accounts for the huge portion of individuals’ wealth to 
many investors,120 they are exposed to huge idiosyncratic risk arising from real estate.  
                                                 
120 In general, the value of real estate is large.  Thus, it is likely that the value of real estate accounts for 
a large part of an investor’s personal wealth.  For example, if an investor’s “one” real estate constitutes 
 
                               66
Even worse, real estate is a very illiquid asset – thus, in an emergency, investors 
should take risks to sell real estate at a deep discount.  For these reasons, investing in 
real estate is not fit for many ordinary people like most potential minority 
shareholders, who are not sufficiently wealthy to deal with aforementioned 
difficulties.  In developed economies, these problems may be well solved by the 
liquid and thick mortgage markets and indirect real estate investment tools such as 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).  However, this has not been the case for most 
developing economies until the recent past.   
In sum, equity is not the only imperfect asset in a country with insufficient 
investor protection, and investing in assets other than stocks is not always feasible to 
investors.  The “fruits” (i.e., investment opportunities in various assets) dangled in 
front of potential investors in a bad-law country do not consist of one “mediocre 
apple” (i.e., scathed equity securities) and the other “good orange, banana, and 
pineapple” (i.e., unscathed bank deposits, debt securities, real estate, etc) – rather, all 
fruits are mediocre (i.e., every asset class is scathed to some degree).  Therefore, 
investors should choose some optimal combination among mediocre fruits.  In that 
sense, even if returns from investment in stocks are impaired by controllers’ 
expropriation, stocks remain a viable investment option for potential investors.   
An overarching principle of finance is diversification between classes of 
assets in order to eliminate unsystematic risks.  This is another reason why putting 
equities in an investment pool is beneficial to investors even when alternative 
investments are sound and feasible.  As known widely in investment community, the 
                                                                                                                                           
70 percent of her personal wealth, the adverse effect on the value of that real estate would impact the 
investor’s total wealth significantly.          
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investment ratio between asset classes varies according to factors that affect each 
individual’s willingness and capacity to take risk in investment.  For example, if an 
investor is young, it is recommendable to take more stocks (or risky assets) because 
she would have other incomes (e.g., salaries) and a long time horizon to recover 
potential loss from relatively risky investment.121  As such, when a particular country 
has many young and active investors, it is possible that the equity market can flourish 
more.  Moreover, stock is better protected from the adverse effects of inflation than 
most debt securities because the cash flows of debt securities are fixed, whereas those 
of stocks would increase as the general price level increases.122  In that sense, in a 
country with high inflation, stocks are likely to be more desirable than debt securities 
to investors.   
One may argue, if domestic stocks are scathed by greedy controllers, investors 
may invest internationally.  If it is true, investors would not have to buy domestic 
stocks at all.  In reality, however, many jurisdictions with poor law have established 
regulations on the outflows of investment by their citizens.123  In that case, domestic 
capital has been kept captive.124  More interestingly, even in developing countries 
where investments in foreign assets are allowed, domestic investors would find it 
difficult to invest significantly in assets abroad.  Why?   
                                                 
121 To the contrary, if an investor is old, it is more recommendable for her to take less risky fixed 
income securities (e.g., treasury bonds or corporate bonds with investment grades) because generally 
she does not have a stable income source like salaries and her horizon is too short to cover the loss 
arising from the failed risky investment.         
 
122 This is widely known among experts in the financial market.  
 
123 For example, Korea and India restricted international capital flows.  As it is the case for Korea, 
Taiwan completed the liberalization of international capital flows only at the end of the 1990s. Rui 
Castro, Gian Luca Clementi & Glenn MacDonald, Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and 
Economic Growth, 119 Q. J. OF ECON. 1131 (2004).   
 
124 Id. at 1162. 
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In principle, international investment is beneficial to investors because adding 
international assets enhances risk-adjusted return. 125   However, since domestic 
investors do have insufficient information on potential foreign investments, they 
hesitate to invest in assets abroad.  In addition, “familiarity bias”126 reinforces this 
tendency of domestic investors not to invest foreign assets with which they are 
unfamiliar, even though those assets provide higher risk-adjusted return.  Moreover, 
since international investment works as a supplement to domestic investments, it is 
more appropriate for affluent people whose wealth needs additional diversification 
after investing the vast majority of their assets in the domestic market.  Many 
potential non-controlling shareholders in developing countries are mostly middle 
class investors who would not have enough capital to diversify beyond domestic 
investments.127  Even worse, the currency risks posed by international investment are 
another obstacle for small individual investors to overcome, if they do not have 
sources to hedge against these risks.128   
These problems would be more severe when undeveloped capital market in a 
developing country does not provide small individual investors with efficient 
                                                 
125 For the explanation on the “international diversification,” see e.g., Haim Levy & Marshall Sarnat, 
International Diversification, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 668 (1970).          
 
126 “Familiarity bias” is the tendency that investors invest the vast majority of their capital in assets and 
securities that they are familiar with.    
 
127 To be sure, there are international diversification benefits to investors investing in equity markets 
abroad.  However, the requirements of international diversification are the willingness and ability to 
take the greater risks that arise from international investment.  Wealthy investors in developed 
countries are able (and willing) to be involved in international diversification, but many minority 
shareholders in developing countries are not.    
 
128 Until recently, the success of international investment has depended heavily on the performance of 
foreign exchange in a country wherein investors invest.  Since the volatility of foreign exchange has 
been great, the risk associated with investing in international investment has been large.  Thus, 
international investment has required investors to have more willingness and capacity to take risks.   
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collective investment tools, such as funds that specialize and diversify in foreign 
equities.  Consequently, unless controlling shareholders extract to extreme degree (i.e., 
unless controllers are roving), potential investors have an incentive to participate in a 
domestic capital market as non-controlling shareholders.         
    
3. Behavioral Finance Problems of Minority Shareholders 
 
Modern standard finance theories are built on the assumptions such as 
“rational investors,” “perfect information,” and “no transaction costs.”129  However, 
the real-world experiences and psychological research of human behavior has shown 
that these assumptions do not often hold.130  Realizing the limitations of modern 
standard finance, financial economists and cognitive psychologists have proposed 
alternative theories of behavioral finance.  As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
have argued, individuals’ cognitive biases can lead them to systematically misassess 
an asset’s value. 131   These new theories of behavioral finance can provide an 
important implication in my thesis – having been exposed to behavioral financial 
problems, public investors in developing countries are likely to invest in domestic 
                                                 
129 Based on these assumptions, modern standard finance relies on three theoretical pillars – the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), the Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance Propositions, and the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (“EMH”). Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias” (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=462786) at 5.  
As to the EMH, Professor Jensen famously states that “the efficient market hypothesis is the best 
established fact in all of the social sciences.” Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding 
Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95 (1978). 
 
130 For example, Herbert Simon describes that individuals are “intendedly rational, but only limitedly 
so.” HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, xxiv (2nd ed. 1957).       
 
131 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 129 at 15; JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).   
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equity markets as non-controlling shareholders even if extraction by controller 
renders the shares unworthy of investment.  Here is the further analysis.     
Since most individuals believe that they are more competent and skillful than 
they actually are, 132  they trade aggressively in stock markets.  Due to this 
“overconfidence”133 investors in a bad-law country may purchase stocks even if those 
stocks are subject to tunneling risk.  For example, they believe that they are able to 
earn extra profits through active trading by such measures as selling and buying 
shares in a very short period (by buying lowest and selling highest).  In addition, 
rather than being risk-averse, investors tend to be “loss-averse,”134 thus they hold the 
losers on for too long.  Furthermore, names of large conglomerates appear in the 
national media every day, and the advertisements of those conglomerates repeatedly 
influence people in domestic markets – “familiarity bias”135 holds.  “Home bias”136 
(which is related to familiarity bias as well) is another explanation for why investors 
prefer investing in large conglomerates in domestic markets rather than foreign ones 
or small companies that are not highly exploited by managers or controllers.  Once 
                                                 
132 Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Courage of Misguided Convictions, 55 Financial Analysts 
Journal 41 (1999). 
 
133  “Overconfidence” is another behavioral phenomenon, which is against the standard finance’s 
assumption that an economic person is rational.       
 
134 In the standard finance, an economic person is risk averse.  However, in reality, many people follow 
loss-aversion rather than the risk-aversion. See generally Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Loss 
Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039 (1991).  
 
135 “Familiarity bias” is the tendency that investors invest the vast majority of their capital in assets and 
securities that they are familiar with.     
 
136 “Home Bias” is the tendency that investors invest the vast majority of their capital in assets and 
securities in domestic countries.  It is related to “familiarity bias.”     
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they purchase shares, investors are often subject to “status quo bias”137 even if the 
performance of shares is disappointing.   
Moreover, minority shareholders often play the role of “noise traders” – they 
make investment decisions that deviate from those that theory would predict of 
rational investors. 138   Investors might invest in shares issued by large family 
conglomerates based on fads and sentiments even if rational information indicates 
that those firms are subject to high risk of expropriation.  Besides, when “some” noise 
traders earn high returns, many other investors might imitate them, ignoring the fact 
that those some successful traders took more risk and just got lucky.139  As a result, 
more investors may enter into this gamble in the stock market casino as non-
controlling shareholders.     
To minority shareholders in a country with insufficient investor protection, 
buying shares of domestic family-controlled corporation might be similar to buying 
lottery tickets, where buyers lose on average.  However, as we have seen many 
participants in lottery, many potential investors are willing to participate in the stock 
market even if the risk-adjusted return is below the level where it should be.  In 
addition, whereas all participants in lotteries know that they will lose on the average, 
most potential minority shareholders in stock market believe that their expected 
return is positive even if unfair games are manipulated by controllers.  Consequently, 
                                                 
137 “Status quo bias” is the tendency of investors to maintain their portfolio even if the performance of 
their portfolio is disappointing.    
 
138 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 129 at16.  
 
139 Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 
19 (1990).    
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where the problems of behavioral finance are severe, prospective investors may have 
incentives to participate in domestic equity markets as minority shareholders.                                      
 
4. Minority Shareholders Are Looted, But They Buy Shares at Discount 
 
In this Section, I explore the counterintuitive possibility that minority 
shareholders actually might not be damaged financially in a bad-law jurisdiction.  
Professor Coffee put forwards a very interesting and creative account – because the 
public shareholders purchased their shares at a “bargain” price, which reflected the 
likelihood of future wealth expropriation by the controlling shareholder, they would 
receive an undeserved “windfall”140 if legal rules were revised to entitle them to a 
proportionate share of corporate assets and distributions.141  In other words, even if 
the price of shares that minority shareholders hold is lower than their fundamental 
value due to controllers’ extraction, minority shareholders would not suffer since they 
bought those shares at a depressed price for the same reason.  In all likelihood, 
                                                 
140 Let’s take example (from articles of Professors Coffee and Black).  Once a company issues shares 
at a discount, the insiders may feel entitled to appropriate most of the company's value for themselves.  
They will resist any change in legal rules that limits this opportunity.  An example can illustrate why 
insiders can feel this way.  Assume that Company A has fifty outstanding shares worth $2 each (for a 
total value of $100), all held by insiders.  Outside investors may be willing to pay only 50¢ per share 
for additional shares, both because the investors don't know the company's true value and because they 
expect insiders to appropriate most of whatever value exists.  Suppose that Company A issues fifty 
additional shares at this price.  Company A now has one hundred shares outstanding, fifty shares held 
by insiders and fifty held by outside investors, and a total value of $125.  If the insiders keep only 50 
percent of the company's value, they have cheated themselves.  Their shares will be worth only $62.50, 
while the outside investors' shares will be worth $62.50--far more than the outside investors paid.  The 
insiders' rational response is to self-deal enough to capture at least 80 percent of the firm's value--$100 
out of the total value of $125.  They will not feel that they have cheated anyone by doing so, and will 
fight legal and institutional reforms that might prevent them from taking what they see as their fair 
share of their company's value.  This explanation is excerpted from Professor Black’s article. Bernard 
S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
781, 807 (2000).  Also, it should be noted that this example is adapted from Professor Coffee’s 
explanation. Coffee, supra note 15 at 657~659.    
 
141 Coffee, supra note15 at 660. 
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minority shareholders would take into consideration the controllers’ appropriation as 
a market risk that is already reflected in determining the price of shares.   
As a result, minority shareholders are not systematically damaged by the 
controllers.  As Professor Coffee explained, from the perspective of “efficiency,” it 
may be clear that the economy will do better if the minority is protected, but from a 
“normative” perspective, the respective entitlements of the majority and the minority 
can be debated endlessly.142  In this regard, Professor Black further made a bold 
claim that once a company issues shares at a discount, the insiders may feel entitled to 
appropriate most of the company’s value for themselves.143    
Although I basically agree with this insightful opinion by Professor Coffee, I 
think that additional analyses are needed.  First, if minority shareholders invest in a 
diversified portfolio of different stocks, the idiosyncratic appropriation risk of each 
company would be diversified away – only systematic appropriation risk remains, and 
minority shareholders are compensated for that risk through a discount.  Nonetheless, 
it might be true as well that many small public investors in developing countries have 
not had diversified portfolio; perhaps, they do not know the benefits of diversification 
due to relatively poor education on personal finance in those jurisdictions; or, in some 
developing countries, there are not many institutional investors that can collect 
individuals’ investment and diversify on behalf of small public investors.   
Second, the volatility of expropriation by a controller is important to public 
investors.  Suppose that there are three investors, “A,” “B” and “C” and they buy and 
                                                 
142 Id. at 660. 
 
143 Black, supra note 140 at 807.  
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sell shares of Corporation “XYZ” which is controlled by a controlling shareholder.  
Initially, A holds shares (at time 1), and sells them to B (at time 2), and finally, B 
sells them to C (at time 3).  Suppose that the controlling shareholder of XYZ extracts 
firm value “partially” at time 1 and time 2, but she appropriates almost all of the firm 
value C holds the shares (at time 3).  A lenient level of extraction has been already 
reflected in the share price in the form of a discount when A and B purchased shares, 
thus A and B might not be financially damaged.  However, C would be seriously 
injured because the extraction at the time of sale is higher than at the time of purchase 
(i.e., buy high and sell low).  If the ex post degree of looting is far beyond the 
investors’ ex ante expectations, or if the controlling shareholders unexpectedly 
transfer corporate wealth through a one-time extraction, minority shareholders are 
clearly damaged, as opposed to Coffee’s account. 
In this respect, again, I argue that the notion of “family” (or a “repeat player”) 
in business groups is important.  As explained, after voluntarily forfeiting excessive 
extraction, a family controller exploits minority shareholders based on the partial 
extraction since she is a stationary bandit rather than a roving bandit.  “Partial” 
extraction is much more beneficial to a controller with long term horizon than “total” 
extraction in terms of joint utility of pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits of 
control as discussed earlier.  In addition, if the current generation of controllers 
seriously takes the pecuniary and non-pecuniary utility of the next generation into 
account, the current generation rarely relies on a one-time extraction.  Therefore, C 
buys a share at the discounted price and she will sell at the similar discounted price, 
meaning that C is not financially damaged.  Consequently, Professor Coffee’s view 
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that minorities are not actually damaged by a controller’s expropriation is reinforced 
under the regime with repeat controllers even if minorities do not have fully 
diversified portfolio.       
 
5. Foreign (Minority) Shareholders 
 
We have observed that many foreign investors invest in equities in a country 
with bad law. 144   It is of significance that they are another type of “minority 
shareholders” in that jurisdiction.  Then, why do foreign investors invest in shares 
that are scathed by poor corporate governance?  The first possible answer is that 
foreign investors are able to purchase shares at a relevant discounted price even if 
there are corporate governance problems.145  Sometimes, foreign investors massively 
buy cheaper shares in an emerging country after this country experiences financial 
crisis, which reinforces the discount more deeply.  In addition, unlike domestic 
minority shareholders, 146  foreign investors are able to achieve the benefits of 
international diversification.  Why?          
First, foreign investors from a good law country usually do not face 
substantial regulation of investment abroad, thus they can almost freely allot a portion 
                                                 
144  Practically, “foreign investors” in this Article are mainly referred to as foreign institutional 
investors from developed economies.  They are another type of “minority” shareholders in developing 
countries.  Although there might be some foreign investors from other developing economies, they do 
not have a significant role as minority shareholders in developing countries.     
 
145 In that sense, foreign investors are like investors A and B (and perhaps C under a stationary 
controller) that I explained in the previous Section.       
 
146  As explained earlier, domestic minority shareholders have found it difficult to participate in 
international investment: the circumstances in a bad-law country, including regulations, the relatively 
low level of wealth, and the underdevelopment of financial intermediaries like funds, impede 
international investment. 
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of their money to assets outside of their country.  In addition, foreign investors are 
usually institutional investors who are able to achieve international diversification, 
and institutional investors have enormous amounts of money and are capable of 
taking risks of international investment; investors are able to enjoy diversification 
effects if they invest in a significant number of securities in a domestic market; 
diversification benefits are more enhanced through international investment, which 
would generate an “international efficient frontier”; in other words, at the same level 
of return, international diversification produces lower risk than domestic 
diversification does.  From the perspective of U.S. investors, the idea is that the 
correlation between the United States and foreign markets is so low that adding 
foreign investments to a domestic portfolio could result in lowering the risk.  Higher 
returns are also expected, as many emerging markets will outperform the markets in 
the developed countries from time to time.  
For those reasons, foreign investors are willing to take the position of minority 
shareholders in a developing country even when this jurisdiction provides insufficient 
investor protection.  From the perspective of foreign investors (i.e., investors in a 
country with good laws, which is usually a wealth country), the amount of their 
investment in bad law countries is only a small portion of their overall investment.  
This is one of reasons why foreign investors are able to be involved in risky 
investments in developing countries.  Nonetheless, this amount is significant from the 
perspective of controllers in a bad law country (i.e., a country which is less wealthy) 
due to the disparity between the size of the economies.  Thus, in the equity market of 
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a poor law country, sometimes foreign shareholders take a significant role as 
“minority shareholders.”   
In addition, it is still unlikely for foreign minority shareholders – as an 
organized group – to react to bad corporate governance and “directly” punish greedy 
controllers.  However, foreign minorities can “indirectly” punish overreaching 
controllers.  What does it mean?  Foreign shareholders are usually institutional 
investors in developed countries so that domestic minority shareholders believe that 
these sophisticated foreign investment entities possess better information about 
domestic stocks and are more capable of assessing corporate value.  Due to this 
informational asymmetry among shareholders, even a fractional withdrawal of 
investment by foreign minority shareholders from the companies in developing 
countries – this withdrawal occurs when foreign minorities are disappointed by the 
corporate governance of a particular corporation in a developing country – would 
send a very strong signal about corporate governance to the domestic minority 
shareholders (and other foreign investors).    
As long as foreign shareholders purchase shares of family business groups at a 
discounted price, foreign shareholders are able to endure a “partial”147 extraction and 
hold shares since the discounted price already reflects the degree of extraction.  
However, if controllers rely on “substantially all” extraction, then the story is 
different – then, foreign shareholders would follow the “Wall Street Rule”, i.e., 
selling shares.  Observing the movement of foreign shareholders, domestic minority 
                                                 
147 Under a repeat controller’s regime (i.e., a stationary controller’s regime), foreign investors are not 
likely to be financially damaged by unexpected one-shot tunneling.  Their status is similar to that of 
investors A and B (and perhaps C under a stationary controller) in an example discussed earlier.       
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shareholders would follow (i.e., herd) the selling trends of foreign shareholders.148  In 
sum, to domestic minority shareholders, foreign shareholders are viewed as a 
“litmus” paper capable of assessing corporate values so that controllers’ lootings are 
constrained to some degree.  If foreign and domestic minority shareholders (i.e., most 
minority shareholders) sell their shares, the controlling shareholder will be damaged 
as well since it is to her benefit to embrace minority shareholders. 149   Once a 
developing country has a significant number of foreign minorities in the stock market, 
it is likely that controlling shareholders in the jurisdiction will not be able to easily 
exacerbate the extent of tunneling.150           
 
6. Minority Shareholders May Free-Ride When a Controller Expropriates 
Stakeholders 
 
So far, I have proposed various explanations as to why domestic minority 
shareholders participate in a country with poor shareholder protection; (1) in some 
developing countries, minority shareholders understand that they luckily deal with 
“stationary controllers”; (2) domestic minorities might not have perfect alternatives 
capable of totally replacing domestic stocks (i.e., “no choice account”); (3) domestic 
                                                 
148 In other words, domestic minority shareholders in a developing country are under the herding effect 
created by foreign investors.   
 
149  In previous Parts, I explained why embracing many minority shareholders is beneficial to a 
controlling shareholder (see Parts  II and  III for the detailed explanations).  
 
150  However, this does not mean that a controlling shareholder in the jurisdiction must improve 
corporate governance.  As long as the quality of corporate governance is maintained (and does not 
deteriorate further), foreign minority shareholders do not lose – instead, they buy and sell stocks at the 
same discounted rate reflecting the same quality of corporate governance.  Therefore, foreign minority 
shareholders do not have a strong incentive to punish controllers by following Wall Street Rule.      
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investors purchase shares because they might often make unreasonable investment 
decisions; (4) surprisingly, minority shareholders might not be financially damaged 
because they purchase shares at a discounted price.  From this foundation, I will 
further argue, which is more counterintuitive from the standpoint of the conventional 
thought that is sympathetic to minority shareholders in developing countries as 
“victims” of poor corporate governance practices.  In short, my argument in the 
following is that minority shareholders in many bad-law jurisdictions are not likely to 
be unilateral “victims.”  Why?    
In regard to dispersed shareholder regimes, the academic interest in corporate 
governance focuses on the relationship between managers and shareholders – the 
former exploits the latter.  On the other hand, when it comes to controlling 
shareholder regimes, the lopsided relationship between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders has been emphasized – again, the former loots the latter.  As a 
combination of these two views, conventional corporate governance scholarship, by 
and large, limits its analytical frameworks to the “triumvirate” – managers, 
controlling shareholders, and minority shareholders.  Under this tradition, minority 
shareholders are (almost) always seen as the ones that are extracted either by 
managers151 or controlling shareholders – minority shareholders are assumed to be 
situated in the lowest level of the “food chain.”     
Then, where are other stakeholders – employees, creditors, trading partners, 
consumers, and taxpayers?  Is it proper to omit them in the corporate governance 
analytical tools?  Probably, in the United States, the triumvirate framework is 
                                                 
151 In many cases, family members of a business group retain positions of top executives as well under 
controlling shareholder regimes.    
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working relatively well.  Fiduciary laws are almost exclusively for shareholders since 
other stakeholders are seen to be protected as fixed claimants by contracts – although 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.152 opens up the possibility of fiduciary duties 
for other stakeholders, and former Delaware Chancellor Allen stated that, in the 
vicinity of bankruptcy, managers owe fiduciary duties to creditors as well (Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.).153  Revlon Inc. v 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.154 reinforces the shareholder supremacy.           
In contrast, the traditional triumvirate framework is not necessarily suitable 
for a country with insufficient investor protection – economic interest of other 
stakeholders (let alone that of minority shareholders) is damaged by corporate 
insiders.  To understand more about this situation, it is noteworthy that in a 
developing economy, the capital market is not the only market that is imperfect.  The 
labor market is generally imperfect as well – and the imperfection in the labor market 
is usually advantageous to employers, i.e., (large) corporations that can set terms in 
labor contracts and transactions.  Under these circumstances, employees are 
expropriated by a corporation as they receive less economic benefits as exchange for 
their labor.  In other words, some of employees’ welfare is transferred to the entire 
body of all shareholders, i.e., the corporation – as a result, minority shareholders are 
benefitted as well since they share the capacity as residual claimants with a 
controlling shareholder.      
                                                 
152 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 
153 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. 
1991).    
 
154 Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
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In addition, in a country where minority shareholders are not protected well, 
we are not able to assume that another type of investors (i.e., creditors) is fully 
protected by contracts.  In this jurisdiction, a corporation (a borrower) is able to take 
advantage of creditors by various means.  For example, a corporation may take a 
highly risky project at the lender’s risk; if a project turns out successful, shareholders 
get the upside benefits as residual claimants; if it turns out dismal, the lender should 
bear the downside cost.  In that way, “shareholders” – it is noteworthy that minority 
shareholders are “shareholders” as well – can transfer welfare from creditors to 
themselves.  In a bank-finance economy, the magnitude of the wealth transfer might 
be huge if creditors are not properly protected.                  
Furthermore, the relationship between a large corporation and its trading 
partners (and notably consumers) makes this analysis even more complicated.  A 
large corporation in a less developed economy is usually able to wield a gigantic 
monopoly power in each market where it plays.  In a country with the inefficient 
corporate law system (law itself and its enforcement), it is plausible that the 
competition law system is inefficient as well because the quality of corporate and 
competition laws are generally correlated.  Therefore, a great deal of welfare of 
trading partners and consumers would be transferred to a large corporation where 
minority shareholders participate as its partial owners.  Besides, the government in a 
developing country sometimes provides a huge amount of subsidies to large 
corporations – accordingly, taxpayers’ money is transferred to all shareholders 
including minorities.   
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In sum, my point is straightforward; true, in a country with poor shareholder 
protection, in general minority shareholders are “victims” in the relation with the 
controlling shareholder who is a usual suspect of “wrongdoer”; the problem may arise 
when a controlling shareholder loots other stakeholders in a corporation; in this case, 
minority shareholders may free-ride on a controller as “shareholders” and be 
benefitted to the detriment of other stakeholders – employees, creditors, trading 
partners, consumers, and taxpayers.  In this sense, minority shareholders have 
incentives to participate in stock markets where they are not properly protected vis-à-
vis controlling shareholders.  Put simply, minority shareholders in a country with 
insufficient investor protection, in fact, are not situated in the lowest level of the 
“food chain” – it is highly likely that there are other stakeholders below minorities.    
Indeed, it is not conclusive whether the minorities’ benefit from this free-
riding exceeds their cost of expropriation by a controller – it depends on jurisdictions 
and case-by-case.  Rather, a critical point is that minority shareholders are not 
“unilateral victims” that is depicted by the conventional view, and we need a more 
expanded framework outside triumvirate model when the financial damage of 
minority shareholders arising from bad-law is discussed.                       
 
7. The Government’s Sponsorship of the Equity Market 
 
For the governments of many emerging countries, having a stock market is 
like having a national airline – according to Professor Gilson, it is a “badge” of 
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modernity that often does not demand economic justification.155  On the other hand, 
more rational governments would like to have more functional stock markets in order 
to achieve economic development – having a stock market is even more necessary 
when the government is not elected democratically because the government needs to 
compensate for the illegitimacy of its political power.  Otherwise, an undemocratic 
and economically failed regime would be very susceptible to any external or internal 
shocks that may arise from socio-political changes.  To this end, the government has 
its own incentive to attract potential investors to its stock markets.   
 It is true that a government in a developing country often colludes with large 
business groups who care little about investor protection.  Once a certain number of 
minority shareholders begin to participate in the stock market, however, at some point 
the government may not ignore totally the welfare of public shareholders.  It is 
because existing or potential minority shareholders constitute a de-facto major 
political group that the government cannot overlook.  Thus, while the government 
may turn a blind eye to a controller’s extraction of the private benefits to some degree 
as long as the level of extraction does not increase substantially to ignite a massive 
public outcry, it does not always tolerate the overt misbehaviors of a controller.  
Indeed, revealing corporate scandals might cause huge political cost to the 
government.  In that respect, a particular ceiling on private benefit extraction by a 
controller might be set formally or informally by the government’s implicit guidelines, 
at least in some developing countries.  Believing this, some investors participate in 
the capital market.   
                                                 
155 Gilson, supra note 4 at 651. 
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In addition, investors can expect the government to take a more active role as 
a “performance enhancer” in the stock market.  The government that pursues 
economic development or colludes with business elites often subsidizes and treats 
preferentially large corporations and business groups – this practice has been justified 
in the name of “industrial policies.”  These industrial policies benefit minority 
shareholders as well, as long as subsidized ones are corporations rather than 
controllers.  Accordingly, prospective investors see merit in participating in the stock 
market as non-controlling shareholders although they expect some expropriation from 
controllers.   
Furthermore, as the literature on political business cycles shows, the 
government has the incentives (and usually the means) to expand monetary and fiscal 
policy in order for the economy to look better than it actually is156 (i.e., “window 
dressing” by the government).157  Stimulation through financial policies in particular 
is largely kept in check if central banks are independent, as in the United States.  
However, in a country with insufficient investor protection, it is less common to see 
an independent central bank resist expansionary policies that result from the arbitrary 
decisions of politicians and bureaucrats in the government.  More seriously, in 
addition to “indirect” stimulation through the fiscal policies aforementioned, 
                                                 
156 See Axel Dreher & Nathan M. Jensen, Independent Actor or Agent?: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Impact of U.S. Interests on international Monetary Fund Conditions, 50 J. LAW. & ECON. 105, 107 
(2007); for classical study of political business cycle, see William D. Nordhaus, The Political Business 
Cycle, 42 REV. ECON. STUD. 169 (1975).    
 
157 “For instance, for years the Japanese government used “price-keeping operations” – government 
manipulation of the stock market.” Valentine V. Craig, Japanese Banking: A Time of Crisis (1998) 
(available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/1998summ/japan.pdf) at 16.     
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sometimes a government “directly” manipulates the stock market 158  – i.e., the 
government may use funds under its influence to purchase stocks in order to boost the 
stock market.    
The stimulation policies of the government might not be beneficial to the 
economy from the long-term perspective and some investors who participate later 
would even be damaged by the bubble that the government intentionally produces.  
However, public investors have at least two incentives to participate in a stock market 
manipulated by the government.  First, some of public investors perceive an 
expansionary policy as another chance to reap windfall even if it actually is not.159  
Second, despite the government’s manipulation, stock market investors are winners at 
least vis-à-vis entire citizens (or taxpayers).  Why?  Although public investors in the 
stock market lose from a bubble created by the government, from the standpoint of 
risk-adjusted return, they lose less than average citizens (or taxpayers) who always 
transfer their wealth to public investors, as seen in the United States after the recent 
financial crisis.160  
                   
   
 
                                                 
158 According to a recent research, Korean government adopted stock market stimulation policies in 49 
times from 1980 to 2004. Jae Ha Lee & Deok Hee Hahn, Effectiveness of Stock Market Plans, 1980 ~ 
2004, 23 S. KOREA J. FIN. MGMT. (2006) (written in Korean).  The number of 49 is based on the 
announcement of the government. Id.  Thus, it is probable that the government has been involved in 
more stock market stimulation policies than 49, if such policies without the announcement of the 
government are taken into consideration.          
 
159 Minority shareholders often lack information and suffer behavioral finance problems – they are not 
perfectly reasonable investors even if they are highly educated. 
 
160 This view is more sensible in countries where only a small subset of citizens invests in the stock 
market.   
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
One of the most appealing and attractive topics of modern corporate 
governance is the comparative study.  Law and finance theories proposed by LLSV 
have made great contributions by introducing scientific methodologies to evaluate 
corporate governance practices in a comparative way.  Nonetheless, their works have 
created a conundrum (i.e., Gilson’s riddle) that, so far, has not been explained well – 
if laws in controlling shareholder regimes within developing countries are inefficient 
to protect public investors, then why are there so many minority shareholders in these 
jurisdictions? 161  As the trailblazing work in response to this puzzle, the product 
market-based account was proposed by Professor Gilson as a possible answer.   
Despite pioneering contribution to pioneering this uncharted territory, the 
explanatory power of the product market-based account is weakened in a corporation 
where a controller’s cash flow rights are low, which is not uncommon in many less-
developed economies.  In order to rectify this problem, I propose two alternative 
explanations as to why a controlling shareholder needs some minority shareholders 
even though the cost of equity is substantially high; (1) a controller can gain a great 
deal of benefit from empire-building as she gains more equity capital from the stock 
market; and (2) having a broader base of minority shareholders is financially 
beneficial to a controlling shareholder since it enables her to gain more pecuniary 
benefits without increasing resistance from minorities.  Based on the product market-
based account and two alternative explanations, we may be able to see a more precise 
                                                 
161 Gilson, supra note 4.      
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picture of why a controlling shareholder in a developing country needs external 
equity capital. 
As the principle of demand-supply explains, for the more relevant analysis, 
we need to analyze the incentives of public investors (consumers in the stock market) 
in addition to the controlling shareholders’ (suppliers in the stock market) viewpoint – 
why would public investors participate in capital markets despite the ineffectiveness 
of the laws that protect them poorly.  Surprisingly, the analysis on the incentives of 
minorities to participate in the stock market has been generally neglected in most 
existing literature.  To rectify this tendency, this Article proposes several expositions 
from the perspective of public investors.  In sum, based on these interactions, both 
controllers and public investors can enjoy a surplus in the capital market.  In that 
sense, informal (non-legal) institutions create a symbiotic relationship between two 
parties in a country with insufficient investor protection.    
In studying the controlling shareholder regime, since it has diverse and 
idiosyncratic forms and characteristics in each market, it is impractical to generate “a 
general theory” for the controlling shareholder system which is observed ubiquitously 
in the rest of the world. 162  Perhaps, a large but missing part of the comparative 
corporate governance scholarship is an analysis based on the culture, which makes 
                                                 
162  The conventional theory explains that there are two ownership structures in the world – the 
dispersed shareholder system and the controlling shareholder system.  The dispersed shareholder 
system is found in only two Anglo-American economies (the United States and United Kingdom) that 
share much commonality in history, philosophy, politics, economy, legal system, and culture.  
However, it is known that these two economies are distinctive in many aspects so that treating these 
two countries as one group is often misleading.  If so, it is clear that there are huge dissimilarities 
among more than a hundred of controlling shareholder economies that do not often share much 
commonality except the ownership structure.  Therefore, it is not practical and even risky to assume 
“the” (one) model for the controlling shareholder regime which is contrasted by the dispersed 
shareholder regime – every controlling shareholder system is different and the extent of the difference 
may be much larger than that we find between the leading two common law countries (i.e., the United 
States and United Kingdom).      
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one system distinctive from the others.  For example, the value of non-pecuniary 
benefits is very dependent on the people’s mindset and preferences, which are shaped 
by their particular culture.  In this context, for future research, it is worth noting the 
comment made by Professor Milhaupt, who is a firm believer in agency theory and 
economic analysis on the corporate governance – “It is obvious that analytical 
framework exploring incentives is fundamental in understanding the conducts of 
rational economic persons like a controller and minority shareholders.  Nonetheless, I 
start to be convinced that we need to see through the lens of culture for the more 
comprehensive analysis on the corporate governance.”163  Agreeing with this insight, 
I look forward to seeing future works that will combine economic analysis and 
cultural explanations for this largely uncharted territory of comparative corporate 















– “ROVING” OR “STATIONARY”   
 
Sang Yop Kang*    
                                       
INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditionally, the world economy is divided into two groups in accordance 
with different ownership structures.  In the “dispersed shareholder regime” (based on 
the Berle and Means model), stocks of a corporation are generally widely held by 
atomized and numerous non-controlling shareholders; 1   In contrast, in “the 
controlling shareholder regime,” a typical corporation is under the complete control 
of a dominant shareholder (or a group of a few shareholders).  Interestingly, although 
the Berle and Means model has been a dominant theme in corporate governance 
scholarship, it is a localized phenomenon observed only in the United States and 
United Kingdom. 2  In the rest of the world, a controlled-corporation with a dominant 
shareholder is the standard form of business organization.         
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1  See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, JR., THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
 
2 John C. Coffee Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 642 (1999).  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Shleifer find that “the Berle and Means corporation is far from universal, and is quite rare for some 
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Based on this sharp dichotomy, a traditional view has portrayed that the 
dispersed shareholder system is better than the controlling shareholder system in 
terms of investor protection and economic performance.3  In general, it is explained 
that a country with the dispersed shareholder system has “good-law” while a country 
with the controlling shareholder system has “bad-law.”  A lot of debates have 
followed suit in favor of and against this view.  Among others, Professor Gilson’s 
criticism has drawn considerable attention in academia.  First, he points out that we 
are able to find a significant number of controlling shareholders in countries with 
good-law. 4   Next, he states that academic implications drawn from a stark 
comparison of two ownership systems are too coarse.5  He argues that the controlling 
shareholder systems in the world can be classified into (i) good-law and (ii) bad-law 
jurisdictions.6   The controlling shareholder system with good-law, is functionally 
equivalent to the dispersed shareholder system in terms of investor protection .7     
                                                                                                                                           
definitions of control.” Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
Ownership around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).  Professors Bebchuk and Roe argue that at present, 
publicly traded companies in the United States and the United Kingdom commonly have dispersed 
ownership, whereas publicly traded companies in other economies generally have controlling 
ownership. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
& Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999)           
 
3 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, Law and 
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECO. 1113 (1998).  In short, the dispersed shareholder system is furnished with 
“good-law,” and is far superior to the controlling shareholder system, which usually has “bad-law.” 
 
4  Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006).   
 
5 Professor Gilson stated, “The simple dichotomy between controlling shareholder systems and widely 
held shareholder systems that has largely dominated academic debate thus far seems to me much too 
coarse to allow a deeper understanding of the diversity of ownership structures in different national 
capital markets and of the policy implications of those structures.” Id.     
 
6 Id.  
 
7 Id.   
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Such a nuanced taxonomy based on the two-dimensional matrix of quality of 
law and ownership puts forward a more precise framework for comparative 
corporation governance than the traditional view that is based on the stark distinction 
between two ownership systems.  Gilson’s study emphasizes primarily a detailed sub-
categorization of a small number of developed controlling shareholder jurisdictions 
with good-law.  However, controlling shareholder systems in developing countries 
with bad-law are still in a black box with many questions unsolved, even though this 
group accounts for the majority of the world.  For more understanding of diversities 
and complicating the taxonomy among “controlling shareholder systems with bad-
law,” this Article applies Professor Olson’s analytical framework of “banditry”8 (that 
was originally developed to explain the evolution of political systems throughout 
human history) to comparative corporate governance for this group of countries.  
According to Olson, a “roving bandit” is one who will not come to expropriate 
victims again.  As a result, he rationally takes every property possible from victims.9  
The dominance of a roving bandit in a community creates chaos and results in 
anarchy that is further aggravated by the possibility of “uncoordinated looting” from 
adjacent roving bandits.  In contrast, a “stationary bandit” is one who rationally 
settles down and rules his “subjects” (who used to be victims under roving bandits) in 
a certain domain.10  Using the monopolistic power to steal without interference from 
other bandits, a stationary bandit executes theft in the form of regular taxation rather 
than total looting, since he has an encompassing interest with his subjects.  Autocracy 
                                                 







is established when a dominant political entity is featured as stationary.  Even if it is 
true that autocracy is less desirable than democracy, it is certainly a superior political 
system to anarchy, in which vandalism and disorder crowd out any possibility of 
prosperity and development to the full potential.          
A controlling shareholder in a bad-law jurisdiction expropriates minority 
shareholders similarly to a powerful political entity that has physical and institutional 
force to exploit the subjects in its domain.  In particular, extant corporate governance 
scholarship explains that a controller in a developing country can siphon all assets 
from a corporation to his own pocket at any time he wishes.  Under these 
circumstances, the performance of the economy that is dominated by roving 
controllers will not be prosperous.  This is the basic assumption of the conventional 
corporate governance view on the controlling shareholder system in bad-law 
countries, and I agree with this view in general.   
However, many comparative studies based on this conventional view miss a 
material point.  In these works, it is implicitly or expressly assumed that controlling 
shareholders in developing countries siphon all assets.  Instead, the more precise 
assumption should be that controlling shareholders in developing countries can 
siphon all assets; thus, some controllers siphon all and others do not siphon all.  In 
this regard, I hypothesize in this Article that the extent of controllers’ theft from 
minority shareholders varies among bad-law jurisdictions, depending on the 
idiosyncratic socio-political economic conditions that controllers face, as well as 
controllers’ personal preferences.  In some countries, most controlling shareholders 
are characterized as roving.  Therefore, they tend to take all wealth from a 
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corporation through an abrupt one-shot deal, which is consistent with the 
conventional view.  As explained above, the presumption that all controllers in bad-
law countries are corporate pirates, however, can be refuted in other countries where 
many controllers are stationary and prone to extract a part of a corporation’s assets 
through on-going transactions.11   
I argue that under some circumstances, being stationary and imposing less 
“taxes” (i.e., exploitation by controllers – please note that “taxes” are an analogy) on 
minorities can be optimal for long-sighted controllers.  Then, even without legal 
enforcements, controllers reasonably and voluntarily decide to protect minority 
shareholders for their own benefits.  In turn, this creates the minorities’ incentive to 
participate in the capital market that is dominated by stationary controllers.  
Cooperation between controllers and minorities forms repeated games in the capital 
market, resulting in enhanced mutual benefits.  Consequently, “stationary controller” 
economies will be more prosperous than “roving controller” economies and 
sometimes even “good-law” economies.  Of course, it is best for minority 
shareholders not to be exploited by controllers at all.  Nonetheless, if the nature of 
bad-law is too systemic and established in a certain economy to be defeated, having 
stationary controllers is acceptable and desirable to investors as the second best.12   
Some may argue that public investors can invest abroad, if they do not like 
having bandits in a domestic market. 13   However, these investors, i.e., minority 
                                                 
11 It is also plausible for “roving” and “stationary” controllers to be commingled in one jurisdiction.  
Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt suggested this possibility in our discussion.    
 
12  In that context, while a method of transforming a bad-law country to a good-law country is 
important, a method of transforming a roving controller economy to a stationary controller economy is 




shareholders in (relatively poor) developing countries, are not equipped for 
international investment because many developing countries have implicit or explicit 
capital regulations.  Even without such regulations, public investors are subject to 
“familiarity bias,” which leads them to invest a significant part of their capital in 
domestic markets.  In addition, many non-controlling investors might have less 
capability for international diversification that requires additional risk unless they 
have hedging tools.  Moreover, financial intermediaries, who pool funds and invest 
abroad on behalf of small investors, have not been available to many developing 
countries until recently.  
Based on this foundation, the aim of this Article is to describe my effort to 
build a generalized model determining under what circumstances a controlling 
shareholder chooses to become roving or stationary as an optimal strategy to 
maximize his benefits.  If a controller chooses to be stationary, he will expect two 
sources of continuous cash flow.  One is from pro-rata economic interest and the 
other is from extraction of minority shareholders.  The value of these two cash flow 
streams can be converted into the total present value of “pecuniary benefits.”14  In 
addition, “non-pecuniary benefits” such as fame, reputation, and social influence 
arising from running corporations add value for a controller as well.  Thus, the total 
benefits that a stationary controller is able to enjoy are the sum of the present value of 
the “pecuniary benefits” (which are the sum of pro-rata economic interest and 
                                                                                                                                           
13 This paragraph is based on Sang Yop Kang, Reenvisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: 
Why Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other (working paper).   
  
14 It is noteworthy that in this Article, while “pecuniary private benefits of control” are meant to be 
pecuniary benefits that exclusively and illegally belong to controllers, “pecuniary benefits” are defined 
more broadly – legally justified monetary benefits for controllers (such as pro-rata dividends) as well 
as illegal monetary benefits are included in “pecuniary benefits.”   
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extraction of minority shareholders) and “non-pecuniary benefits” in dollar terms.  By 
contrast, when a controller chooses to be roving, he loots (substantially) all of the 
corporate assets including his own paid-in capital.  Therefore, a controller may 
compare the total benefits as a stationary controller and as a roving controller, and 
ultimately chooses his position where he can receive more benefits.   
Large family corporations often (but not always) function as a catalyst to 
make controllers more stationary.  Through inheritance within a family, the length of 
tenure of a family controller can be extended to infinity.  Then, to stay as a controller 
for a (potentially) eternal time horizon, a controlling family shareholder has to use 
less radical exploitation in its relationship with minority shareholders.  In addition, 
imposing lenient “taxation” is in fact aligned with a controlling family shareholder’s 
best interest in the long run.  By being stationary, he can hope that his descendants 
will be able to maintain a “golden goose” producing non-pecuniary as well as 
pecuniary benefits forever.  
However, it is noteworthy that controlling family shareholders are not 
necessarily stationary due to the inherent problems of family.  A mean-reverting 
problem in management skills and structural changes can adversely affect the existing 
repeated game set between a family controller and minority shareholders.  Then a 
final period problem and backward induction may occur, which would destroy the 
concept of a family controller with infinite tenure.  In addition, some family 
controllers are not perfectly altruistic to their following generations.  Then, an 
incumbent controller may cause an inter-temporal problem.  He will attempt to 
transform “future value” belonging to his descendants in the remote future to “present 
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value” that he can use immediately.  Put differently, as he takes substantially all of 
the wealth from a corporation at present, he becomes roving.   
Furthermore, from any controller’s point of view (not limited to family 
controllers’ view), choosing to be stationary incurs inherent risks.  The expected value 
that a controlling shareholder can enjoy through pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
benefits in the future is not definite – it is exposed to volatilities.  In contrast, by 
being roving and looting at present, a controller can take a certain amount of 
pecuniary benefits.  Then, Carpe Diem may hold – a controlling shareholder would 
choose to be roving even if the value accruing to him as a stationary controller is 
expected to be larger than that as a roving controller.  To many controllers, it is 
absolutely valid financial advice that “a bird in hand is worth two in the bush.”      
Against these backdrops, this Article proceeds as follows.  Part  I sketches the 
development of taxonomies of the controlling shareholder regime (the traditional 
view and Professor Gilson’s view).  Part  II introduces the analytical framework of 
Olson’s banditry in order to delve into the controlling shareholder system with bad-
law.  Part  III proposes under what circumstances a controlling shareholder would 
choose to be stationary.  Various economic analyses such as “taxation” (i.e., 
extraction by a controller), valuation method, a controller’s utility function, pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary benefits will be discussed.  Part  IV explores why a controlling 
family shareholder is more likely to be stationary.  In contrast, Part  V examines what 
factors make it difficult for a controller (in particular a family controller) to be 
stationary.  As the first attempt to analyze controlling shareholder systems in the 
context of roving or stationary bandits, this Article emphasizes theoretical approaches 
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and adopts deductions based on logic.  I hope to use rigorous case and empirical 
studies to explain theories on the controlling shareholder system in more depth in the 
near future. 
                                               
                    
I. TAXONOMIES OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER 
SYSTEMS 
 
Traditionally, comparative features of corporate economies and capital 
markets are viewed through the prism of corporate ownership regimes.  According to 
this view, the world economy is divided into two ownership categories – one is the 
“dispersed shareholder system” and the other is the “controlling shareholder system.”  
In response, critics of the traditional view argue that this classification is too simple to 
examine “the rest of the world” outside Anglo-American economies.  Based on this 
concern, this Part introduces Professor Gilson’s new taxonomy on controlling 
shareholder systems.  In turn, I explain the notions of roving and stationary 
controlling shareholder systems.   
 
1. Conventional Views on Comparative Ownership – The Dispersed 




Since Berle and Means’ declaration on the separation of ownership and 
management in U.S. corporations,15  the “dispersed shareholder system” has been 
established as the norm and standard in corporate governance academia.  In fact, 
however, the dispersed shareholder system is a parochial phenomenon that can be 
observed only in two Anglo American countries, i.e., the United States and United 
Kingdom.  Rather, the alternative ownership, i.e., the “controlling shareholder 
system,” prevails across Europe and Asia.16   
In dispersed shareholder system, the combination of shareholders who are 
atomized and executives with powerful discretion in corporate operations inevitably 
creates managerial agency problems. 17   In order to rectify (or mitigate) the 
imperfectness arising from the agent-principal relation, legal doctrines which are 
designed to punish managers’ outreaching and incentive mechanisms have been 
developed to align managers’ interests with a corporation.  The controlling 
shareholder system has its own agency problem – a controller often takes corporate 
wealth at the sacrifice of minority shareholders via “tunneling.”18  Then, among two 
ownership systems that are subject to inherent agency problems respectively, which is 
better in terms of investor protection?   
                                                 
15 Berle & Means, supra note 1.  
 
16 Coffee, supra note 2 at 643.   
 
17 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 395 (1976).  Academics and practitioners 
have recognized and observed managerial problems in the contexts of executive compensation, M&A 
defense, and empire building.   
 
18 See e.g., Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 
90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000).    
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A decade ago, four prominent economists – La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) – made attempt to solve this puzzle by presenting 
empirical studies on comparative corporate governance with sophisticated 
econometric techniques.  Evaluating corporate governance of 46 countries by means 
of investor protection index,19 they conclude that the controlling shareholder system 
is systematically worse in protecting outside investors than the dispersed shareholder 
system,20 which reinforces the view of traditional corporate governance scholarship. 
However, the validity of the sharp distinction between ownership systems in 
the conventional view is called into question in terms of comparative methodology.  
In fact, countries in the dispersed shareholder system are rather outliers since the 
United States and the United Kingdom are demonstrably the most advanced 
economies in the world.  In addition, the sample size is too small to approve 
conclusions of the traditional theory – from data of two countries (i.e., the United 
States and United Kingdom), can we draw the meaningful generalization that the 
diffused ownership is superior to the controlling ownership and it should be a paragon 
of corporate economy?  Or, more fundamentally, is the traditional view that divides 
the world economy two categories valid and useful for the comparative corporate 
governance scholarship?     
     
2. Complicating the Taxonomy of Controlling Shareholder Ownership       
  
                                                 
19 La Porta et al., supra note 3.  
 
20  See e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 3; Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in 
Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 633 (2007); Gilson, supra 
note 4.     
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Perhaps, as Professor Gilson states, “[I]t is hardly a startling intuition that a 
taxonomy that divides the world into two categories – the United States and the 
United Kingdom on the one hand, and everyone else on the other – does not tell us 
very much about the rest of the world.” 21   Rather, he proposes that the world 
economy is divided into two categories in a more textured way – controlling 
shareholder regimes with functionally bad-law and regimes that have functionally 
good-law.22  Accordingly, Sweden and the United States both fall within the second 
group, although the traditional view categorizes these two countries in different 
groups.23  In contrast, Sweden and Mexico – which are included in the same group as 
countries with controlling ownership by the traditional view’s standard – are not 
treated as being in the same group since the former is equipped with an efficient legal 
system and the latter is not.24   
Gilson’s taxonomy of the world economy sets another watershed in 
comparative corporate governance scholarship – this categorization of the world is 
more sophisticated and informative than the conventional view based on two versus 
“all minus two” (I call it the “traditional version of the rest of the world”).  Gilson’s 
taxonomy addresses two key points.  First, controlling shareholder systems with 
                                                 
21 Gilson, supra note 4 at 1653. 
 
22 Professor Gilson states that “… two more textured categories: controlling shareholder regimes with 
functionally bad law and regimes that have functionally good law and support a diversity of 
shareholder distributions.” Id. at 1646.    
 
23 Professor Gilson explains “This second group includes both Sweden, which is characterized by 
companies with controlling shareholders, and the United States, which is characterized by companies 
with widely held shareholdings.” Id. at 1646. 
 
24 Professor Gilson explains that “For example, both Mexico (with bad law) and Sweden (with good 
law) have controlling shareholder systems.” Id. at 1650.  Mexican controlling shareholders are said to 
expropriate more than a third of the value of the company, while expropriation by their Swedish 
counterparts is limited to 1% of company value. Id. at 1650 & n.23 (citing Tatiana Nenova, The Value 
of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003)).    
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good-law and ones with bad-law should not be treated as one unified group (as seen 
in the comparison of Sweden and Mexico), as the conventional view has implicitly 
but erroneously assumed.  Second, the controlling shareholder system is not 
necessarily inferior to widely-held shareholding (as seen in the comparison of 
Sweden and the United States) – efficiency of legal infrastructure is more significant 
in terms of investor protection than particular forms of ownership system. 
 
3. The Need for the More Complicated Taxonomy of Controlling 
Shareholder Systems  
    
Professor Gilson’s new taxonomy can be interpreted as dividing the world 
economy into three groups: (i) the dispersed shareholder regime (only two economies, 
i.e., the United States and United Kingdom); (ii) the controlling shareholder regime 
with good-law (some developed countries including Sweden); and (iii) the controlling 
shareholder regime with bad-law (some developed countries and almost all 
developing countries).  Gilson’s contributions are to distinguish the second and third 
groups within the controlling shareholder system and to propose the commonalities in 
the first and second groups across different ownership structures.  However, it is 
worth noting that countries with inefficient (bad-law) controlling ownership – I call 
this third group “Gilson’s version of the rest of the world” 25 – are still treated as one 
group even though they account for a supermajority in the world economy (i.e., the 
                                                 
25 It is important to distinguish the “traditional version of the rest of the world” and Professor Gilson’s 
version of “the rest of the world.”  While the “traditional version of the rest of the world” is composed 
of all countries except the United States and United Kingdom (i.e., “all minus two”), “Gilson’s version 
of the rest of the world” is composed of all countries except the United States, United Kingdom, and 
some developed countries including Sweden. 
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third group is composed of all countries except two Anglo-American countries and 
several developed countries).  Perhaps, a reason that the third group is not sub-
categorized further is that Gilson’s effort is focused on figuring out the commonalities 
among developed economies (i.e., the first and second groups) despite their different 
ownership systems.     
Benefitting from Professor Gilson’s seminal work on the more nuanced 
taxonomy of the world economy, this Article has a motive to classify the 
aforementioned third group, i.e. “Gilson’s version of the rest of the world,” in more 
detail.  To be sure, countries in this group are very diverse and heterogeneous in 
terms of the socio-economic and political environments that they face – even some 
developed countries (such as Italy, as Gilson explains26) are included in this group, 
not to mention substantially all developing countries.  Therefore, I believe that it is 
high time to sub-categorize this group that is at large deemed as having only common 
(inferior) features such as bad law, institutions, and enforcement.   
From now on, I delve into how the concepts of “roving” and “stationary” 
controller systems can be distinguished (at least roughly) within the third group.  For 
that purpose, I examine how socio-economic and political factors determine the 
prevalence of “roving” or “stationary” controlling systems.  By doing so, I hope to 
answer the paradox of some bad-law countries achieving superior economic 
development to good-law countries as well as other bad-law countries.  Table 1 
                                                 
26  In addition, Shleifer and Vishny deemed Italy as one of countries that lacks good corporate 
governance.  “In contrast, corporate governance systems in most other countries, ranging from poor 
developing countries, to transition economies, to some rich European countries such as Italy, lack 
some essential elements of a good system,” Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of 
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 739 (1997).     
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summarizes the classifications of the world economy by the traditional view, Gilson, 
and myself respectively. 
   
Table 1: Taxonomies of the World Economy 
 
I.  Classification of the World by the Traditional View 
 Group 1, Dispersed Shareholder System: the U.S. and U.K. 
 Group 2, Controlling Shareholder System (i.e., the “Traditional Version of the Rest 
of the World”): all countries except the U.S. and U.K.  
 
II.  Complicating Taxonomy of the World by Professor Gilson 
 
 Group 1, Dispersed Shareholder System: the U.S. and U.K.  
 Group 2, Controlling Shareholder System with Good-Law: some developed 
countries (e.g., Sweden) 
 Group 3, Controlling Shareholder System with Bad-Law (i.e., “Gilson’s version of 
the Rest of the World”): all countries except the U.S., U.K., and some developed 
countries – in other words, some developed countries (e.g., Italy) and all developing 
countries are included in Group 3    
  
III.  The More Complicating Taxonomy of the World by This Article 
 
 Group 1, Dispersed Shareholder System: the U.S. and U.K.  
 Group 2, Controlling Shareholder System with Good-Law: some developed 
countries (e.g., Sweden) 
 
Then, Professor Gilson’s Group 3 (i.e., “Gilson’s the Rest of the World”) Is Divided Into 
hree Sub-Groups T  
 Group 3-1, “Roving” Controlling Shareholder System   
 Group 3-2, “Stationary” Controlling Shareholder System 




II. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AND THE ANALYSIS OF 
BANDITRY  
 
Politics and corporate economics share a lot in common.  In fact, corporate 
governance is the field that examines the political power-plays and relationships of 
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corporate constituencies such as directors, managers, controlling and minority 
shareholders. 27   In this Part, I explain the concepts of “roving” and “stationary” 
controllers, which originate from the vocabulary of political economics, and explore 
the similarity between corporate economies and political systems.        
                                            
1. Analysis of Banditry – Roving and Stationary Bandits   
 
In his study on the evolution of governmental systems in history, Professor 
Olson explains that political groups with force in anarchies and autocracies are 
analogous to “bandits” since from the perspective of the laypeople, political groups 
with force exploit them by means of violence.28  However, every bandit is not same – 
according to Olson, bandits are classified into at least two groups: “roving” and 
“stationary” bandits.29   
“Roving” bandits are usually found in anarchy.  As the vocabulary itself 
explains, they are bandits who are ready to depart from the pillaged place soon after 
total plundering.30  In anarchy where no single entity dominates the entire domain, 
                                                 
27 Discussion with Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt.       
 
28 MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST 
DICTATORSHIP (BASIC BOOK 2000).   
 
29 Professor Olson takes an example from the history of pre-modern China, when many warlords ruled 
in certain domains, independent of the central authority.  “In the 1920s, China was in large part under 
the control of various warlords.  They were men who led some armed band with which they conquered 
some territory and who then appointed themselves lords of that territory.  They taxed the population 
heavily and pocketed much of the proceeds.  The warlord Feng Yu-hsiang was noted for the 
exceptional extent to which he used his army for suppressing bandits and for his defeat of the relatively 
substantial army of the roving bandit, White Wolf.  Apparently most people in Feng’s domain found 
him much preferable to the roving bandits.” Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and 
Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 568 (1993).    
 
30 Id. at 568. 
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powerful groups loot a limited number of victims.  Facing uncoordinated competitive 
theft with other groups, it is in their best interest to take every property possible from 
victims – if they do not loot victims’ total wealth, but leave some of it, competing 
bandits will take the remainder.  As a result, roving bandits do not need to set a long-
term goal of theft because they will not come again to expropriate victims who have 
nothing.  Put simply, only “today” is meaningful in the minds of roving bandits.31   
This tendency of a roving banditry distorts the incentive of victims.  Facing 
and expecting cruel and short-term oriented vandalism, victims have little or no 
incentive to produce or accumulate anything32 since endurance of a painful “today” 
will not generate any fruit “tomorrow,” but will end with total plundering by roving 
bandits anyway.  Victims make every attempt to leave the place in order to avoid the 
ruthlessness of roving bandits.  Therefore, as roving banditry becomes more 
established, it becomes more difficult for roving bandits to find victims that they can 
loot.  Consequently, the welfare of the entire society (both bandits and victims) will 
deteriorate as this vicious cycle is formed among roving bandits and victims.   
A more desirable story may occur when a “roving” bandit rationally settles 
down and becomes a “stationary” bandit who resides with his “subjects” (who used to 
be victims under roving bandits’ reign) and continuously steal from them.33  In this 
case, a bandit is established as a dictator and monopolizes theft from a certain domain 
                                                 
31 Pirates can be defined as “roving” bandits in a similar way.  They do not expect to see the same 
victims in the future.  Thus, when they have chance to plunder, it is in their best interest and the 
rational choice to take all wealth possible from their victims.  This is why they are often ruthless.   
 





– thus, it can be said that anarchy turns into autocracy.34  In the absence of competing 
bandits with whom he must share trophies, a stationary bandit finds that from the 
long-term perspective, it is optimal for him to thieve in the form of regular taxation 
rather than occasional and brutal plunder.35  When only a part of their income is 
taken by a stationary bandit, his subjects have an economic incentive to produce, save, 
and invest for the future;36 in the long run, “[a rational stationary bandit] will be able 
to exact a larger total amount of income from his subjects if he leaves them with an 
incentive to generate income that he can tax.”37   
In other words, a stationary bandit has an encompassing interest in the 
continuing prosperity of his victims and so will take less than a roving bandit.38  Then, 
it can be said that the dismal inter-temporal problem under the threat of a roving 
banditry can be solved by the advent of a stationary bandit; in contrast to a roving 
bandit, a stationary bandit pursues long-term interest, and “tomorrow” as well as 
“today” is significant to him.  Consequently, subjects under the stationary banditry 
are able to take the future more seriously into consideration; the economy of the 
domain will grow and the welfare of subjects will be improved as well.   
                                                 
34 Id. at 567-568. 
 
35 Id. at 568. 
 
36 “… the victims of the theft can expect to retain whatever capital they accumulate out of after-tax 
income and therefore also have an incentive to save and to invest, thereby increasing future income 
…,” Id. at 568.               
 
37 Id. at 568.   
 
38 See e.g., Noshab, Book Review on “Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist 
Dictatorship” by Olson (http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002_files/no_2/review/5r.htm); Olson, supra 
note 28 (explaining that “The stationary bandit, because of his monopoly on crime and taxation, has an 
encompassing interest in his domain that makes him limit his predations because he bears a substantial 
share of the social losses resulting from these predations.”)   
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It is true that by basic definition, there is no fundamental difference between 
roving and stationary bandits as far as victims are concerned.39  Nonetheless, victims 
prefer stationary bandits to roving bandits because victims notice that under the reign 
of stationary banditry, victims and bandits are sailing on the same ship (in other 
words, the interests of both stationary bandits and victims are generally aligned, 
which is not observed under roving banditry).  Through rationalizing the theft to a 
moderate extent and a positive process of feedback, the system based on stationary 
banditry is mutually beneficial to both the bandit and victims – thus, stationary 
banditry in relation to autocracy can generate much better economic performance 
than roving banditry in relation to anarchy.  Democracy with political legitimacy 
might be the best situation for the general population in terms of political freedom 
and economic development. 40   However, given the facts that lack of political 
legitimacy is firmly established and democracy is remote for the current generation, it 
is almost sure that coexistence with stationary bandits is much more desirable to 






                                                 
39 See e.g., Noshab, supra note 38; Olson, supra note 29.   
 
40  However, there is debate whether a democracy is always better for enhancing economic 
development than a dictatorship.  Some commentators argue that in certain cases, dictatorship achieves 
more economic prosperity than democracy.  See generally, Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, 
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They are “roving” in that they 
depart soon.  Often, they will not 
come to expropriate victims again. 
They are “stationary” in that they 
stay with victims and continuously 
steal for a long time period. 
Method of Theft Cruel Looting (roving bandits take all property possible) 
Regular Taxation (stationary 




Short-term Oriented Long-term Oriented 
Victims’ Incentive Victims have little incentive to produce 
Victims have sufficient incentive 
to produce 
 
Victims prefer a stationary bandit to a roving bandit because they can prepare for 




2. “Roving” and “Stationary” Controlling Shareholders   
 
I have reviewed political economy analysis on the evolution of government 
systems – especially anarchy and autocracy – by means of Professor Olson’s 
framework of banditry.41  From now on, I turn back to the subject on which I am 
writing, i.e. “controlling shareholder systems with bad-law,” by connecting corporate 
governance issues and Olson’s analytical framework of political economics.  In the 
context of corporate governance, whoever takes corporate assets to the detriment of 
                                                 
41  Another example of stationary banditry can be found in organized crimes.  Once a criminal 
organization establishes monopolistic dominance in a certain area, it has a long-term horizon for the 
exploitation of that area.  Then, members of the criminal organization will soon understand that it is 
rational to protect their victims’ property rights to some degree and exploit them moderately for a long 
time.  Since a moderate level of exploitation of victims will foster an economic incentive for victims to 
produce, the criminal organization is able to extract more wealth from victims “in the long run.” 
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investors (and/or other constituencies in corporations) can be named as a corporate 
“pirate” or “bandit.”  When the corporate law is not protective in a jurisdiction, a 
significant issue to victims (i.e., shareholders or other constituencies) is a corporate 
bandit’s degree of looting a corporation – in other words, whether he is roving or 
stationary should be a focal point from the standpoint of victims, given the condition 
that looting is inevitable and law does not protect victims in a bad-law country.   
In a jurisdiction where investors are well protected by corporate laws and 
enforcement systems, minority shareholders are at large insulated from a large scale 
of expropriation by corporate dictators (professional managers or controlling 
shareholders).  For example, in the United States where a diffused shareholder 
ownership is the norm, statutes and common laws effectively protect public investors 
especially from unfair transactions arising from a conflict of interests.  In fact, as 
Professor Fox explains, legal doctrines and jurisprudence of corporate law in the 
United States have been developed in order to solve problems imposed by corporate 
“buccaneers” (i.e., “bandits” in my analysis). 42   In Sweden, although a limited 
number of wealthy families dominate the entire economy, it is well known that they 
do not siphon public corporations’ wealth to their own pockets.43   
These law-abiding economies successfully discourage “bandits” from taking 
wealth from victims – when a bandit appears and is recognized in the market, 
enforcement agencies or courts will intervene and punish him.44  In that sense, good-
                                                 
42 Discussion with Professor Merritt B. Fox.     
 
43 In this sense, institutions around corporations in Sweden are functionally equivalent to those of the 
United States, even though the two countries differ in terms of dispersed and controlling shareholder 
systems.  Gilson, supra note 4.  
 
44 A notable U.S. example is punishment of Madoff for his Ponzi scheme.     
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law countries – whether they adopt the widely-held ownership (Gilson’s first group 
including the United States) or the dominant shareholder ownership (Gilson’s second 
group including Sweden) – can be connoted as economies with few bandits.45                    
By contrast, most developing countries (and even some developed countries) 
in Gilson’s third group lack well-performing legal infra-structures that are designed to 
effectively protect investors in the capital markets.  Thus, the conventional wisdom 
(based on law and finance literature) on the taxonomy of ownership systems 
presumes that the piracy of controlling shareholders in (all) developing countries is a 
default rule – this view treats all (developing) countries as “one” unified group that is 
dominated by “roving” bandits, in Olson’s terminology.  However, as the notion of a 
“stationary” bandit shows, it is possible that some controlling shareholders in bad-law 
jurisdictions do not abuse their power for looting to the full extent even if they can, 
because paradoxically limiting theft in each period maximizes total theft in the long 
run.   
With this possibility that the extent of stealing may vary, I propose dividing 
controlling shareholders into two categories: (i) “roving controllers” plunder 
corporations severely and cruelly (for example through a one-shot deal); and (ii) 
“stationary controllers” exploit minority shareholders to a moderate extent (for 
example, through continuous extractions similar to regular taxation).  Then, the next 
question is – what factors make a controlling shareholder become either roving or 
stationary?   
                                                 
45 It is impossible to eradicate every bandit in a society.  Even in a good-law country like the United 
States, there might be many occasions where corporate insiders take corporate assets, which are not 
recognized by authorities due to the relatively small magnitude of theft.  Of course, there are some 





III. WHAT MAKES A CONTROLLER “STATIONARY”? – 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF “STATIONARY” 
CONTROLLERS   
 
It is possible that controlling shareholders in some developing countries may 
be more moralistic and ethical, and thus they voluntarily do not loot minority 
shareholders to the full extent.  Although I do not entirely rule out this humane 
possibility, my aim in this Article is to figure out hidden socio-political economic 
rationalities that affect a controlling shareholder’s decision on the way of stealing – 
whether he should be a “roving” or “stationary” controller.  Following are my 
analyses.   
 
1. A Controller’s “Taxation” of Minority Shareholders – One-Shot Looting 
v. Ongoing Extractions     
 
Here, let me start with a seeming digression – even if it is ultimately not – to a 
theory on taxation particular to Olson’s world.  Tax revenue is equal to the product of 
the tax rate and the taxable income (i.e., tax base).  Since taxpayers’ incentive to earn 
income is more discouraged by a higher tax rate, the trade-off relationship between 
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tax rate and tax base is apparent.46  As the tax rate increases, the size of tax revenue is 
dependent of the relative strengths of two competing factors, as follows.   
When tax rate increases, tax revenue is initially likely to increase as well since 
the positive effect by increased tax rate is stronger than the negative effect by 
decreased tax base.  When the tax rate reaches a certain point (i.e., the revenue-
maximizing tax rate), however, tax revenue goes down as the tax rate continues to 
rise.  It is because the burdensome tax rate so adversely distorts taxpayers’ incentive 
to earn (taxable) income in this range of tax rate47 – the positive effect by increased 
tax rate is overwhelmed by the negative effect by decreased tax base.  Thus, if the 
government is economically rational to maximize tax revenue, it should impose the 













                                                 
46 The trade-off relation between tax rates and tax revenues is named the Laffer Curve.  As Laffer 
himself admits, however, this concept should be credited to Ibn Khaldun, a 14th century Muslim 
philosopher, and more recently, John Meynard Keynes.  Arthur B. Laffer, The Laffer Curve: Past, 
Present, and Future, Heritage Foundation (2004) (also available at http://www.gates-
home.com/files/Laffer%20Curve%20-%20Past%20Presetn%20and%20Future.pdf.).  Professor Olson 
stated, “As Joseph Schumpeter (1991) lucidly pointed out, and Ibn Kalduhn (1967) sensed much 
earlier, tax receipts will (if we start with low taxation) increase as tax rates increase, but after the 
revenue-maximizing rate is reached, higher tax rates distort incentives and reduce income so much that 
tax collections fall.”  Olson, supra note 8 at 569.   
 
47 Olson, supra note 8; Laffer, supra note 46.    
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Figure 1: Optimal Tax Rate 1 
  
X axis: tax rate 
Y axis: tax revenue 
 
In Olson’s world, the method and degree of “taxation” (i.e., theft by bandits) 
is an important feature in distinguishing roving and stationary bandits.  An (extreme) 
roving bandit will choose to take everything possible from victims.  In other words, 
the imposed tax rate by the roving bandit is 100 percent in this case.  Under this harsh 
tax rate, it is expected that victims will end up producing nothing in the next stage 
since they will be deprived of everything again.  As a result, the tax base will shrink 
to zero, and in turn the tax revenue accruing to a roving bandit approaches zero soon 
as well.   
However, when a bandit becomes stationary, a self-interested autocrat chooses 
a revenue-maximizing tax rate which is far less than a roving bandit’s ruthless tax 
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rate.48  This generous tax rate imposed by a stationary bandit will foment his subjects’ 
incentive to produce, save, and invest for the future, which will create a larger tax 
base.  Tax revenues will continuously accrue to a stationary bandit, and the sum of tax 
revenue in the long run will exceed the one-shot tax collection of a comparable roving 
bandit.          
Now, let me turn the topic to controlling shareholders’ extractions in bad-law 
countries.  Like bandits in Olson’s world, controlling shareholders in bad-law 
jurisdictions impose (illicit) “tax” on their “subjects” (i.e., minority shareholders) by 
tunneling corporate assets at the sacrifice of minority shareholders (please note that 
“tax” is analogy).  If a controlling shareholder is interested in maximizing “tax 
revenue” (i.e., the amount of pecuniary private benefits), he should use the optimal 
trade-off relation between “tax rates” (i.e., the extraction rate) and “the tax base” (i.e., 
the corporate value).     
A “roving” controller may take almost all corporate value through a one-shot 
transaction that is severely detrimental to minority shareholders.  However, the 
problem for a roving controller is that when the extraction rate is prohibitively high, 
minority shareholders lose their incentive to invest their money in that corporation 
and follow the Wall Street rule in the next stage.  Then corporate value, which is 
analogous to tax base, will drastically decrease in the subsequent period and a roving 
controller may not have another opportunity to accumulate his pecuniary interest in 
the future.  A roving controller does not use the optimal extraction strategy from the 
perspective of the long-term horizon.   
                                                 
48 Olson, supra note 8.  
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In contrast, a controller with sufficient strength in the economy may rationally 
settle down as a “stationary” controller in the domestic capital market, and will find 
that it is in his best interest to extract from minority shareholders to a more 
benevolent extent.  In other words, in order to maximize the amount of pecuniary 
private benefits, a stationary controller chooses the optimal extraction rate that is far 
less than a roving controller’s tax rate.  In that sense, a stationary controller’s limited 
theft is not the result of his generosity, but of his carefully-calculated rationality.  
Paradoxically, extra-legal factors such as the self-interest of controllers may 
substitute for an efficient legal infrastructure in some developing countries, at least to 
some degree.  Without strong intervention by the government and judiciary, the 
market performs self-regulation in a bad-law country, which is similar to Adam 
Smith’s explanation of the “invisible hand.”49        
 
2. When a Controlling Shareholder Rationally Chooses to be “Stationary” 
  
According to the conventional view, it is generally (if not always) presumed 
that controlling shareholders in bad-law jurisdictions can take all properties of a 
corporation at will.  In that sense, economic models have so far portrayed all 
controllers in bad-law countries as roving controllers who can potentially impose a 
nearly 100 percent tax rate on minority shareholders.  Since controllers have full 
discretion on the extent of taxation according to these traditional accounts, there is an 
urgent call to protect minority shareholders from controllers’ tyranny.  This view is 
                                                 
49 In fact, Olson himself explains that there is an “invisible hand” behind stationary banditry.  Olson, 
supra note 8.    
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correct in part and shows only the half of the picture.  In contrast to this conventional 
view that emphasizes the concerns arising from roving bandits in bad-law countries, I 
propose that there is another type of controlling shareholder, i.e., stationary bandits in 
bad-law countries.  Therefore, I request that the future economic models should take 
into consideration the presence of stationary controllers who levy a more generous 
taxation for the sake of their long-term prosperity, and inadvertently protect minority 
shareholders to some degree.   
Then, under what conditions and circumstances, if any, does a controlling 
shareholder in a developing country become a stationary controller?  Here, I put 
forward potential answers as to when a controlling shareholder becomes stationary.  
First, a simplified numerical example is explained, and subsequently a more 
generalized model is examined.50   
 
(a) When a Controller Rationally Becomes Stationary – A Numerical 
Example       
 
Due to the inefficient legal system and enforcement in a bad-law jurisdiction, 
a controlling shareholder is able to extract corporate value from public shareholders 
in a form of a one-shot deal – the extreme form of extraction by a roving controller.  
For example, suppose that the amount of equity in a corporation is 100 million dollars 
– at the outset, a controller invests 50 million dollars and public shareholders invest 
                                                 
50 As explained in the Introduction, my primary aim in this Article is not to work case studies from 
concrete examples in particular countries.  Rather, it is to propose abstract theories and rationales for 
examining the possibility of stationary controllers’ presence, which has not been considered in 
traditional models of controlling shareholders.   
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the remaining 50 million dollars.  Suddenly, the controller extracts 100 million dollars 
from the corporation, and it is left as a shell that does not have any meaningful assets 
for public shareholders.   
Alternatively, a controlling shareholder may think that maintaining a 
corporation as a “proverbial golden goose” may be more attractive to him (and his 
children), if he extracts a part of the corporate value for long time.  Suppose that a 
controller receives a stream of cash flows of 5 million dollars each year – 2.5 million 
dollars are from the pro-rata cash flow available to all shareholders, and the 
remaining 2.5 million dollars are from cash flow exclusive to him as a result of 
exploitation.  Suppose that this amount of annual dividend and illicit exploitation is 
sustainable and acceptable to minority shareholders.  Then, they are willing to keep 
investing their money in that corporation. 51   For simplicity, the discount rate is 
assumed to be zero here.  If he is patient enough with a long time horizon, in 20 years 
he will be better off because the total pecuniary benefit that he can gain as a 
stationary controller is more than 100 million dollars, which is the amount of a one-
shot extraction as a roving controller.52  In sum, being a stationary controller is more 
beneficial to him if he is able to stay in a corporation for a long time horizon.   
 
                                                 
51 When public shareholders decide whether or not to remain in a controlled corporation, they will take 
into account “tax” by controllers (a controller’s exploitation is analogous to the “tax”).  If the “after 
tax” return is satisfactory to public shareholders, they keep their investment in that corporation.      
 
52 In other words, the strategy of a modest annual and periodic looting (i.e., “taxation”) of 2.5 million 
dollars is better for him than that of a drastic looting of 50 million dollars at once.   
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(b) When a Controller Rationally Becomes Stationary – A More 
Generalized Valuation Model       
        
A generalized model for a “stationary” controller can be derived from the 
valuation model in financial economics.  The value of an asset that generates cash 
flow in each period can be measured by the discounted cash flow (DCF) formula.53  
According to the DCF formula, the present value of an asset is equal to the sum of the 
present values of expected cash flows with relevant discount rates.  Therefore, the 
present value of common stocks in a firm should be the sum of all discounted 
dividends in the future.54   
In the DCF model, the life of common stocks is assumed to be infinite – 
barring such corporate hazards as bankruptcy or acquisition, common stocks are 
immortal.55  Thus, the price of common stocks of a firm (P0) can be expressed as the 
present value of a perpetual stream of cash dividends (CFt).56  In particular, when a 
company’s dividends are expected to grow at the constant rate (g), the stock price 
(P0) is calculated by dividing the dividend of the first year (CF1) by the difference 
between the discount rate (r) and the growth rate (g)57 as is suggested by the constant 
growth model in Table 3.    
                                                 
53 For the more information about the valuation of shares, see BREALEY & MEYERS, PRINCIPLE OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE (McGraw-Hill Irwin 6th ed. 2000).   
 
54 Id.     
 
55 Id. at 65. 
56 Id. at 66.  It is written as; P0 = 




   (P0 stands for the price of common stock; DIVt stands 
for dividend paid out at the end of year t; r stands for the discount rate; ∞ indicates infinity).     
 
57 Id. at 67.   
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 P0 = 




    
 P0 = gr
CF

1                  
- P0 : the price of common stocks of a firm 
- CFt : cash dividends that shareholders are paid at the end of year t 
- r : the discount rate 
- g : the growth rate 
 
 
In a developing country with bad-law, it can be said that a (stationary) 
controlling shareholder receives two sources of dividends from a corporation, as 
shown in the numerical example above: (i) he is paid pro-rata “normal dividends” (or 
any form of legitimate pecuniary benefits from a corporation) that are also available 
to all (public) shareholders according to each shareholder’s economic interest; (ii) in 
addition, he is paid “special dividends” (or any form of illicit pecuniary benefits from 
a corporation) exclusively for himself in the form of pecuniary private benefits of 
control58 (it should be noted that in this Article, while “pecuniary private benefits of 
control” refers to pecuniary benefits that exclusively (and illegally) belong to 
controllers, “pecuniary benefits” are defined more broadly to include any justified 
(legal) monetary benefits for controllers, like pro-rata dividends).  These (illicit) 
“special dividends” – i.e., pecuniary private benefits are available to a controller since 
he is effectively insulated from interference by government authorities and from the 
                                                 
58 Generally, “special dividends” refer to a corporation’s payments to its shareholders.  They are 
special because they are different from regularly recurring dividends.  In this Article, however, “special 
dividends” are meant to be various types of illicit cash flows to a controlling shareholder.  They are 
special because these payments are only available to a controller.     
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courts’ intervention, due to the inefficient legal infrastructure in a developing country.  
Accordingly, the present value that a (stationary) controlling shareholder expects to 
have in a corporation can be calculated by summing up the present value of “normal 
dividends” and “special dividends” accruing to a controller.      
Let us first consider the present value of a stream of “special dividends” 
belonging to a stationary controller.  The expected amount of extraction (i.e., “special 
dividend”) at the end of year t is notated as Extt.  Then, the final period and discount 
rate are notated as N and r respectively.  SD0 is defined as the present value of 
perpetual extractions belonging to a controller – in the same way, SDN is the value of 
perpetual extractions at the end of year N.  In addition, the constant growth model can 
be used for the valuation of the pecuniary private benefits of control to a stationary 
controller.   
An (extreme) roving controller steals all corporate value at once.  Thus, there 
is no “tomorrow” in the minds of him and victims – therefore, no possibility of 
corporate growth is expected under his reign.  In contrast, since the partial taxation 
policy of a stationary controller encourages minority shareholders to invest in the 
future, a corporation will experience growth.  Suppose that the value of a corporation 
under a stationary controller grows at the constant rate (g).  Then, even if the “tax 
rate” (the rate of extraction from minority shareholders) is constant over each period, 
the dollar amount of annual extraction by a controller increases at the rate of g as 
well.59  Accordingly, the present value of extractions to a stationary controller (SD0) 
                                                 
59 I assume here that as the value of a corporation grows at the rate of g, the “tax revenue” of a 
stationary controller (the amount of extraction in each period) grows at the same rate, if “tax rates” (the 
rate of extraction from a corporation) are the same across periods.  Tax revenue is equal to the product 
of tax rates and tax base.  Accordingly, if tax rates are the same, the only factor to determine the size of 
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is written in two ways, as is shown in Table 4 – the two formulas are driven by the 
general DCF model and the constant growth model respectively.   
     
Table 4: The Present Value of Extractions to a Stationary Controller 
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- SD0 : the present value of extractions to a stationary controller 
- SDN : the value of extractions to a stationary controller at the end of year N 
- Extt. : the expected amount of extraction (i.e., “special dividend”) at the end of year t 
- r : the discount rate 
- g : the growth rate 
 
 
Suppose that N is infinite – this means that a controlling shareholder’s tenure 
is infinite, which is unrealistic since no human being is immortal.  Since I will come 
back to resolve this issue soon, let us maintain this assumption for a while.  Then, the 
present value of extractions to a stationary controller (SD0) can be reduced to the 
following formula in Table 5, similarly found in valuing common stock without 
maturity.   
 
                                                                                                                                           
tax revenue is the tax base.  In the context of controlling shareholders’ expropriation, “tax base” is the 
value of the corporation.  Consequently, if the value of the corporation grows at the rate of g and the 
rate of extraction from a corporation is constant over time, the amount of extraction in each period 
grows at the rate of g as well.      
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Table 5: The Present Value of Extractions to a Stationary Controller When His 
Time Horizon Is Large Enough60 
 
 




                                                                 
 
- SD0 : the present value of extractions to a stationary controller 
- Ext1. : the expected amount of extraction (i.e., “special dividend”) at the end of year 1 
- r : the discount rate 
- g : the growth rate 
                                                                                         
 
The present value of “normal dividends” (i.e., the present value of the pro-rata 
payment to every shareholder) belonging to a stationary controller, which is noted as 
ND0, can be calculated in the same way if the assumption of a controller’s 
immortality is maintained.  Therefore, the present value of “normal dividends” is 
expressed as a pro-rata dividend in the year 1 (Div1) over the difference between the 
discount rate (r) and the growth rate (g).  Put together, the present value of total 
pecuniary benefits that a stationary controlling shareholder (V0) has in a corporation is 
the sum of the present values of “normal dividends” (i.e., the present value of 
accumulated pro-rata dividends in the future) and “special dividends” (i.e., the present 





        
                                                 
60 To use this formula, the discount rate (r) should be greater than the growth rate (g).    
  
 123
Table 6: The Present Value of Total Pecuniary Benefits to a Stationary 
Controlling Shareholder 
 
                                                  









- Div1: the amount of pro-rata dividend that a controller is paid at the end of year 1 
- Ext1: the amount of extraction that a controller siphons at the end of year 1 
- r: the discount rate      
- g: the growth rate 
- ND0: the present value of the sum of “normal dividends” (i.e., the present value of 
pro-rata dividends for a controller)  
- SD0: the present value of the sum of “special dividends” (i.e., the present value of 
extractions for a controller) 
- V0: the present value of the total pecuniary benefits that a stationary controlling 
shareholder has in a corporation = the present value of sum of pro-rata dividends and 
extractions = “normal dividends” plus “special dividends” = ND0 + SD0 
                                                                                            
 
 
(c) A Controller’s Rational Decision – To Be “Roving” Or “Stationary”       
 
The above formulas explain how much pecuniary benefit – either through 
“normal” or “special” dividends – a controlling shareholder can expect, if he chooses 
to be stationary.  On the other hand, a controlling shareholder may choose to be 
roving if he wishes.  In that case, he takes all corporate wealth, including his own 
paid-in capital as well as the minorities’ at time 0 (now).  Let us note the amount that 
a roving controller loots from a corporation through a one-shot transaction at time 0 
as ROV0.  Then, as we have seen in the numerical example, a controlling shareholder 
will choose to be either roving or stationary.   
So far, since he is assumed to be rational only in terms of wealth (I will loosen 
this assumption later in order to take into account non-pecuniary private benefits as 
well), he compares ROV0 (the value that a roving controller loots from a corporation 
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through a one-shot transaction at time 0, i.e., now) and V0 (the present value of total 
pecuniary benefits, consisting of normal and special dividends, to a stationary 
controller).  The conclusion is obvious; if ROV0 is larger than V0, it is in his best 
interest to be roving; if V0 is larger than ROV0, a rational controller will choose to be 
stationary.  I call it “one-factor analysis” since a controlling shareholder takes into 
account only the level of wealth, i.e., pecuniary benefit.  One-factor analysis is 
summarized in Table 7.      
 




 ROV0 > V0 : a controlling shareholder chooses to be roving 
 ROV0 < V0 : a controlling shareholder chooses to be stationary 
- ROV0: the total value that a roving controller loots from a corporation through a one-
shot transaction at time 0 (now) 
 
- V0 : the present value of the total pecuniary benefit that a stationary controlling 
shareholder has in a corporation  
 
 
ROV0 and V0 represent the liquidating and going concern values of private 
benefits of control respectively.  In general, since the going concern value is larger 
than the liquidating value, it is likely that V0 is larger than ROV0 as long as a 
controlling shareholder is patient.  This phenomenon is already shown in the 
aforementioned numerical example – if a controller waits for 20 years, being a 
stationary controller is the better choice for him than being a roving controller.  In 
Olson’s world of political banditry, this common sense is explained in the same way 
– when a roving bandit settles down and rules over his subjects exclusively in a 
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certain domain as a stationary bandit, it is in his best interest to maximize the total 
value of theft in the long run.    
        However, it is an oversimplification to state that all controlling shareholders 
will choose to be stationary – there are several factors that affect the ultimate decision 
by a controlling shareholder.  As seen in the formula, i.e., “V0 = [Div1 + Ext1] / (r – 
g),” the amount of the total pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller (V0) is the 
function of a dividend in year 1 (DIV1), an extraction at a sustainable level in year 1 
(Ext1), the growth rate (g), and the discount rate (r).  Given a dividend and a 
sustainable extraction level in year 1 (DIV1 and Ext1), the amount of the total 
pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller (V0) becomes larger: (i) when the growth 
rate (g) is larger, and (ii) when the discount rate (r) is smaller.  Consequently, with 
the combination of a larger growth rate and a smaller discount rate, a controller is 
more likely to be a stationary controller.  The reverse is true as well – with the 
combination of a smaller growth rate and a larger discount rate, there is more 
likelihood that a controller will be roving.  In addition, we should bear in mind that 
the formula assumes that N approaches an infinite (or large) number and the “tax 
rate” is constant across all periods.       




IV. FAMILY CORPORATIONS AND “STATIONARY” 
CONTROLLERS  
 
So far, I have reviewed the foundation of economic analyses of stationary 
controllers.  In this Part, I add the concept of “family” corporations to the analytical 
framework of stationary controllers, and make the generalized model more realistic.  
In fact, the concept of “family” corporations is very difficult to define,61 although it is 
always used colloquially.  According to Professor Morck, there are at least two 
definitions of the “family” firm.  First, broadly defined, it is used to refer to any firm 
with a dominant shareholder.62  Then Microsoft is a family firm, even though Bill 
Gates has given no notice of any intention to pass control to his sons or daughters.63  
Second, if it is narrowly defined, a “family” corporation64 refers to a corporation 
where family control is expected to continue to the next generation through 
inheritance.65   This Article depends on the latter narrow definition of a “family” 
corporation.   
                                                 
61 Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family 




62 Ronald C. Anderson & David Reeb, Founding Family Ownership and Firm Performance, Evidence 
from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301 (2003).   
 
63 Morck & Yeung, supra note 61 at 3. 
 
64 This Article uses terms such as “family business,” “family business group,” “business group,” 
“corporate group,” and “family corporate group” interchangeably.     
 
65 Heirs may come to realize that professionals can run the family’s firms better than themselves and 
may opt to become passive investors with diversified portfolios of stock in firms they do not control.  
This appears to be the path chosen by numerous wealthy American heirs, including the Rockefellers 
(Morck & Yeung, supra note 61).  However, this is not the case for some countries in East Asia.  
Rather than remaining wealthy but passive investors, family controllers and heirs like to control 




1. Length of Tenure and Controlling “Family” Shareholders       
 
Suppose that for some reason, an absolute tyrant in a country stays on the 
throne for a short period.  Accordingly, he does not have a long-term plan to pursue – 
as the final period approaches, it is in his best interest to take as much as possible as 
from his subjects.  In this case, unfortunately, subjects are under a roving bandit and 
face a high risk of total plunder.  As Professor Olson wisely explains, this is why the 
king’s subjects have more reason to be sincere when they say that “long live the 
king.” 66   “If the king anticipates and values dynastic succession, that further 
lengthens the planning horizon and is good for his subjects.”67   With an infinite 
tenure through inheritance, the king is more likely to act as a stationary bandit who 
“benevolently” exploits people in his kingdom.      
The same logic applies to the context of corporate governance in developing 
countries.  In a bad-law jurisdiction, like a despotic kingdom, a controlling 
shareholder of a corporation has enormous power to extract corporate wealth at the 
expense of minority shareholders.  Under these circumstances, the longer a 
controller’s tenure is, the more likely he is to be stationary, other things being equal.  
Since a stationary controller and minority shareholders share encompassing interests, 
minority shareholders wish to have a controller with a more extended horizon.  
                                                                                                                                           
position or fame is extremely important – in other words, the non-pecuniary private benefits of control 
are valued very highly.           
 
66 Olson, supra note 8 at 571.  
 
67 Olson, supra note 8 at 571.   
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Here, the notion of a “family” corporation comes into the economic analyses 
of stationary banditry.  In the previous Part, I propose a model for calculating the 
present value of total pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller, which is based on 
the assumption that a controller’s tenure is infinite.  Unlike a corporation that is an 
eternal entity, the life of a controlling shareholder is limited – therefore, the model is 
not practical.  Through intra-family inheritance, however, a controlling “family” 
shareholder can achieve immortality (i.e., infinite tenure) as long as he treats his 
descendants’ utility as the equivalent of his own. 68   One explanation of why a 
controlling “family” shareholder is altruistic for his children is that his genes will 
survive in his descendants as well.  If genes consider a father (a today’s controller) 
and his children (future controllers) as the same entity, the father’s altruism is in fact, 
another appearance of genetic selfishness.69  Then, he is expected to keep a “golden 
goose” for the future rather than to kill it and take more eggs for today.   
Now, by the introduction of the notion of “family,” the present value of total 
pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller, “V0 = [Div1 + Ext1] / (r – g),” which 
assumes an infinite time horizon (N) of a controller, can be justified.  The notion of 
“family” solves another difficult problem in a stationary controller as well.  As seen 
in the above example of a tyrant, the final period problem may occur if his tenure is 
limited.  In the context of corporate governance, it can be said that a controlling 
shareholder with absolute power is more likely to change his status from a stationary 
controller to a roving controller, as his final period of “reign” in a corporation 
becomes closer.  However, family succession can reduce the likelihood of the final 
                                                 
68 Ronald J. Gilson, supra note 20 at 644.  
 
69 I borrowed the terminology of the “selfish gene” from Richard Dawkins’ book “The Selfish Gene.”   
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period problem since the tenure is effectively extended to infinity via inheritance.70  
Accordingly, a controlling “family” shareholder shares more encompassing interests 
with minority shareholders, and a family corporation is more likely to be prosperous 
and productive 71  under the cooperative and repeated game between an immortal 
controller and public shareholders.      
To be sure, it is in the best interests of minority shareholders to have good 
legal infrastructures and systems that protect their interests in corporations and the 
capital market.  Nonetheless, if it is minority shareholders’ fate to stay in a bad-law 
jurisdiction and invest there, having a controlling “family” system may be more 
favorable to minority shareholders than having a corporate dictator – either a 
controller or professional manager – with limited tenure.                         
 
2. Non-Pecuniary Private Benefits of Control and Stationary Controllers     
 
Extant literature predominantly emphasizes a controlling shareholder’s desire 
for pecuniary benefits – it is assumed that an economically rational controlling 
shareholder is only concerned about maximizing the level of wealth he can acquire.  
In reality, however, the psychological satisfaction arising from managing a 
corporation – for example, social prestige, reputation, and social influence72 – is an 
                                                 
70 See generally, Gilson, supra note 20.   
 
71 Professor Olson said, “Given autocracy, then, dynamic succession can be socially desirable, both 
because it may reduce the likelihood of succession crises and because it may give monarchs more 
concern for the long run and the productivity of their societies.” Olson, supra note 8 at 572.  This 
explanation can be applied to “family” controlling ownerships in many developing countries as well.                  
 
72 See e.g., Gilson, supra note 4.  Running sports teams is another example for gaining the non-
pecuniary benefits.  Gilson, supra note 4 at 1667.  For example, the Steinbrenner family, even if they 
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important factor as well because a controlling shareholder considers it to be another 
form of “compensation.”  Put simply, “money is not everything,” even to business 
people.73   In that sense, the utility function of a controlling shareholder is more 
complicated than may have been thought – it should take into consideration not only 
pecuniary benefits but also non-pecuniary benefits. 74   In this sense, the goal of a 
controlling shareholder is not to maximize his wealth, but to maximize his utility from 
a combined “consumption”75 of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.76     
                                                                                                                                           
have spent a lot of money to run the New York Yankees, is compensated (at least partially) when the 
New York Yankees win the World Series championship (of course, the Steinbrenner family may 
expect financial benefits from the team as well).   
 
73 Economics is not merely a study of “money.”  Instead, it is a study of incentive, utility, and the 
happiness of human beings.  Thus, psychological satisfaction should be included as an important factor 
when we analyze based on the “economics” model.  For example, “Some managerial teams attempt to 
insulate themselves from investors’ control in order to carry out programs that they view as more 
important than profits.  Both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal have established 
structures that give their mangers substantial freedom to produce news at the (potential) expense of 
profit.” FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
13 (Harvard University Press 1996).         
 
74 Professor Gilson is one of the first few scholars who take into account the presence and value of 
non-pecuniary private benefits of control. See e.g., Gilson, supra note 20.       
 
75 I use the word a “consumption,” because my argument here partially relies on a microeconomics 
theory of a consumer’s optimization.      
 
76 Indeed, figuring out the value and utility of psychological satisfaction is not a simple job.  Measuring 
wealth is relatively easy (in fact, it is not easy as well) because at least a dollar amount is measurable.  
On the other hand, measuring psychological utility is almost impossible; there is no market price for 
psychological pleasure that is valued objectively; psychological utility is a subjective value system by 
its nature.  The relative price of pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits constantly changes 
depending on situations including the absolute amount of her wealth – for example, the marginal utility 
of non-pecuniary private benefits of control decreases as her wealth, including pecuniary benefits, 
accumulates; in addition, there is not even a definition of “one unit” of non-pecuniary benefits that can 
be converted into some amount of dollars.  Probably, these are reasons why extant literature has not 
paid attention non-pecuniary benefits in detail – in other words, how can we add up the utility of non-
pecuniary and pecuniary benefits that lack a common and justified unit?  Despite these problems, 
however, at least a theoretical economic model on the utility function of a controlling shareholder 
should take into consideration the presence of non-pecuniary benefits.  Without non-pecuniary benefits 
of control, we may not precisely understand what determines a controlling shareholder’s strategic and 
operational decisions in a controlled corporation.  In particular, the presence of non-pecuniary benefits 
may be a significant factor that can alter the looting policy of a controlling shareholder – whether he 
would be a “roving” or “stationary” controller. 
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Indeed, every human being wants to show that he has achieved more than 
other people have done.  To business people, for example, building their own 
business empire is a special achievement that other people may not be able to do.  
Now, by bequeathing his throne to his children, the founder of a family corporation 
can continue to impact the world even after his death – his (selfish) gene77 is still 
alive in the next generations.  Keeping the family name in their empire – in itself does 
not generate money though – is significantly valuable to a controlling family.78   
 
(a) One-Factor Analysis v. Two-Factor Analysis         
 
In the previous Part, I introduced “one-factor analysis” of a controller’s 
determining whether to be roving or stationary.  When only pecuniary benefits are 
taken into consideration, a rational controller should compare the dollar amount of 
ROV0 (i.e., the value that a roving controller loots from a corporation through a one-
shot transaction at time 0, i.e., now) and V0 (i.e., the present value of the total 
pecuniary benefit to a stationary controller): (i) when ROV0 is greater than V0, he 
chooses to be a roving controller; (ii) when V0 is greater than ROV0, he chooses to be 
a stationary controller.   
                                                 
77 See supra note 69.   
 
78 We have sometimes seen that dictators bequeath their position to children.  A notable example is the 
Kim dynasty in North Korea.  Kim Il-Sung observed that Khrushchyov denounced Stalin in the Soviet 
Union after Khrushchyov succeeded Stalin.  Perhaps, Kim Il-Sung was deeply concerned about a 
possible denouncement after his death.  In order to reduce this risk, Kim Il-Sung appointed his son 
(Kim Jung-Il) as his successor (in fact, while I am writing this Article, Kim Jung-Il appointed his son – 
i.e., Kim Il-Sung’s grandson – Kim Jung-Un as his successor as well).  This example in North Korea 
shows how human beings care about their “name” and “reputation” even after their death.  This 
tendency may be true for business people as well, although the extent varies in each country.           
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After recognition of the presence of non-pecuniary benefits, however, a 
controller will take into account both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits when 
determining to be roving or stationary.  Thus, “two-factor analysis,” which better 
reflects reality, is now required.  Let us note the present value of non-pecuniary 
benefits of control, including a controller’s descendants’, as Alpha.  Then, a 
controlling shareholder should compare ROV0 and the sum of two factors, V0 and 
Alpha: (i) when ROV0 is greater than the sum of V0 and Alpha, he chooses to be 
roving; (ii) on the contrary, when the case is the reverse, he chooses to be stationary.  
Table 8 shows this explanation.    
 
Table 8: One-Factor Analysis v. Two-Factor Analysis 
 
 
 One-Factor Analysis  
(i) ROV0 > V0 : a controlling shareholder chooses to be roving 
(ii) ROV0 < V0 : a controlling shareholder chooses to be stationary 
 
 Two-Factor Analysis 
(i) ROV0 > V0 + Alpha : a controlling shareholder chooses to be roving 
(ii) ROV0 < V0 + Alpha : a controlling shareholder chooses to be stationary 
 
- ROV0: the value that a roving controller loots from a corporation through a 
one-shot transaction at time 0, i.e., now 
- V0: the present value of the total pecuniary benefit to a stationary controller 






What is the implication of the new approach, i.e., two-factor analysis, in the 
context of a controlling shareholder system with bad-law?  Under the two-factor 
analysis, even if ROV0 is much greater than V0, a controlling shareholder chooses to 
be stationary as long as Alpha compensates for the difference of two numbers (ROV0 
– V0).  For example, when ROV0 is 100 million dollars and V0 is only 70 million 
dollars, according to the one-factor analysis, a controller definitely should choose to 
be roving.  However, under the two-factor analysis, a controller should choose to be 
stationary as long as the value of a family’s non-pecuniary benefits (i.e., Alpha) is 
more than 30 million dollars.   
As such, there is more likelihood that a controlling shareholder will be found 
as stationary when applying the two-factor analysis (rather than the one-factor 
analysis) and when the value of Alpha is large.  The more highly a controlling family 
shareholder values reputation, social prestige and family influence, the larger the 
value of Alpha is for him – accordingly, the more likely it is that the controller will be 
stationary.  Since Alpha is defined as the non-pecuniary private benefits to all family 
members, a significant part of the value of Alpha may be reserved for a controller’s 
future descendants if a controlling family shareholder treats his descendants’ utility as 
approaching equivalence to his own.  Conversely, when he does not put a high value 
on his descendants’ happiness, the value of Alpha will be deeply discounted.  Thus, 
when the incumbent controller is more altruistic to his future descendants, the value 
of Alpha is larger.   
From the perspective of minority shareholders, the presence of a large Alpha 
is more beneficial.  Since the larger Alpha makes the controller more stationary, it is 
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expected that the controlling family shareholder with the larger Alpha will extract 
pecuniary private benefits to a more lenient degree.                                   
                 
(b) Interplay between Pecuniary and Non-pecuniary Benefits in Family 
Corporations           
 
There is a proverb in East Asia: “The King is a ship and his subjects are water.  
A ship floats on the water, but the same water can overturn the ship.”  In history in 
the East and the West, we know that harsh taxation and looting by an absolute 
monarch has lead to his subjects’ discontent, resistance, and ultimately to a revolution 
resulting in ending the dynasty – broadly defined, perhaps the Boston Tea Party is an 
example as well.  This lesson is applicable to family shareholders managing large 
corporations as well, because family controllers are despotic “kings” in corporations 
that are their empires.  In fact, it is almost impossible for minority shareholders to 
“overthrow” a particular controlling shareholder in active ways even if they are 
deeply discontented with corporate performance and governance; first, a controlling 
shareholder has by definition a majority of votes; and second, minority shareholders 
face a huge collective action problem hindering a successful insurgency.  Nonetheless, 
minority shareholders can punish a tyrannical controlling shareholder by adopting a 
passive method of resistance: “voting with their feet.”  When an unjustified “tax” by a 
controller (in the form of minority extraction) is harsh enough, minority shareholders 
will sell their shares (i.e., by following the Wall Street Rule) and exit a corporation, 
devastating the corporate dynasty.    
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It is noteworthy that a displeased minorities’ exit after cruel theft might not be 
a punishment at all to a roving controller.  All a roving controller is concerned about 
is how to efficiently extract money from minority shareholders at the time when he 
loots, i.e., today.  After looting, he does not care whether minorities leave a 
corporation, which is left as a shell.  Clearly, a roving controller does not have any 
incentive to maintain a shell company as his empire for the future.  In other words, 
tomorrow is not existent in a roving controller’s mind, and losing his empire by the 
minorities’ exit is an absent concern.   
As such, minority shareholders’ collective decision to follow the Wall Street 
Rule 79  and enact an exodus from a business empire threatens only a stationary 
controller.  Having a large base of minority shareholders gives huge advantages to a 
stationary controller because it is the essence of non-pecuniary private benefits; the 
more minority shareholders a controlling family shareholder has, the more equity he 
holds in a corporation and the more debts he can borrow.  As a result, he is able to 
control more assets, which means he is able to build a larger empire.  Conversely, 
when a controlling family shareholder has a small base of minority shareholders, he 
will end up having a small empire, which reduces his (and his descendants’) non-
pecuniary private benefits significantly.  Consequently, minorities’ collective exit 
from a controller’s corporate empire works as a prime punishment to a controller.   
In that sense, if non-pecuniary benefits – especially benefits arising from 
maintaining the control of large corporations – are highly valued in a particular 
culture, a controller with a long-term plan has an incentive to be recognized as a 
                                                 
79 Wall Street Rule is the tendency of shareholders to sell their stocks when they are disappointed by 
those stocks.      
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benevolent bandit.  It is because by imposing low “taxation” on minority shareholders, 
a controller is able to manage a larger corporation and enjoy higher non-pecuniary 
benefits as a result.  In other words, if a king wishes to rule over a larger empire, 
ultimately he should “buy” more subjects’ support (or public opinion) by reducing the 
tax rate. 80   
The more interesting factor to consider is that the value increase of the non-
pecuniary benefits to a controller might lead to the value increase of the pecuniary 
benefits to a controller as well.  As is explained earlier, a reduction in the “tax rate” 
(i.e., extraction rate) sometimes increases “tax revenue” (i.e., pecuniary private 
benefits) due to the enlarged “tax base” (i.e., minorities’ investment in a corporation) 
when the current “tax rate” is above the optimal level maximizing revenue.  In this 
case, a controlling shareholder may attain more pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits 
(i.e., expansion of his empire) by lowering the “tax rate.”   
It is noteworthy that, even when a reduction in the “tax rate” decreases “tax 
revenue” (when the current “tax rate is below the optimal level), the “tax rate” 
reduction is often beneficial to a controller.  Why?  Now, the lower “tax rate” 
decreases pecuniary benefits for a controller.  However, it increases non-pecuniary 
benefits since more minority shareholders come to “reside” in his empire.  Thus, as 
                                                 
80 In fact, minority shareholders do not know how much a controlling shareholder extract pecuniary 
private benefits.  However, in the capital market, they are able to know the after “tax” (extraction) 
return i.e., the return that they receive after a controlling shareholder extracts pecuniary benefits as 
“tax.”  Then, it can be said that what minority shareholders care is not how much a controlling 
shareholder takes extraction, but how much they receive ultimately after a controller’s extraction.  
Public shareholders will eventually migrate to a corporation where they can receive more after “tax” 
return.  Under these circumstances, a controlling shareholder faces two scenarios; the one is to increase 
the firm value more than other controllers and takes a large amount of extraction from the corporation; 
the other is not to take extraction from the corporation very much if he does not enhance the firm value 
more than other controllers.  Therefore, a more efficient and competent controlling shareholder can 
extract more from the corporation without losing minority shareholders.  However, if the efficiency of 
most controlling shareholders is similar, most controllers would choose to take extraction comparably 
with other controllers in order not to lose minority shareholders.       
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long as any additional non-pecuniary benefits are larger than foregone pecuniary 
benefits, even choosing a lower “tax rate” than the optimal point will lead to a higher 
utility for a controller.  Again, it cannot be overemphasized that the aim of an 
individual human being, including a controller, is not to maximize wealth, but to 
maximize utility consisting of psychological satisfaction as well as wealth – therefore, 
a controller’s aim is not to maximize “tax revenue” but to maximize the sum of the 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from running his kingdom.             
 
(c) Summary of Non-pecuniary Benefits  
    
A roving controller takes everything from minority shareholders – it is 
equivalent to saying that his “tax rate” is 100 percent.  In contrast, a stationary 
controller’s “tax rate” is much lower than that of a roving controller.  However, by 
choosing an optimal “tax rate,” a stationary controller may maximize “tax revenue.”  
To a stationary controller, protecting minority shareholders by reducing the “tax rate” 
is in fact protecting and improving his interests. 
The presence of non-pecuniary benefits can reduce a stationary controller’s 
“tax rate” further.  “Tax revenue” accounts for a large part of the pecuniary benefits 
for a stationary controller.  However, a controller is willing to give up some pecuniary 
benefits as long as the utility achieved from additional non-pecuniary benefits is 
larger than the utility foregone from lost pecuniary benefits.  If sufficient utility from 
non-pecuniary benefits is attained from expanding the business empire, it is possible 
that a stationary controller is more benefited by reducing the “tax rate” from the 
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optimal point, resulting in lowering “tax revenue” and pecuniary benefits.  When this 
is the case, minority shareholders find that having a stationary controller is more 
beneficial to them than having a roving controller in two ways: (i) through a 
controller’s reduction of the tax rate from 100 percent to the optimal tax rate; and (ii) 
through a controller’s additional reduction of the tax rate from the optimal tax rate to 
the tax rate that can maximize the sum of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits for a 
controller.  In other words, when a controller takes into consideration non-pecuniary 
benefits of control, it is possible that the controller’s optimal tax rate is reduced 
further.    
    
Figure 2: Optimal Tax Rate 2 
 
X axis: “tax rate” (extraction rate) by a controller  
Curve 1: “tax revenue” (pecuniary private benefits of control) by a controller 
Curve 2: value of non-pecuniary benefits of control 
Curve 3: Curve 1 + Curve 2 
 
Implication: The optimal “tax rate” (max 3), where the sum of pecuniary private benefits and 
non-pecuniary benefits of control are maximized, is smaller than the optimal “tax rate” (max 
1), where pecuniary private benefits of control are maximized.         
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In sum, both a controller and minority shareholders are likely to be more 
satisfied under a stationary controller’s reign than under a roving controller’s reign – 
Pareto improvement takes place in the economy of stationary controllers.  A 
stationary controller can be praised as a “benevolent” king by minority shareholders 
who are pleased with the low “tax rate.”  As a result, the ship can stably float on the 
peaceful water.                     
 
3. Reputation81 as Being (Benevolent) Stationary Controllers 
 
So far I have dealt with the circumstances under which a controlling 
shareholder chooses to be stationary.  After evaluating his utility by two-factor 
analysis, a controller will decide to be stationary if being stationary provides more 
utility to him than being roving.  Then, minority shareholders are assumed to know 
with perfect certainty that a controller they encounter is stationary.  Under this 
assumption, it is rational for minority shareholders to participate in transactions with 
a stationary controller in the capital market since by doing so, they are benefited as 
well.   
As opposed to this assumption, in reality, even if a controller would like to act 
as a stationary controller, minority shareholders are not able to know for sure that the 
                                                 
81 According to Shleifer & Vishny, “Reputation building is a very common explanation for why people 
deliver on their agreements even if they cannot be forced to.”  “[S]everal recent articles have presented 
reputation-building models of private financing. Diamond (1989, 1991) shows how firms establish 
reputations as good borrowers by repaying their short term loans, and Gomes (1996) shows how 
dividend payments create reputations that enable firms to raise equity.” See Shleifer & Vishny, supra 
note 26 at 749.    
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controller they deal with is truly a stationary controller – asymmetric information 
exists.  When minority shareholders do not trust that a controller is stationary, they do 
not cooperate with him in the capital market.  Expecting this mistrust among minority 
shareholders, a controller will abandon the option to be stationary in the first place, 
even though being stationary would generate much better utility for him than being 
roving.  In this Section, problems associated with trust by public shareholders and the 
reputation of a stationary controller are analyzed more in-depth.        
 
(a) Distrust among Potential Minority Shareholders  
 
As we have seen previously, the going concern value of a controller’s 
pecuniary benefits (V0) is generally larger than the liquidating value of his looting 
(ROV0).  Then, there is a fairly high possibility that the sum of the value of non-
pecuniary benefits (Alpha) and the going concern value of pecuniary benefits (V0) is 
larger than the liquidating value of looting (ROV0).  Consequently, given the 
assumption that a controlling family shareholder is patient and holds a long-term 
horizon, being a stationary controller by receiving the sum of Alpha and V0 is more 
advantageous to a family controller. 
The above conclusion, however, is conditional on a controlling shareholder 
being able to take a series of extractions continuously from minority shareholders – a 
large part of V0 is made by continuous extractions.  In order for a controller to extract 
continuously from minorities, he needs to attain minorities’ “trust” that he is truly 
stationary.  Then, what if investors in the capital market do not trust a controlling 
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shareholder’s integrity as a stationary controller?  For example, investors may think 
that a controller is not patient enough to plan for the future or that his discount rates 
are prohibitively high – as a result, investors may conclude that a controller they face 
is more likely to be roving.  In that case, many potential minority shareholders will 
not invest their money in the first place for fear of total plunder by a roving controller.  
Then, how can a controlling shareholder take a series of extractions continuously 
when he will not have sufficient minority shareholders in the next stage?  In addition, 
if a controller’s integrity is questioned, the value of non-pecuniary benefits (Alpha) 
will eventually shrink to zero in the near future since the controller will manage a 
corporation which no longer has many minority shareholders – the fewer minority 
shareholders a controller retains in the corporation, the less non-pecuniary benefits 
there are.82   
Facing the possibility of distrust among potential minority shareholders, a 
controlling shareholder is likely to end up with a small value of V0 and Alpha – now, 
there is substantial likelihood that the sum of Alpha and V0 is smaller than ROV0.  If 
so, a controlling shareholder will choose to be roving even if he initially wishes to be 
stationary – in this case, it is his optimal strategy to take everything from a 
corporation, which is detrimental to the existing minorities.  Indeed, it is not primarily 
important whether a controller is a stationary controller.  Instead, whether the market 
                                                 
82  If there is not sufficient equity influx from outside minority shareholders in the next stage, a 
controlling shareholder will be unable to use more debts as well due to the constraint of the debt to 
equity ratio – the size of the total debt that a controlling shareholder can use is linked to the size of 
available equity.   In turn, a corporation’s asset size – which is the sum of debt and equity – shrinks.  
Among others, non-pecuniary private benefits of control arise primarily from the asset size of a 
corporation that a controlling shareholder manages.  Thus, if she does not find more minority 
shareholders in the next stage, a controller’s non-pecuniary benefits associated with empire-building 
are ultimately lessened significantly.  Consequently, the value of Alpha will approach zero.   
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deems a controller to be a stationary controller is more significant and determinative.  
Put differently, the relevant question is not who you are, but who you seem to be.       
Thus, a stationary controller has to convince potential minority shareholders 
that he is sincerely stationary.  By assuring prospective investors, a controlling 
shareholder can play the game repeatedly83 in the capital market.  Since a stationary 
controller, by definition, is required to have continuous transactions with minority 
shareholders, establishing his integrity is the first thing he has to do in the market.  
Consequently, a stationary controller has to send off a credible signal to minority 
shareholders that he is really a stationary controller.  Otherwise, he will end up being 
a roving controller against his initial will and intent.    
 
(b) Reputational Advantages of Family Corporations   
 
Indeed, a controlling shareholder finds it difficult to send a credible signal to 
the capital market that he is a benevolent (stationary) controller.  When a capital 
market faces a huge problem of asymmetric information among market participants, a 
controller encounters a greater challenge when attempting to convince minorities that 
he is different from roving bandits who perhaps are prevalent in the market place.   
We often observe that corporate tycoons are involved in philanthropy – for 
example, many of them build non-profit foundations and donate scholarships for poor 
but capable students.  Although mostly their generosity might be sincere, they 
                                                 
83 When two parties in the market (i.e., a controlling shareholder and minority shareholders) do not 
make another transaction again, neither player needs to cooperate since neither is not concerned about 
the potential penalty imposed by the other.  As such, the prisoners’ dilemma arises and the end result is 
that each player chooses to “defect.”  However, if they are involved in repeated transactions, they will 
cooperate and Pareto improvement will be achieved.   
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sometimes use disguised altruism for image-making purposes – they would like to 
show to the world that they are good and trustworthy people.84  Put differently, such 
donations and other forms of philanthropy sometimes function as “advertisements” or 
public relations (PR) portraying that corporate tycoons are truly honest and principled 
and do not cheat investors and consumers.   
In this sense, a “family” controller has a comparative advantage in building a 
reputation and convincing prospective investors of his integrity.  Why?  It is almost 
impossible for investors to know whether, in a controller’s own mind, he is roving or 
stationary.  This is the reason that business people need to take costly measures such 
as sending off signals and “advertisements” to show that they are trustworthy 
businessmen or at least stationary bandits.  In contrast, investors are able to recognize 
more easily that a certain corporation is a “family” corporation by reviewing the 
corporate governance structure (e.g., how shares are spread among family members, 
whether children of a founder are managers or directors of a corporation, etc.).  
Clearly, it is more convenient for minority shareholders to observe the appearance of 
a corporation than to scan the mentality of a controller.   
When a sufficient number of prospective investors share the common opinion 
that a particular corporation is a family corporation, the market will presume that the 
tenure of a controller is perpetual via inheritance.  Then, potential minority 
shareholders trust that the controller will make repeated transactions with them in the 
capital market for a long time.  In other words, investors understand that it will likely 
be in a controlling family shareholder’s best interest to be stationary if he is involved 
                                                 
84 This point should be credited to Professor Merritt B. Fox.  When I discussed this Article with 
Professor Fox, he mentioned that public relations and image-making through donations and 
philanthropy can make business tycoons look sincere and moralistic.     
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in repeated transactions in the capital market. 85   Based on this belief, market 
participants implicitly anticipate that the final period of transactions will not be set 
within the reasonably foreseeable future.  As such, no backward induction will take 
place in these transactions, and coordination between minority shareholders and a 
controller is expected to continue, which results in enhanced benefits for both parties. 
 
(c) Reputational Advantages of Family Corporate “Groups”   
   
The comparative advantage of a family corporation in signaling a controller’s 
trustworthiness as a stationary controller is more apparent in a family corporate 
“group” context.  Once a controlling family shareholder is trusted by potential 
minority shareholders in one subsidiary, he is able to use scale and scope economy to 
maintain his family’s reputation by means of a diversified corporate “group,” because 
a controller’s reputation need not be industry-specific.86  Scale and scope economy 
lessens the transaction costs of convincing minority shareholders as to his integrity, 
and he can significantly enlarge the base of minority shareholders who are induced to 
trust him by his already verified reputation.   
Further, the presence of a corporate “group” works as a safety net for minority 
shareholders because in a corporate group, a controlling shareholder will not easily 
renege on his promise to be stationary.  Why?  If he deserts minority shareholders in 
                                                 
85 Of course, the decision of whether or not to continue to act as a stationary controller is totally 
dependent on the controller’s discretion or whim.  However, investors expect that if the controller is 
reasonable, he will not suddenly become a roving bandit unless there are revolutionary or catastrophic 
changes in the business environment surrounding him.   
 
86  Gilson, supra note 20 (continuing to explain that “Once family ownership is established, the 
marginal cost of transmitting that fact, and thereby providing a foundation for reputation-based trading, 
is decreasing with scale”). 
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the next stage for some reason, the adverse effect of breaking “an implicit contract” – 
a contract to be stationary and receive investors’ money – will be amplified through 
scale and scope economy of the reputation built in his corporate group.  The 
reputation of a controller’s corporate group as a whole will be tainted in the capital 
market, and there is substantial risk that minority shareholders will exit en masse 
from all subsidiaries when he does not meet investors’ expectations in even one 
subsidiary. 
In the analysis of banditry, it is noteworthy that one of reasons roving bandits 
are prevalent in a particular country is that there are so many bandits who are 
uncoordinated with respect to theft.  When “a common well” is available to many 
bandits, it is in their best interest to be roving – if one bandit waits to steal until 
tomorrow, other bandits will take everything today before he does.  In contrast, if 
there are a small number of (gigantic) bandits who are able to monopolize theft from 
subjects (i.e., victims) in their own domains, they are more likely to consider long-
term prosperity.  Knowing this, subjects tend to believe that these powerful bandits 
who establish their reign to nearly the full possible extent are benevolent and 
stationary.  In effect, under the powerful and monopolistic banditry, bandits and 
victims are on the same ship – cooperation is the best solution for both bandits and 
victims.  As a result, a positive feedback loop is formed between bandits and victims 
and it generates mutual benefits.        
The same logic can apply to the relationship between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders in a developing country.  Suppose that a developing 
economy – which is far smaller than the economy of the United States – is 
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predominated by family corporate “groups” consisting of a score of subsidiaries.  It 
means that a very small number of wealthy families dominate the entire economy of 
the country.  Naturally, these family controllers have (quasi) monopolistic power vis-
à-vis minority shareholders and there is only a low probability of a common well 
problem occurring.  Thus, controllers in corporate groups are more likely to have 
long-term horizons than those in small corporations.   
Consequently, in the capital market, signals of integrity from a “corporate 
group” are treated as being more creditworthy than those from an “individual 
corporation.”  A controller in a corporate group and minority shareholders are more 
likely to be involved in coordination and a self-enforcing mechanism through 
repeated games in the capital market, which leads to economic development.  In this 
sense, paradoxically there is high possibility that a developing country is better off 
with a (quasi) monopoly by a small number of large players (i.e., family corporate 
groups) in the capital market than with competition between a large number of 
independent corporations.   In sum, in terms of extraction and stealing, a monopolized 
banditry is much better to investors and an economy as a whole than a competitive 








V. WHAT MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR A FAMILY 
CONTROLLER TO BE STAIONARY? 
 
So far, I have examined why a controlling family shareholder is more likely to 
be a stationary controller.  Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that I say here 
“more likely.”  Put differently, I do not mean that every controlling family 
shareholder is stationary.  In this Part, I will review which factors make it difficult for 
a family controller to be a stationary controller, by using the formulas that I already 
introduced infra.  Table 9 presents a recap of the formulas. 
 
Table 9: Recap  
 
 
The Present Value of Total Pecuniary Benefits to A Stationary Controller 
  










- Div1: the amount of pro-rata dividend that a controller is paid at the end of year 1 
- Ext1: the amount of extraction that a controller siphons at the end of year 1 
- r: the discount rate      
- g: the growth rate 
- ND0: the present value of the sum of “normal dividends” (i.e., the present value of 
pro-rata dividends for a controller)  
- SD0: the present value of the sum of “special dividends” (i.e., the present value of 
extractions for a controller) 
- V0: the present value of total pecuniary benefits that a stationary controlling 
shareholder has in a corporation = the present value of the sum of pro-rata dividends 
and extractions = “normal dividends” plus “special dividends” = ND0 + SD0 
 
 
Two Factor Analysis 
(i) ROV0 > V0 + Alpha : a controlling shareholder chooses to be roving 
(ii) ROV0 < V0 + Alpha : a controlling shareholder chooses to be stationary 
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1. Variables in the Formulas Determining the Present Value of Extractions 
by a Stationary Controller 
 
As seen in the recap, the present value of extractions by a stationary controller 
(SD0) is determined by three variables – the dollar amount of an extraction in year 1 
(Ext1), the discount rate (r), and the growth rate (g).  The assumptions in the formulas 
are: (i) the discount rate is constant; (ii) the dollar amount of an extraction will 
increase at a constant rate; and (iii) the length of a controller’s tenure is infinite. 
 
(a) What If the Discount Rate Is Very High? 
 
 The discount rate (r) is very high when a corporation is subject to high risks, 
such as systematic macro-economic and country risk.  Then, the present value of total 
pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller (V0) decreases.  Accordingly, since the 
total value that a roving controller loots from a corporation through a one-shot 
transaction at time 0 (ROV0) has more chance of being larger than the sum of V0 and 
Alpha, being a roving controller is increasingly attractive to a controlling shareholder.  
For example, suppose that a controller is concerned about the possibility of 
hyperinflation in the future.  It will weaken the incentive of a controller to be 
stationary in the first place, since the inflation risk will increase the discount rate (r) 
and reduce the present value of total pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller (V0).   
Political risks in a specific country are a significant factor to determine the 
discount rate (r) as well.  If the political system of a country is unstable and the 
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government-business relationship does not protect businesspeople in the long run, 
controlling shareholders are not able to set up a long-term plan, which will hamper a 
controlling shareholder’s desire to be stationary.  For example, suppose that the 
government expropriates properties of businesspeople without due process and 
punishes them at its discretion.87  In other words, the government is more like a 
roving bandit in relation to businesspeople, who are victims in this context.  As a 
result, businesspeople who are concerned about total expropriation by the government 
have a strong incentive to siphon corporate wealth as soon as possible and remit 
money to foreign countries.  Consequently, reasonable controllers find that being 
roving is a better option than being stationary in the presence of a roving government.  
Conversely, when the government in a developing country is stationary rather than 
roving in relation to the business circle, the possibility that a controller will become 
stationary vis-à-vis minority shareholders increase.   
Another important issue about the discount rate (r) is how accurately and 
objectively it is determined.  In general, the discount rate in the capital market is 
determined by the market consensus.  There are two particular challenges to this 
general idea when it comes to analyzing capital markets in developing countries.  
First, it is uncertain whether an “objective” market consensus is existent in 
developing countries where capital markets are not sophisticated and “efficient.”  The 
“objective” market consensus on the discount rate (which affects the present value of 
pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller) has a prerequisite that the capital market 
in the economy at issue is “efficient.”  Since many developing countries do not have 
efficient capital markets, it is highly dubious that the “objective” market consensus on 
                                                 
87 For example, the government in a developing country may send businesspeople to prison if it wishes.    
  
 150
the discount rate is existent.  Since there is no credible discount rate, the present value 
of pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller, i.e., V0, also cannot be calculated in a 
credible way.  In contrast, a roving controller knows relatively well the total value 
that he loots from a corporation through a one-shot transaction now, i.e., ROV0, 
because he does not have to infer future discount rates for ROV0.  Under these 
circumstances, a controller is more inclined to choose to be roving.           
Second, even if the market reaches a consensus on the discount rate, it 
functions only as the “objective” measurement in the market.  Although it is possible 
that controllers may use the “objective” discount rate determined by the market, it is 
more likely that they will rely on their own “subjective” evaluation of risk and time 
preference.  Under these circumstances, even if the discount rate objectively 
measured in the market is in fact low, the discount rate that a stationary controller 
perceives that he will apply in the formula can be much higher.  This takes place, for 
example, because a controller is particularly impatient or pessimistic toward the 
future as opposed to the general evaluation of the market.  Or, it could happen 
because the illiquidity of the market for corporate control in a developing country 
makes the discount rate higher.  In sum, the “objective” discount rate functions only 
as a “reference” to controllers in developing countries, even if the market generally 
agrees on the number, which in fact is quite difficult in an inefficient capital market in 
a developing country.  Ultimately, controllers use their subjective (rather than 
objective) discount rate in formulas for figuring out the present value of pecuniary 
benefits.  When their subjective discount rate is high enough compared to the general 
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market evaluation, they will choose to be roving controllers rather than stationary 
controllers.     
       
(b) What about the Growth Rate and Stream of Cash Flows? 
 
According to the formula, the present value of total pecuniary benefits to a 
stationary controller becomes smaller as the growth rate (g) decreases.  Thus, when 
the growth rate (g) is so small that ROV0 is larger than the sum of V0 and Alpha, a 
controlling shareholder will rationally choose to become a roving controller.  The 
growth rate is a function of many factors, such as the political stability, business-labor 
relations, and industries where controlling shareholders participate, and the 
managerial capability of a controller.   
In addition, if a stream of cash flows – the sum of “normal” dividends (i.e., 
justified dividends) and “special” dividends (i.e., extractions through private benefits) 
– is uncertain and unstable from a controlling shareholder’s point of view, he is more 
likely to choose to be roving.  Why?  One of the assumptions of the formula is that 
both (“normal” and “special”) dividends in each period increase at the constant rate of 
growth rate (g).  Thus, for example, if the amount of extractions is highly volatile 
across years – for one year it increases, and for another year it decreases – the 
formula is not very reliable.  An alternative explanation is that, in that case of volatile 
dividends, a controller may apply a higher discount rate for the higher risk, i.e., a 
higher standard deviation of dividend payments.  As a result, a controller may choose 
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to be roving, which is the opposite phenomenon from what is expected by the original 
formula. 
In general, keeping the “golden goose” is seen as a better idea than killing it.  
As long as the value from two factors (i.e., pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits) 
exceeds the one-shot extraction that generates only lump sum of pecuniary benefits, it 
is a better choice to be stationary.  However, time, as usual, is a core issue.  When the 
breakeven point is expected to be reached in 10 years, many controllers will probably 
choose to be stationary.  When it is in 30 years, it is obvious that fewer controllers 
will do so.  Fewer people are sure whether the “golden goose” can still generate good-
quality eggs in 30 years.  Thus, it may be a better decision for him to take a certain 
amount of ROV0 today rather than the uncertain sum of V0 and Alpha, most of which 
will be determined in the far future.  A financial epigram describes this situation well 
– “A bird (i.e., a certain amount of ROV0) in hand is worth two (the uncertain sum of 
V0 and Alpha) in the bush.”  
                         
(c) What If a Controlling “Family” Shareholder Does Not Treat His 
Descendants’ Utility as Exactly Equivalent to His Own?  
   
So far, this Article has assumed that a controlling “family” shareholder treats 
his descendants’ utility as exactly equivalent to his own.88  In other words, parents are 
deemed to be absolutely altruistic towards their children.  Of course, parental 
affection for their children is universal, so children’s utility is generally a part of 
parents’ utility as well.  However, this does not necessarily mean that “one” unit of 
                                                 
88 See Gilson, supra note 20.   
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utility accruing to a controller’s children is exactly as valuable as “one” unit of utility 
to an incumbent controller.  Thus, the extent to which the assumption holds varies 
across countries depending on their cultures and other socio-economic circumstances.  
In some countries, this assumption might be almost true.  In other countries, it is far 
from the reality.89            
Suppose that a representative controlling shareholder in a country treats his 
descendants’ utility as significantly different from his own (i.e., suppose that a 
controller treats his defendants’ utility as less important), which is sharply against the 
assumption that he considers his children as alter ego.  The formula of the sum of 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits for a stationary controller is dependent on the 
above assumption.  If the reality is far different from the assumption, the formula 
should be modified accordingly as well.  In the modified formula, the discount rates 
that apply to the future benefits of offspring should be augmented since the future 
benefits accruing to his descendants are less valuable to the controller who is not 
perfectly altruistic to his progeny.   
Under these circumstances, for example, a founding controller may have more 
than two stages in the discounted cash flows of his and his next generations: (i) in the 
first stage, when he manages a corporation, the discount rate that he faces is the same 
as r; (ii) but, in the second stage (after he dies or retires), when his descendants 
manage the corporation, the discount rate that he psychologically feels is not r 
anymore, but r plus β (β > 0).  If this is the case, the real present value of the total 
pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller (the real V0) is (much) smaller than the 
                                                 
89 Even if I judge on a national or cultural basis here, it is obvious that the relationship between a 
parent and children in a family corporation significantly varies on an individual basis as well.   
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model-based present value of the total pecuniary benefits to a stationary controller 
(V0).  Then, there is more probability that a controlling shareholder would have been 
found as a roving controller in the first place.                
 
(d) What If the Value of Alpha (the Value of Non-Pecuniary Benefits to a 
Controller) Is Very Small?   
 
In the two-factor analysis, the value of Alpha (the value of non-pecuniary 
benefits to a controller) plays a key role in determining whether a controlling 
shareholder chooses to be roving or stationary.  When the value of Alpha is 
meaningful compared to the value of pecuniary benefits, a controlling shareholder is 
more likely to be a stationary controller.  But when its relative value is not large 
enough, he is more likely to be a roving controller.  In that sense, it is of significance 
to understand the relative value of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to a 
controlling shareholder.  The relative value of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits 
is determined by many factors, such as culture, the idiosyncratic psychological 
standard of a particular controller, and the absolute level of wealth accumulation – 
among these, I pay more attention to the absolute level of wealth accumulation in the 
following. 
The analysis of the “luxury good” in microeconomics theory is useful to 
explore the relationship of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to a controller.  For 
example, in New York, people may enjoy Broadway musicals only if the level of 
income that people make is more than living costs – in other words, Broadway 
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musicals are a luxury good, while food, clothes, medical expenses, and shelter are 
necessities to New Yorkers.  Similarly, only when the level of the wealth that a 
controlling shareholder accumulates exceeds some satisfactory point, does he start 
considering the non-pecuniary benefits.  In that sense, unless a controlling 
shareholder is super-wealthy, he does not “demand” and cannot “consume” the non-
pecuniary benefits, a luxury good.  In this case, since the controlling shareholder does 
not enjoy many non-pecuniary benefits, the value of Alpha is not a significant number.  
Consequently, since the total benefits for the controller are almost all from the 
pecuniary benefits, it is more probable that he is going to be roving.   
 
2. A Family Controller Managing a Small Corporation 
 
As I explained earlier, a controller in a family corporation is more likely to be 
stationary compared to that of a non-family corporation because of the potentially 
infinite duration of a family corporation, other things being equal.  In this Section, I 
provide the hypothesis that among family controllers, while a controller of a large 
family corporation is more likely to be stationary, a controller of a small family 
corporation is more likely to be roving for the following reasons. 
First, when a corporation is small, the absolute amount of extraction is in 
general small.  The non-pecuniary private benefits of control that a family controller 
can enjoy are small as well since they are a positive function of the size of a 
corporation.  In addition, since non-pecuniary benefits are a luxury good to a 
controller, they are less meaningful to a controlling shareholder who manages a small 
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corporation and does not accumulate wealth sufficiently to consume more non-
pecuniary benefits.  Accordingly, since Alpha and as a result the sum of V0 and Alpha 
(the present value of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to a controller) is small, a 
reasonable controller is more likely to become roving.  Conversely, when a controller 
manages a large corporation, in general he has greater opportunity to maintain a large 
amount of extraction from the corporation, because although his “tax rate” is the same 
as that of another controller running a small corporation, his “tax base” is larger.  
Then, he is more interested in consuming non-pecuniary benefits.  Since the value of 
non-pecuniary benefits to a controller of a large corporation is significant, V0 plus 
Alpha (the present value of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to a controller) is 
much larger than the present value of only pecuniary benefits.  Therefore, as two-
factor analysis indicates, it is more likely that the controller will become stationary.       
Second, the imperfection of the capital market may distort the decision of a 
controller in a small family corporation.  Suppose that to a controller in a small 
corporation, the present value of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to a stationary 
controller is larger than a one-shot extraction.  Thus, it is reasonable for him to extract 
small but continuous pecuniary benefits from the corporation as a stationary 
controller.  However, suppose that he needs a large amount of money all of a sudden 
for some reason.  If the capital market is imperfect, he is not able to borrow the 
required money immediately.  Then, the only solution for him is to become roving 
and attain the lump-sum pecuniary benefits at once, even though the lump-sum value 
is less than the present value of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to a stationary 
controller.  In contrast, even if the imperfect market problem is a barrier to a 
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controller of a large corporation, he is more able to manage this problem; since the 
allotment of pecuniary benefits in one period to a controller in a large corporation is 
much higher, he is less likely to face a liquidity problem; in addition, even when he 
encounters a liquidity problem, he is more able to borrow a large amount of money 
since he can provide more assets as collateral.  In addition, since he runs a large 
corporation, his negotiation power or political influence might be large enough to 
borrow the money he needs.     
Third, it is important to note that developing countries lack a proper disclosure 
system in the capital market.  When an economy consists of a large number of small 
corporations, prospective investors in the capital market are not able to research a 
large number of controllers’ individual integrity given the condition of insufficient 
disclosure.  As a result, the high degree of asymmetric information in the capital 
market will obstruct the building of trust between controllers and prospective 
investors.  In other words, prospective investors are likely to treat all of controllers as 
roving bandits once they observe one controller’s gigantic wrongdoing, because it is 
difficult and costly for them to tell the better (i.e., stationary controllers) from the 
worse (i.e., roving controllers).  Knowing that they are not deemed as stationary 
regardless of their sincerity and conduct, controllers in small corporations will “be 
compelled” to become roving by default even if being stationary would be more 
valuable to them – the adverse selection problem drives out stationary controllers 
from the capital market and only roving controllers remain.   
It is true that many developing countries that are dominated by a small 
number of large corporations have a similar disclosure problem and asymmetric 
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information issue.  However, at least comparatively, prospective investors in the 
capital market are more easily able to interpret a small number of large controllers’ 
conducts, transactions, and (relative) faithfulness through circumstantial evidence and 
observations.  In other words, the same amount of information is concentrated on the 
small number of controllers.  Therefore, under this system (i.e., the economy of a 
small number of large corporations), despite a similarly deficient disclosure system, 
prospective investors in the capital market are better equipped to tell – although 
crudely – which one is roving and which one is stationary.  Therefore, at least the 
capital market does not bluntly treat all controllers in the economy as roving.  
Knowing this, controllers in large corporations are more able to choose to be 
stationary when the value of two factors is larger than the value of a one-shot looting.       
Fourth, the formula’s assumption that a family controller’s tenure is infinite is 
less applicable to a jurisdiction with small corporations than that with large 
corporations or a corporate group.  Why?  Put simply, being a successor of a small 
corporation might be less attractive to a corporate founder’s children.  They may be 
more interested in being professionals in other fields, such as medical doctors, 
lawyers, musicians, professors, politicians or whatever they want to be, rather than 
businesspeople in a large corporation, and they often (or sometimes) choose not to 
succeed their father.  Put differently, the opportunity cost to give up the position of 
controlling shareholders is not so high to children of small corporations’ founders. 
When the assumption of infinite tenure is broken, obviously there is a greater chance 
that controllers will be roving.90      
                                                 
90 Of course, many of the next generations are still interested in succeeding to the management job of 
the founder.  What I say is that they are less interested in small corporations compared to the setting of 
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Fifth, the fact that small corporations have small influence in the market 
makes controllers be more roving.  In Olson’s world, a roving bandit will rationally 
become a stationary bandit when he is strong enough to monopolize the theft from his 
subjects – when the bandit’s power to steal exclusively becomes stronger and more 
established, it is more likely that the bandit will transform from a roving bandit to a 
stationary one.  The same logic holds in the corporate governance issue as to 
controllers.  Controlling shareholders in small corporations do not have monopolistic 
stealing power from minority shareholders in the domestic economy of a developing 
country.  Put differently, they face “a common well” problem; if they do not exploit 
water from the common well immediately, somebody else will use it anyway; there is 
no incentive to save and there is no tomorrow.  Under these circumstances, 
controllers are not able to have long-term plans.  When they find chances of one-shot 
transactions to loot minorities to the full extent, it is rational for them to reap those 
opportunities at the time.  As a result, it is difficult for controllers to evolve to 
stationary controllers when so many small corporations exist in a bad-law 
jurisdiction.91 
               
                                                                                                                                           
large corporations.  If this tendency is systematically accumulated nation wide, that economy is more 
likely to be featured as roving.     
 
91 Conversely, it is likely that a small number of large and powerful controllers become stationary.  
However, it does not say that a few powerful controllers of large corporations are always stationary.  
Chinese history is very indicative in this sense.  In ancient China, there were many independent states 
that waged numerous wars with each other until Qin Shi Hwang unified China in B.C. 221.  In the 
warring period before the unification, ordinary Chinese people suffered under many competing rulers 
with short-sighted plans – in wartime, it was difficult to think about “tomorrow,” so most rulers could 
not help but be roving.  Qin Shi Hwang is credited for forming “one” China and ending this chaos.  
Under one unified China, Qin Shi Hwang had a very good chance to be a stationary ruler because as 
the sole ruler in all of China, he could have considered “tomorrow” and long-term plans.  However, for 
various reasons, disappointingly he remained a tyrant even after unification and his Qin dynasty lasted 
for only 15 years.  In other words, although Qin Shi Hwang had strong conditions (e.g., having 
monopolistic power in his domain) for being stationary, he ended up as roving.        
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3. Inherent Problems of “Family” 
   
One of the main features of “family” corporations is that a controlling 
shareholder can have infinite life because his genes run through generations.  Thus, 
minority shareholders do not have the final period problem vis-à-vis a controlling 
shareholder in a capital market where a repeated game takes place.  In this Section, I 
further articulate the possibility that the infinity assumption may not hold in other 
cases, and the potential problem that the final stage will appear when power shits 
from one generation to the next generation.   
 
(a) Inheritance – Mean-Reversion and Structural Change 
 
Many business gurus often say that children of Olympic gold medalists are not 
guaranteed to win the Olympic Games one generation later.  Athletic talent of parents 
is not exactly inherited by their children, even though their children will often be 
more gifted in sports than others on average.  Similarly, when corporate control 
passed within a family, it is likely that the heir in the second generation is less 
competent in management than the founder, who was a highly capable entrepreneur92 
– in other words, management capacity tends to follow the principle of the mean-
reversion over future generations.  
What are implications of the mean-reversion of family’s managerial talents in 
the context of stationary (family) controllers?  As we have seen, a representative 
                                                 




controlling family shareholder is assumed to control a corporation infinitely through 
inheritance.  This assumption is implicitly based on the notion that the identity of the 
corporation and controllers is maintained eternally even if a particular family 
controller dies and the next one succeeds.  However, the phenomenon of mean-
reversion can weaken this notion; the corporation before and after inheritance is so 
different that it should be treated as “two” different entities rather than “one”; theories 
based on the concept that “one” set of human DNA controls the “same” corporation 
eternally through family succession have to be modified case by case.   
Suppose that a son who has less managerial capability than his father succeeds 
in a family-controlled corporation.  This means that the corporate growth rate under 
the son’s reign is lower than that under his father’s.  Then, the successor realizes that 
the present value of extractions by a stationary controller becomes smaller after he 
inherits – thus, there is a growing likelihood that the son will at some point abandon 
the status of stationary controller and choose to be roving.   
In addition, a less talented successor’s appearance in management will impact 
investors in the capital market as well.  First, they will be worried that cash flows 
generated by the corporation from now on will be lower than those derived by the 
assumption that the same gene (i.e., the father’s gene) controls the same corporation 
forever.  Therefore, investors’ confidence in the corporation will be disturbed.  
Second, investors will be fearful that the inheritor will raise the “tax” (i.e., extraction) 
rate; this is because the son may have different (i.e., more stringent) “tax policies” 
than his father’s, or because the “tax rate” must be higher if the successor wishes to 
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keep the same growth rate of extraction given the lower growth of the corporation due 
to his lower management capability.   
Consequently, both a new controlling shareholder and investors perceive that 
the (former) corporation under the founder’s reign is different from the (new) 
corporation under the successor’s reign.  In fact, even a son who is comparably 
capable to his father will create problems as well.  Even if the managerial talent of a 
father and a son is equal, their perspectives on business and philosophy might be 
different, and these differences will affect employees and partners in various 
transactions as well as investors in the capital market.  In sum, from the investors’ 
standpoint, doing business with the second generation is not the same as with the 
founder.    
Then, a new controlling family shareholder and corporate constituencies, 
minority shareholders in particular, do not share the same framework, vision, and 
expectations of the corporation in the future.  In other words, the environment and 
rules of the game are materially modified during the course of dynastic succession: (i) 
when the succeeding son is comparable to his father in terms of management talent, 
the succession itself still generates significant “regime changes” to create two 
different eras; (ii) when the succeeding son is subject to the problem of mean-
reversion, the succession may precipitate public concern about the future of the 
corporation, (sometimes) ending up with a catastrophe.   
Either way, during the power shift, corporate constituencies do not feel that 
they trade with the same person with the same DNA, as the notion of the family 
corporation emphasizes and assumes.  Subsequently, there is substantial likelihood 
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that the “final stage” is set and realized by other corporate constituencies as well as a 
controlling family shareholder and minority shareholders.  In turn, backward 
induction could occur, and the game between the controller and investors in the 
capital market might not be repeated any longer.  Consequently, there is the 
possibility that a new controlling family shareholder would not be a stationary 
controller since the infinity assumption is invalid under these circumstances.    
 
(b) King Lear Case – What If There Are Several Children?   
 
Things will be more complicated if a founding father has multiple children – 
structural changes during the course of inheritance may be worse.  If the oldest son 
succeeds to his father’s position and most of his father’s property irrespective of his 
ability, the mean-reversion problem may be more magnified since the oldest son is 
not necessarily the most capable among his siblings.  The alternative solution is that 
all of the offspring should compete with each other for the next chairmanship.  
Apparently, this alternative is not fundamentally able to avoid the mean-reversion 
problem.  In addition, it creates another problem.  While many parents treat their 
children’s utility as nearing equivalence to their own, siblings are less likely to feel 
this for each other – they are rivals.  The history of the West and East has observed a 
lot of bloodshed between siblings vying for thrones.   
When there are several princes but no primogeniture system, no one is so sure 
about who will be the next king.  Mostly, it is up to a founding father’s discretion to 
choose his successor.  To make things worse, he is sometimes very capricious about 
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his decision until his death.  Then, inevitably, the problem of uncertainty makes 
things complicated.  For example, professional managers who were retainers of the 
last king should stake their fate on only one prince.  This creates a very big problem, 
especially in many developing countries where labor markets are not flexible; when a 
talented manager chooses the wrong person as his lord, his life is permanently 
stagnated since he cannot easily move to other corporations after the next king takes 
the throne.  It means that managers have to give up their successful careers in that 
economy when they lose in this lottery.  Thus, even the most capable managers may 
be thrown away by a new ruler, and corporate performance may be affected adversely.  
In addition, more frictions can be expected in wars between princes because retainers 
of each prince know that they lose everything if their lord misses the chance to rule.     
Accordingly, this rivalry among siblings usually creates structural changes at 
the time of succession and participants in the capital market (possibly the product and 
labor market as well) become wary about seismic alteration of a corporation including 
the potential for chaos and disorder.  Then, the final stage problem will arise.  Since 
the repeated game would not hold any more, the market becomes skeptical that 
stationary banditry is maintained.  This misfortune can be further aggravated when a 
particular son is supported by his father, and other sons dispute with this father-son 
alliance in any type of corporate control contest.       
So far, I have reviewed the possibility that only one child inherits his father’s 
entire empire through competition.  However, there is also the possibility that each 
child succeeds to a portion of the domain – in general, this would take place in the 
setting of a corporate group.  Suppose that a founding father with three children 
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manages nine subsidiaries under a corporate group, which is now about to be divided 
evenly.  Then, rather than one large corporate empire, three independent and small 
corporate groups are created.  The corporate group’s advantages, including building a 
reputation based on scale and scope economy, are now significantly lessened. 93   
Again, this is a structural change, and a vicious circle will follow; the final period 
problem arises when a corporate group is divided into three small groups because the 
three newly created corporate groups are clearly different partners than the previous 
one gigantic corporate group; then, the repeated game might no longer be expected; 
accordingly, controlling shareholders find it more difficult to be stationary controllers.  
Further, due to the “even and fair inheritance” among children, the number of 
controllers increases and the size of corporations decreases in an economy.  Then, as 
explained earlier, controllers become more likely to be roving because of the small 
corporations’ effect.     
 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Throughout this Article, I propose a hypothesis that the controlling 
shareholder systems with bad-law can be classified into at least two sub-categories: 
(i) the “stationary” controlling shareholder system; (ii) and the “roving” controlling 
shareholder system; in addition, the third possible sub-category is the “commingled” 
controlling shareholder system where stationary and roving controlling shareholders 
                                                 
93 As to a corporate group’s reputation building based on scale and scope economy, see Gilson, supra 
note 20.  
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are mixed. 94   In the stationary controlling shareholder system, since a family 
controlling shareholder has an encompassing interest in his controlled corporation for 
the long term, it is in his best interest to voluntarily reduce the degree of 
expropriation against minority shareholders.  
In that sense, given the condition that the corporate law in that economy is 
inefficient, having “stationary” bandits is the most optimal choice available to 
minority shareholders in developing countries unless they invest abroad – however, as 
explained earlier, international diversification has been difficult for them.  When a 
controlling shareholder convinces the capital market that he is a “stationary” 
controller, investors participate in the capital market as minority shareholders who are 
benefitted as well.  Given bad-law in a jurisdiction, the relationship between a 
“stationary” controlling family and minority shareholders might be symbiotic and 
mutually beneficial.  In that sense, although the conventional view that minority 
shareholders are victims is true, it can be said that minority shareholders are not that 
seriously injured.  The relatively aligned interests of a controlling shareholder and 
public shareholders under the “stationary” controlling system make up partially for 
the deficiency in good corporate law.  As a result, developing countries with 
“stationary” controller systems are more advantageous in terms of investor protection 
and economic development than those with “roving” controllers. 
To be sure, controlling shareholder systems in developing countries have 
many weaknesses in terms of corporate governance.  However, treating all 
controlling shareholder systems with diversity as the same (i.e., as roving controllers) 
                                                 
94 Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt suggested this “commingled” controlling system when I explained 





is an oversimplification, and this view ignores the specificity of each sub-category of 
controlling shareholder systems – at least, there is the possibility of a stationary 
controller regime.  With this concern, this Article makes attempts to develop analyses 
of understanding the diverse controlling shareholder systems with bad-law in a more 
proportional and balanced way.  The final point in this Article is that the banditry in 
controlling shareholder systems is very dynamic – stationary controllers may be 
changed into roving controllers due to many external and internal conditions.  In that 
sense, even successful stationary controlling economies should be careful and should 
make every attempt to enhance the general corporate governance in their jurisdictions.  
In addition, more globalization – which will foment more international investment by 
non-controlling shareholders in developing countries – may fundamentally change the 




TRANSPLANTING A POISON PILL  
TO A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER REGIME 
 




In the history of Corporate America, the 1980s were characterized as the most 
vibrant decade of hostile merger and acquisition (“M&A”).1  Most corporations were 
concerned about being a target by an uninvited acquirer, and heated public debates on 
the social implications of the market for corporate control focused on whether the 
dynamic hostile takeover wave was beneficial to the economy.  All of a sudden, 
however, the mechanism of the hostile takeover was virtually crowded out with the 
advent of a poison pill, the most effective anti-takeover device ever invented.  To 
make things worse (from the standpoint of critics of the pill), around the early 1990s 
the pill finally developed into “just say no” where a board is able to flatly refuse a bid 
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1 Professor Merritt B. Fox explains M&A is a mechanism for correcting managerial agency problem.  
“Managers face a number of pressures of varying intensity that help align their interests with those of 
shareholders: the threat of legal action for violation of fiduciary duties, the threat of hostile takeover, 
the managerial labor market, the evolutionary growth or decline of the firm as the result of succeeding 
or failing in product competition, peer review, the discipline of the outside directors, and the threat of 
removal by dissatisfied shareholders.” Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence versus Managerial 
Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV 2088, 2098 (1994).   
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although the bid is highly attractive as well as non-coercive to shareholders.  Then, 
did M&A activities decrease in the United States?   
Interestingly, not really – in fact, the M&A wave became more powerful with 
the evolution of executive compensation in the 1990s.  Now, managers started to 
accept (or acquiesce to) the change in control, since they realized that they could 
benefit from stock options under a high-premium bid and depart from corporations 
with generous severance packages.2  The practice of high executive compensation 
saved the corporate control market from the pill by transforming the nature of M&A 
from “hostile” to “friendly.” 
Until recently, M&A had been generally deemed to be a creature of Anglo-
American business culture, so that the market for corporate control was virtually 
nonexistent outside the United States (and United Kingdom).  The corporate norm in 
the “rest of the world” (i.e., non-Anglo American countries) is principally built on the 
notion of the “controlling shareholder regime,” where dynastic succession within 
dominant family shareholders is well respected and established – thus, there had been 
few sales of control.  This stereotypical M&A landscape started to change rapidly, 
however, around the beginning of the new millennium.  Now, economies dominated 
by large corporations with stable control-shareholding have observed hostile bids and 
takeovers (although relatively few).  The great tide of globalization also made M&A 
activities spill over internationally, as global entities are more likely to consider a 
cross-national acquisition as a feasible option.  Then, what have reactions been to this 
new phenomenon in the “rest of the world?”           
                                                 
2 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive 
Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002).   
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M&A (in particular, a hostile takeover) raises complicated questions in a 
jurisdiction.  Commentators are sharply divided over whether a hostile takeover is 
beneficial from the perspective of investors and capital market efficiency.  Some 
argue that a hostile takeover is the best disciplinary device to enhance shareholder 
value by lessening of the chronic problem of managerial agency cost.  In contrast, 
others argue that M&A (including a hostile takeover) does not create sufficient 
benefits, pointing out the net value-added to all shareholders (not only those of a 
target but also those of an acquirer) is almost nothing.3   
Moreover, even if an M&A produces additional wealth for the entire group of 
investors in the capital market, it might generate many socio-political questions for a 
local government.  For example, an M&A pursuing cost-reduction and synergy is 
often followed by a massive layoff that would create social unrest; if such loss from 
the employees’ side is taken into account, value-maximizing acquisition for 
shareholders is not necessarily beneficial to the entire society in even Kaldor-Hicks 
terms.  In addition, when a prospective acquirer is a foreign entity, public sentiment 
could suddenly turn to politically flammable nationalism, which would drive 
policymakers into a corner.  From local business people’s perspective, a seismic 
change arising from an unprecedented takeover wave (although weak so far) is an 
apparent threat to the Ancien Regime.  Accordingly, authorities and the business 
circles in the “rest of the world” may collude and consider adopting a new defensive 
system to insulate a domestic economy from the active market for corporate control.  
As expected, the poison pill is a prominently suggested solution since it has proven to 
                                                 
3 REINIER KRAAKMAN, GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN WILLIAM T. ALLEN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON 
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 3rd ed. 2009).      
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be the most effective defense device in U.S. takeover history.  In addition, the 
movement to enact law (either by statute or case law) permitting the poison pill is 
supported by a slogan of the “global standard” – “If the United States allows the pill, 
then why don’t we?”           
To be sure, however, transplanting is more complicated than simple copying.  
A foreign subject that is inserted may be incompatible with other organs and cause 
rejection symptoms.  Thus, it is of importance to analyze in advance whether the 
poison pill would be harmonious with an importing jurisdiction’s socio-political 
economy and judicial system, which are (often sharply) different from those of the 
United States.  Most of all, the ownership structure matters when considering the 
pill’s side-effects.  While shareholding is widely dispersed in the Anglo-American 
economies, the corporate norm in the rest of the world is based on the premise that a 
dominant family shareholder with a large fraction of voting rights runs the business.  
If a typical controller uses voting leverage (such as stock pyramiding, dual class 
common stocks, and intra-shareholding),4 allowing her the “just say no” pill may lead 
to excessive defense because the voting leverage itself is a built-in and strong anti-
takeover device.      
In addition, many countries in the rest of the world do not have the lynchpins 
that uphold the legitimacy of the pill in Delaware.  For example, a typical corporation 
in such countries lacks the tradition of having a functional (or relatively independent) 
board which is designed to keep a corporate decision-maker from abusing her power 
– absent such a board, however, the legality of a pill is greatly weakened.  Moreover, 
                                                 
4 Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and 
Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, 
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000).    
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unlike efficient Delaware courts, most judiciary systems in those countries are neither 
equipped with the expertise required to deal with cutting-edge takeover issues nor fast 
enough to reduce uncertainty associated with time-delay.5   
Furthermore, it cannot be overemphasized that under the Delaware 
jurisprudence, a pill is not “absolute” 6 (thus not perfectly impenetrable) – Delaware 
courts rely on the proposition that ultimately shareholders have the power to replace 
an incumbent board with a new one to redeem a pill, if they are dissatisfied with an 
incumbent’s defense and continuing business model.  From this perspective, a poison 
pill is legally upheld only when the shareholder franchise is not impeded and distorted 
by corporate insiders.7   Nonetheless, many countries are unlikely to have such a 
“ballot box safety valve.” 8   In particular, when the poison pill is adopted in a 
jurisdiction that allows a voting leverage (such as stock pyramiding) which artificially 
inflates a controller’s voting power, the true will of shareholders reflecting all 
shareholders’ weighted cash-flow rights can be replaced with one in favor of a 
controller with small cash-flow rights.  Under these circumstances, transplanting only 
the poison pill without importing complementary Delaware corporate governance 
                                                 
5 The deficiency of such an important legal infrastructure would seriously discourage a prospective 
acquirer from submitting an uninvited bid in the first place.  In addition, uncertainty associated with 
time-delay would make a pill more powerful than an original Delaware pill. 
   
6 Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
   
7  See e.g., Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 1988).  Blasius requires 
management to demonstrate “compelling justification” for its defensive maneuver if the primary 
purpose of taking such a defensive device interferes with the shareholder franchise. 
    
8 For the explanation of a “ballot box safety valve,” see Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & 
Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and 
Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).    
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systems (such as an independent board, an efficient judicial system, and safety 
valves) creates an awkwardness similar to “wearing a suit jacket with pajama pants.” 
As explained, U.S. market participants adapted quickly to a pill-dominated 
M&A climate by evolving executive compensation, aligning the interests of managers 
and shareholders by accepting a high-premium bid.  Then, is the same (or similar) 
capital market accommodation expected to take place in a pill-importing jurisdiction?  
Maybe, in some countries.  In countries where social democracy and egalitarianism is 
popular, however, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to adopt the 
American-style corporate compensation system that tolerates (or even encourages) 
vast income disparity.   
Perhaps executive compensation is not the main variable in a complicated 
equation with respect to a pill and M&A because in many countries, those who 
consider importing a pill system are generally not CEOs but dominant shareholders – 
thus, the driving force that encourages a dominant shareholder to sell control is the 
control premium that she is offered rather than a severance package available to 
management (or, a dominant shareholder can be paid both when she holds an 
executive position in a corporation).  Then, as long as a controller is willing to sell 
control for the “appropriate” price, a pill would not preclude a friendly deal.  An 
obstacle to a sale of control, however, is that the reserve price of many controllers is 
often higher than buyers’ offer price so that deals are less likely to take place9 – in 
fact, this is a reason why there was virtually no market for corporate control in the 
“rest of the world” in the past.  Another impediment arises when the control premium 
                                                 
9 It might be (among many potential reasons) because a founding controller deems a corporation as her 
own avatar, thus she attaches more psychic value with the corporation than any third party.   
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should be equally shared with all shareholders.  Under such an “equal treatment rule,” 
it is needless to say that a controller loses a great deal of incentive to sell control to a 
prospective acquirer.  Even if equal treatment were not legally required, control sales 
would not be often made in a country with an egalitarian culture for precisely the 
same reason discussed regarding executive compensation.  Under these circumstances, 
if the pill is imported, M&A activities (voluntary friendly deals as well as hostile 
takeovers) would be seriously weakened.  
This Article is structured with the following organization.  Part I sketches the 
evolution of the poison pill and how Delaware takeover doctrines have been 
developed in relation to the pill.  Part II explores how the U.S. market for corporate 
control has survived the “just say no” pill (coupled with a staggered board).  Part III 
describes M&A in the controlling shareholder regime, which is the corporate 
governance system in most countries outside the two Anglo-American economies.  
Part IV analyzes why transplanting the Delaware pill is difficult by demonstrating the 
Delaware pill’s potential incompatibility with the underlying socio-economic and 
legal infrastructure in an importing jurisdiction.  Part V delves more into why a pill 
might stifle even most of voluntary friendly deals in some countries by showing that 
executive compensation and the sale of control are not conveniently available there.  
Part VI provides concluding remarks. 
In sum, importing the Delaware pill blindly is risky because the pill is likely to 
crowd out an effective disciplining mechanism of a takeover market in an importing 
country.  Without a takeover market, available outlets for a failing company are 
generally limited to bankruptcy, involuntary friendly deals (i.e., a fire sale), and a 
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bailout, which would affect the economy more adversely.  However, it does not say 
that any additional defense measure is unnecessary to this jurisdiction.  A pill is the 
most effective defense measure ever invented, so that without the pill a corporation in 
a controlling shareholder jurisdiction has less deterrence compared to its U.S. peers.  
By proposing a theoretical framework in this Article, I call for rigorous country-based 
studies in the near future to develop a “proportional” takeover defense system in a 
particular jurisdiction.        
           
 
I. EVOLUTION OF THE POISON PILL AND DELAWARE 
DOCTRINES 
 
Despite federalization in areas such as disclosure rules10 and some parts of 
corporate governance, U.S. corporate law remains mainly a “state creature.”  Since a 
majority of U.S. public companies are incorporated in the state of Delaware, statutes 
and judge-made laws in Delaware govern a significant part of the takeover issues in 
the United States.  Therefore, reviewing Delaware doctrines in relation to the poison 
pill sheds light on a controlling shareholder jurisdiction that considers adopting an 
American poison pill.    
 
1. The Poison Pill in General – Its Nature and Impacts 
   
                                                 
10 For the more explanation on the mandatory disclosure and its related discussion, see generally 
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999).    
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Traditionally, the main tool for a hostile takeover was a proxy contest11 in 
which an insurgent made attempts to obtain control of a target company via the 
support of colleague shareholders in a directors’ election.  The proxy contest, 
however, was not an effective method for a would-be acquirer; first, the proxy 
machinery is procedurally advantageous to incumbents, so that gaining the 
endorsement of a majority of shareholders is a difficult task to an insurgent; in 
addition, while a hostile bidder will share the benefits from replacing a less capable 
management, she alone has to bear the entire costs occurring in the proxy fight and 
future managerial efforts. 12   These difficulties were exacerbated by the SEC 
regulation (by 1992) that significantly regulated shareholders in terms of 
communication and coordination. 
Realizing these disadvantages associated with a proxy contest, hostile bidders 
mainly used tender offers during the period between the 1960s and 1985 (before 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.13 – hereinafter “Unocal”).14  Reliance on tender 
offers was further strengthened by financial innovations such as a developed junk 
bond market, where even a bidder with limited financial resources could raise capital 
to purchase a large fraction of a target’s stocks.  In this respect, the takeover arena 
was changed from an “election” to a “market,” and a would-be acquirer could bypass 
                                                 
11  Jack B. Jacobs, Implementing Japan's New Anti-Takeover Defense Guidelines - Part 1: Some 
Lessons from Delaware's Experience in Crafting Fair Takeover Rules, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 323 
(2006).  
  
12 In other words, a bidder is subject to the collective action problem. 
 
13 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
   
14 Jacobs, supra note 11.   
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a target corporation’s board in an acquisition and deal directly with individual 
shareholders.15 
A tender offer – by itself, not in combination with other acquisition 
maneuvers – became powerless, however, with the advent of a “poison pill” (or in 
short “pill”) which is a colloquial name for various “shareholder rights plans.” 16  
With a pill,17 all of the target shareholders other than a (prospective) acquirer are 
entitled to purchase securities (of a target or an acquirer)18 at a bargain price if a 
specified triggering event (e.g., the acquisition of 20% of the target’s stock by a third 
party) takes place.19  As a result, the exercise of the pill would massively dilute an 
acquiring entity’s stock position so that the acquisition of the target stocks above a 
pre-specified level (e.g., 20%) in the market is irrational for a bidder to pursue. 20  
Thus, if a bidder is still interested in the acquisition of a target, she is compelled to 
negotiate with a target board on the terms of a bid.  If consent is not reached in that 
negotiation, the only way for the bidder to take control of the target is to wage a 
                                                 
15 Discussion with Professor Jeffrey N. Gordon.   
 
16  O’KELLY & THOMSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 779 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2006). 
 
17 Adopting a poison pill can be decided solely by a target board and the approval of shareholders is 
not required. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW (Foundation Press 2nd ed. 2008).   
 
18 Depending on the types of “securities,” a poison pill is classified either as the flip-over feature (in 
which “securities” are a bidder company’s shares) or as the flip-in provision (in which “securities” are 
a target company’s shares).      
 
19 See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381 (2002). 
   
20  See e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (Foundation Press 9th ed. 2005); Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 8; William 
B. Chandler III, Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: A Judicial Perspective, 2004 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 45 (2004).  However, “All rights plans have a provision that enables the board to “redeem” the 
rights even after they are triggered, for a very nominal sum (say, one penny per share).” Jacobs, supra 
note 11.     
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proxy contest with the incumbent management.  The advent of a pill changed the 
arena of a takeover once again from the “market” to the “election.”21    
In terms of impacts on corporate governance brought by the poison pill, two 
contrasting views have competed.  One is that a pill can be used to protect 
shareholders.  As concerned the Unocal court, 22  dispersed shareholders are 
susceptible to the “prisoners’ dilemma” 23  – in the fear of ending up with worse 
payoffs if they reject an initial tender offer, unorganized shareholders  are stampeded 
to accept even an inappropriately lowball bid.  With a pill, this coercion could be 
prevented to a large extent since the pill requires a prospective bidder to negotiate 
with a target board that acts as a centralized agent on behalf of shareholders.  In 
addition, the premium from a takeover can be enhanced for the shareholders’ benefit. 
On the other hand, it is argued that the pill has worsened the managerial 
agency problem.  With the pill, a hostile bidder finds it difficult – if not impossible – 
to prevail in a takeover battle, although she is welcomed by most shareholders.24  To 
make things worse, every corporation inherently has a shareholder rights plan 
(although not at the time of the hostile bid) in the form of a “shadow” pill, since it 
takes only a few hours for a board to adopt a pill without approval from 
                                                 
21 Discussion with Professor Jeffrey N. Gordon.   
 
22 The Unocal court said, “It is now well recognized that such [two-tiered coercive] offers are a classic 
coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is 
inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the transaction.” Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
   
23  It is widely known among commentators that Mesa (a hostile bidder in Unocal) designed the 
prisoners’ dilemma among shareholders. See e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 8. 
 
24 Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Insider the 
Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993). 
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shareholders.25  As Professor Grundfest stated, now the hostile takeover wars are over 
and management won. 26   Although disgruntled shareholders (and a prospective 
acquirer) have an opportunity to replace the board through a proxy fight, it is an 
uphill battle for them since a proxy fight is cost-inefficient and time-consuming as 
aforementioned.  As such, the poison pill works as an impermeable armor insulating 
incumbent management from the threat of hostile takeovers.  
    
2. Unocal’s Proportionality Test – Intermediate Standard and Harbinger of 
the Pill     
 
By the mid-1980s, when the wave of hostile takeovers reached the peak, the 
Delaware court had a doctrinal dilemma in takeover cases.  Under the business 
judgment presumption,27 the court does not second-guess the legality of a board’s 
decision unless a plaintiff rebuts the presumption.  This highly deferential standard 
for a board could have over-protected directors who were inherently involved in the 
“omnipresent specter”28 of the agency problem, particularly in merger and acquisition 
cases where managers and directors lose their jobs.29  In contrast, under the entire 
                                                 
25John Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 
79 TEX. L. REV. 271 (2000). 
      
26 Grundfest, supra note 24. 
 
27 The business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was 
in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 
28  The Unocal court was concerned about the “omnipresent specter that a board may be acting 




fairness review, directors and managers had to prove that the transaction was fair to 
the corporation in terms of the process and price as Weinberger30 stated.31  Under this 
stringent doctrine, consequently, the board would not have implemented any 
defensive device for the shareholders in the first place, which is harmful to 
shareholders who are susceptible to a coercive tender offer.32      
Recognizing these problems, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal put 
forward an “intermediate (or proportional) standard” compromising the two 
traditional standards of review.  Now, the board must demonstrate that a takeover bid 
generated “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness existed” 33  and the defensive measure adopted was “reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.”34  After satisfying these conditions, the board’s conduct 
in a hostile takeover is entitled to be evaluated according to the business judgment 
rule.35  
It is noteworthy that Unocal in itself had nothing to do with a poison pill. A 
target (i.e., Unocal) implemented a self-tender as a defense tactic, excluding only 
Mesa Petroleum, an unwanted suitor, so that Mesa’s economic interest would be 
massively diluted; fearful of this economic damage, Mesa was deterred from closing 
                                                                                                                                           
29 John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs, and Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Comparative Analysis of Hostile Takeover 
Regimes in the U.S., U.K., and Japan (with Implications for Emerging Markets) (available at SSRN) 
(2010). 
      
30 Id.; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 
31 Armour et al., supra note 29.  
 
32 Id.    
 




35 See Unocal; O’Kelly & Thomson, supra note 16 at 777.  
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in to complete a hostile takeover and finally brought a suit.  The court posited that 
Unocal’s selective self-tender satisfied the two-pronged proportionality test, and 
legitimized a board’s conduct of discriminating against an insurgent shareholder in 
the takeover context.  After Unocal, SEC promulgated Rule 14d-10, prohibiting the 
selective self-tender.36  Nonetheless, the “general principle” articulated in Unocal has 
been unchanged – an anti-takeover device discriminating against a hostile 
bidder/shareholder could be allowed (unless it is a selective self-tender) as long as the 
proportionality test is passed.  In this light, Unocal paved the way for approving the 
legality of a poison pill, which is dependent on discriminatory treatment among 
shareholders.37  
 
3. The Evolution of the Poison Pill to the “Just Say No” Defense      
   
In the same year of Unocal (1985) – the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. 
Household International, Inc. (“Moran”)38 upheld the legality of a (flip-over) poison 
pill based on the reasoning that; (i) the two-pronged proportionality test was satisfied; 
and (ii) a (prospective) bidder could still rely on a proxy contest through which a 
newly elected board could redeem the pill.39  However, it was unclear whether the 
existing board that placed the pill was required to redeem it, and under what 
circumstances.        
                                                 
36 See SEC Rule 14d-10; O’Kelly & Thomson, supra note 16 at 778.  
 
37 Discussion with Professor Katharina Pistor.  
 
38 Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).   
 
39 Moran.  In this sense, Moran expressed the Delaware court’s preference for the “election” over the 
“market” as a solution for the conflict generated in a corporate control contest.   
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A few years later, the Delaware Chancery Court opined in City Capital 
Associates v. Interco Inc. (“Interco”)40 that a target board had to redeem a poison pill 
if it was used against a non-coercive tender offer.41  Accordingly, shareholders were 
restored the right to sell their shares without the obstacle of a continued pill, unless 
they were coerced by a bid.  A corporate raider was another beneficiary of the case, 
since under Interco she gained a substantial chance to triumph in a hostile takeover 
without relying on a highly burdensome proxy contest.   
The Interco regime, however, was struck down soon by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Paramount Communications v. Time Inc. (“Time”).42  Although 
Paramount announced an “all-cash 100%” non-coercive tender offer for Time at a 
substantial premium,43 Time’s board refused to redeem a pill, asserting that the price 
was inadequate.  Reviewing this case, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the 
“threat” examined in the Unocal test included shareholders’ “ignorance or mistaken 
belief” of the strategic benefit from a target board’s favored business combination 
(i.e., a Time-Warner merger).44   
These statements seem to be based on the notion that a target board may be 
smarter than the market, as the semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis 
explains.  Accordingly, for the sake of “foolish” shareholders, a “wise” board – that is 
                                                 
40 City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc., 551 A. 2d 787 (Del. 1988). 
 
41 Bebchuk et al., supra note 8 at 905-906.        
 
42 Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).   
 
43 The final bid price reached at $200 per share for Time, while the stock price of Time before 
Paramount’s initial bid was only $126. See Time. 
 
44 Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder Adopted 
Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (1997).  See Time as well.      
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assumed to be a faithful agent who cares primarily for the principal’s interest – is 
paternally allowed to force them not to sell their shares to the unwanted bidder.  In 
other words, a board can “just say no”45 to redeem the pill even in a non-coercive and 
high-premium bid.  
 
 
II. HOW DEALS SURVIVE UNDER “JUST SAY NO” IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
So far, the “just say no” pill in Time has remained valid in the Delaware 
takeover law.  This Part first sketches the pill’s safety valves, and then explains that 
an effective staggered board46 is able to make safety valves (in particular, a ballot box 
safety valve) powerless.  Then, this Part further explains a puzzling phenomenon in 
the U.S. corporate control market: M&A activities have thrived despite the highly 
potent defensive combination of a poison pill and a staggered board.         
 
1. Two Safety Valves47 to “Just Say No”   
 
                                                 
45 Id.  Professors Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian explain that while theoretically “Just Say No” can 
be defeated, there is no empirical example for that possibility.  “While Delaware jurisprudence does 
not say that courts will never order the redemption of a poison pill, there has not been since Time a 
single case in which redemption of a pill was ordered by a Delaware court.  Thus, as a practical matter, 
a bidder has had to assume in planning a bid that a target could “Just Say No” and retain a pill unless 
and until the bidder obtained majority control of the target’s board.” Bebchuk et al., supra note 8 at 
906. 
     
46 Bebchuk et al., supra note 8. 
    
47 Commentators use the term “two safety valves” widely, which refer to as limitations of “just say 
no.” See e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 8.  
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Under the Time regime, the shareholders’ only recourse in the face of a 
board’s “just say no” pill is to replace the existing directors.48  In fact, this is why the 
pill satisfies the proportionality test and is legitimate.   Although a board can refuse 
the acquisition by using a pill that blocks transactions between a prospective acquirer 
and shareholders, ultimately shareholders can make the final the fundamental decision 
on the M&A via their confidence votes for an incumbent board49 –  a ballot box 
safety valve  keeps the “just say no” pill in check.  Thus, maintaining the 
shareholders’ franchise unscathed is the essential foundation for the legality of a 
poison pill.  In this respect, Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp. 50  (“Blasius”) is of 
importance – in the specific context of a contested election for directors, a board has 
the burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for its defensive actions, if the 
primary purpose of such actions is to interfere with the effectiveness of shareholder 
franchise.51   
Another safety valve for the “just say no” pill available to shareholders is 
proposed in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes (“Revlon”)52.  When a board is to 
abandon its independence and to enter into particular modes such as selling a 
company, breaking it up, or selling control (which are irreversible by shareholders), a 
board’s decision on the takeover defense strategy is subject to the Revlon standard, 
                                                 
48 Gordon, supra note 44. 
 




51 Id.; Discussion with Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt. 
  




which is more stringent than Unocal53 – now, the board’s role is required to change 
from a defender of a corporate bastion to a neutral auctioneer charged with getting the 
best price for the shareholders. 54   A board’s discretion in whether to take into 
consideration the stakeholders such as “creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps 
even the community generally” (which was argued under Unocal) no longer exists in 
Revlon, under which shareholder wealth maximization is the board’s only goal. 
 
2. How Safety Valves Have Been Weakened    
 
The Revlon duty was more developed in Paramount Communications Inc. v. 
QVC Network55 (“QVC”).56  Historically, nonetheless, Delaware courts have rarely 
recognized Revlon duty.57  In practice, the ballot box safety valve also imposes only 
limited constraints on management’s “just say no” defense.  As discussed, since the 
proxy contest is far more advantageous to an incumbent, shareholder voting does not 
precisely reflect the true will of shareholders on the control contest issue.  In addition, 
since shareholder meetings usually take place once a year, a prospective acquirer has 
to adhere to a particular timeframe in order to mount a proxy fight.  Therefore, a 
                                                 
53 Id.   
 
54 Id.; Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's 
Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994). 
 
55 Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).  In QVC, if the control 
is transferred from public dispersed shareholders (i.e., the market) to a single person, entity, or group, 
Revlon-mode is triggered and a board has to discharge its fiduciary duty to sell the company to the 




57 From a Professor Katharina Pistor’s lecture.   
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prospective acquirer may give up taking part in the corporate control contest in the 
first place if the timing is not favorable to her.58   
Above all, perhaps the most powerful device to nearly incapacitate the ballot 
box safety valve is a staggered board implementing a poison pill.  When a board is 
staggered based on a charter provision, both a shareholder approval and a board 
resolution are necessary in order to dismantle a staggered board.  Then, a hostile 
bidder is required to win two proxy contests in a row in order to take control of the 
board which will redeem a poison pill.  Obviously, an incumbent has the more 
incentive to fight since it can successfully fend off a hostile bid by winning only one 
of two consecutive elections.  In addition, from the perspective of a prospective 
acquirer, the requirement of winning two consecutive elections means that it will take 
more than a year for her to completely take control of a target.  Since expediting a 
takeover process is key in business in terms of reducing uncertainty, this protracted 
timetable discourages a bidder from initiating a hostile takeover in the first place.59  
For the foregoing reasons, a staggered board – if it is not dismantled or “packed” by 
an insurgent within a year60 – is referred to as an effective staggered board (“ESB”), 
which makes a corporation almost invincible when it places a pill.61         
 
3. How M&A Activities Survive – Golden Parachutes and Stock Options            
 
                                                 
58 See Gordon, supra note 44. 
      




61 Id.    
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A great number of U.S. corporations were exposed to the threat of hostile 
takeovers in the 1980s.  Soon after the “just say no” defense was firmly established in 
Delaware jurisprudence, however, the wave of hostile takeovers ebbed.  A careful 
board that is advised by good lawyers and investment bankers could figure out how to 
avoid triggering Blasius and Revlon standards under which defensive conduct is 
reviewed more stringently than under the deferential Unocal (or more watered-down 
Unocal/Unitrin 62 ) standard.  Furthermore, a target became impenetrable with the 
combination of an ESB and the “just say no” pill.  Were the M&A activities stifled?  
Interestingly, the market for corporate control has become even more active and 
flourishing.  The changed landscape was that the nature of M&A has become 
“friendly” since the middle of the 1990s.63  What happened?   
To corporate insiders, being acquired was a disaster – they lost jobs, high 
compensation and perquisites, and psychic utility from running a company.  In order 
to avoid these losses, a target management objected to a bid although the price and 
terms were attractive to shareholders.  The “omnipresent specter”64 of the agency 
problem weakened the mechanism of a hostile takeover, which was a major market 
device to discipline corporate insiders.  However, the evolution of the executive 
compensation changed this story.     
The typical executive compensation is composed of salary, bonus, stock 
options, and other forms of compensation.  In the 1990s, the composition of the 
                                                 
62 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
  
63 See e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 2 (quoting Joseph H. Flom, Merger & Acquisitions; The Decade 
in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 753 (2000))  




executive compensation became significantly skewed towards stock options.  This 
evolution was intended to align the interests of executives and shareholders and to 
redress the agency problem – the idea was, if management performed well and stock 
price went up, management as well as shareholders benefited from the increased 
stock price.  Stock options based on such high-powered incentives were supported by 
tax and accounting rules in order to pay for the performance.   
The end result was an explosive increase in a typical executive compensation 
package when the stock market was prosperous in the 1990s.  Along with the upward 
trend of executive compensation in general, a “golden parachute” (i.e., a generous 
severance package) was developed as well.  A typical golden parachute provided a 
departing executive the average bonus of prior years as well as three times her 
salary.65  In addition, in the case of a change in control transaction, the parachute also 
included the accelerated vesting of stock options that had been granted but were not 
yet vested.66   In other words, an executive in a target corporation could receive 
substantial gains in the event of a premium acquisition,67 which in fact she did not 
make any contribution to.68  As a result, management did not fiercely oppose being 
acquired – rather, management started to acquiesce to or welcome the deal. 69  At the 
                                                 
65  Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value And Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1533-1534 (2007).  “Executives 
can reap substantial financial benefits from stock options when their company is acquired in a 
premium bid.  These benefits are multiplied by golden parachutes, which provide for severance 
payments, benefits, early vesting of pension rights, and accelerated vesting of unvested options.” 
Kahan and Rock, supra note 2. 
 
66 Id. 
   
67 Bebchuk et al., supra note 8 at 908; Kahan & Rock, supra note 2. 
   
68 However, if high premium bid was the result of negotiation, she made contribution to a high ball bid. 
 
69 Gordon, supra note 65; Kahan & Rock, supra note 2. 
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same time, management may prefer using defense devices as a bargaining tool to 
make the terms and price of the bid more favorable for shareholders of a target 
corporation, which in the end is sold.70   
  
                                                                 
III. THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER REGIME AND THE 
MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL    
 
To this point, I have analyzed Delaware doctrines and experiences as to a 
hostile takeover and defenses.  Against this backdrop, this Part discusses the potential 
consequences for the M&A market if the controlling shareholder regime implements 
a poison pill in its corporate law system. 
        
1. The Controlling Shareholder Regime and Takeover Defense  
 
Based on ownership structures, the world economy is classified into two 
groups; (i) the dispersed shareholder regime found in the United States and United 
Kingdom, where the control of a public corporation is generally in the hands of public 
shareholders71; and (ii) the controlling shareholder regime in which a single person 
(or a group of dominant shareholders) can exercise effective voting control, not 
                                                 
70 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 8.  However, there is possibility that management could enter into a 
less attractive deal from the perspective of shareholders, as long as management could leap the 
substantial amount of financial benefits from stock options and golden parachutes. 
   
71  Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (2006). 
   
  
 190
necessarily with corresponding equity holdings. 72   In fact, companies with a 
controlling shareholder are the dominant form among publicly traded firms in most 
countries outside the two Anglo-American economies.73   However, until recently 
M&A (in particular M&A initiated by a hostile bid) has been considered a 
phenomenon localized in the two dispersed shareholder economies.   
As globalization has developed and spread, corporate insiders in “the rest of 
the world” (i.e., outside the two Anglo-American economies) gradually came under 
the pressure of the market for corporate control; Live Door (Takafumi Horie) and 
Steel Partners (Karl Ichan) initiated hostile takeover bids towards Fuji TV and 
Bulldog Sauce respectively in Japan; Vodafone (headquartered in the United 
Kingdom) successfully took over Mannesmann, a flagship corporation in Germany; 
Sovereign fund almost dismantled one of the largest conglomerates in Korea, SK 
Group, and took in a massive profit from the hostile attack.   
Accordingly, within business circles in the rest of the world, there has been 
growing concern about the expansion of corporate control contests because business 
elites themselves will be the most apparent victims in hostile takeovers.  Since the 
changed rules in the corporate control game may generate adverse impacts in 
economic and political terms (e.g., massive layoffs due to acquisitions of domestic 
firms), governments in such countries have become more wary about this global trend 
and have made attempts to redesign their countries’ anti-takeover systems and law 
                                                 
72 Id. at 1643. 
 
73  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weibach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 652, Harvard Law School (2009) at 14.     
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and financial market environments.  Local business lobbies also strengthens such 
government movements.      
In this respect, importing the Delaware poison pill system could be an 
attractive solution to relieve the fear of potential hostile takeovers, since the pill is – 
from the perspective of a target management and board – the most effective and the 
least costly defensive device.  Above all, as proven in U.S. takeover history, a pill 
makes a company almost takeover-proof. 74   In addition, a pill does not require 
shareholders’ approval – only a board’s resolution is necessary.75  Thus, a company 
can adopt a pill very quickly, when a company notices “abnormal” movement in a 
stock market via early warning systems such as 13 D filing.   
Moreover, a pill does not affect any significant strategic business plans or the 
financial status of a company beyond deterring a hostile takeover.76  Suppose that a 
pill is not available in a particular jurisdiction.  Facing a hostile bid, a target company 
could, for example, sell an important asset to a third party in order to discourage a 
hostile bidder who is interested primarily in acquiring the trophy asset; the problem, 
however, is that a target corporation is harmed as well by its own decision to sell the 
crown jewelry (often at the fire sale price), which would depress the firm value and 
damage business opportunities in the future.  Alternatively, a target could issue debt 
securities or assume obligations so that the capital structure of the firm is significantly 
changed; since the target is then no longer the attractive firm that the prospective 
                                                 
74 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2.     
 
75 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 
(Foundation Press 2d ed. 1995). 
   
76 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2. 
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acquirer had gone after, she in the end would give up proceeding with the acquisition. 
Although this strategy works in terms of preserving a firm’s independence, it is 
injurious to the target itself as well.  In contrast, the sole effect of adopting a poison 
pill is either to deter a hostile bid or to negotiate the terms of acquisition without 
damaging a target itself.  
 
2. Dominant Shareholders – Identity and Ownership Structure   
 
As explained, amid the changing M&A landscape, dominant shareholders in 
controlling shareholder regimes have made attempts to neutralize hostile bids by 
adopting new defensive measures in their jurisdictions.  Before analyzing the 
anticipated consequences of adopting a poison pill in such a jurisdiction, let me start 
with a question – who are dominant shareholders?  Basically, there are two types of 
dominant shareholders.  One is the government. For instance, the Chinese 
government manages large state-owned enterprises (“SOE”) that constitute a 
substantial fraction of the Chinese economy in terms of assets and revenues.77  The 
other is controlling family shareholders, who are ubiquitously observed in Asia, 
Europe, Latin America and even the United States.  The subject that my Article 
delves into is this second group.       
What ownership structures do they rely on in order to retain corporate control?  
For this question, it is worth noting that the primary factor that determines corporate 
control is not the economic stake a dominant shareholder holds in a corporation, but 
                                                 
77 See e.g., Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 73 (2007).  
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the voting power she can exercise.  Until recently, most commentators have analyzed 
the controlling shareholder system based on a controlled structure (“CS”) model in 
which a large block-holder owns a majority or large plurality of a company’s 
shares.78   However, the CS model does not cover the ownership structure of all 
controlled companies.  The other half of the picture can be explained as a controlling-
minority structure (“CMS”) in which a dominant shareholder is able to exercise 
control over a corporation while holding only a fraction of its equity79 – for example, 
while a dominant shareholder holds only 5% of cash-flow rights, she exercises 
effective control over a company.  According to Bebchuk et al., such a radical 
separation of voting rights and cash-flow rights can occur in three principal ways – 
through dual-class share structures, stock pyramids, and cross-ownership ties.80   
 
3. Dominant Shareholders and Anti-Takeover Defenses    
 
A dominant shareholder perhaps does not need a pill if she holds “absolute” 
control (i.e., more than 51% of voting rights).  However, many controllers in the 
world do not hold absolute control – as long as the rest of all shareholders are widely 
dispersed, a shareholder with less than 50% of all votes can control a corporation.  In 
this latter case, a dominant shareholder may consider a poison pill to fend off a hostile 
bid completely.       
                                                 
78 Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and 
Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, 
NBER Working Paper No. 6951 (1999) at 1. 
  
79 Id. at 1. 
  




(a) CMS – an “Internal Defensive Device” 
When a controller refuses a high-premium bid which will be beneficial to 
shareholders as a whole, a controller in a CS company has more legitimacy than one 
in a CMS company.  It is because; (i) the CS controller has a significant holding of 
economic interest corresponding to her voting rights while a CMS controller wields 
the control by utilizing a voting leverage without owning corresponding economic 
interest; and (ii) a CS controller is the very person who will lose the most when she 
does not accept an attractive bid from outside, while the opportunity cost of a CMS 
controller is minimal since her cash-flow rights in a corporation are small.  Therefore, 
the larger the discrepancy between economic interest and voting power, the more 
entrenchment effect is expected.     
Now, let me explain the CMS in terms of a defense device.  Suppose that the 
top executives in a widely-held U.S. corporation hold 5% of the corporation’s 
economic interest.  Facing a takeover bid, they urge the board to adopt a poison pill 
(and suppose that the board agrees with management).  Accordingly, the threat is 
eliminated and executives can continue to manage the corporation.  On the other hand, 
suppose that there is a controller in a CMS company outside the United States, who 
holds 5% of the economic interest in the company and wields 51% of voting control.  
Here, the controller, as opposed to the executives aforementioned, does not need a pill 
to quell a hostile bid, although the controller and executives have the same amount of 
economic interest in each company.   In this sense, the CMS itself is a strong “internal 
defensive device” similar to a poison pill.     
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In fact, this was the foundation of German opposition to the European 
Takeover Directive in June 2000, the goal of which was to lower the barriers to 
takeovers within the European Union and to establish common standards for such 
transactions by imposing strict neutrality on the board of a target company once a 
takeover bid has been made.81  Germany believed that its firms were more open to a 
takeover threat than were firms from France or Scandinavian member states that 
continued to allow multiple voting rights that constituted strong post-bid defenses.82 
 
(b) What If a Dominant Shareholder Does Not Have “Absolute” Control?     
So far, I have assumed that a dominant shareholder holds a majority of votes 
irrespective of how much economic interest she has.  However, she is able to 
“control” a corporation with less than 50% of the voting rights as long as the rest of 
the shareholders are widely-dispersed and do not collaborate and form one opposing 
group.  In this respect, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Perlman v. Feldmann 83  
(“Feldmann”) is worth noting; Feldmann, who held 33% of Newport, was to sell all 
of his holding and shares held by his friends (thus, altogether 37% of the Newport 
stock) to a third party, Wilport, for a control premium; the court opined (seemingly in 
opposition to the established principle as to the sale of control in the United States) 
that a dominant shareholder may not sell control at a premium excluding non-
                                                 
81  CURTIS J. MILHAUPT AND KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISIS 
REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 80 (The 
University of Chicago Press 2008). 
  
82 Id. at 81. 
  
83 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).   
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dominant shareholders from reaping the profits.84  Although it is important to analyze 
whether non-dominant shareholders are entitled to share control premiums, what is 
emphasized in this Sub-Section is the fact that the court deemed Feldmann to be a 
controller although he held 33% (or 37% including the shares of his friends) of the 
outstanding Newport stock, which is far less than a majority.   
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the “Panel”) in the United Kingdom, an 
independent body which supervises and regulates takeovers and other matters, has a 
similar position.85  According to the City Code that the Panel issues and administers, 
“control” is defined as an interest, or interests, in shares carrying in the aggregate 
30% or more of the voting rights of a company. 86   Thus, a controller does not 
necessarily hold a majority of voting power.   
When a dominant shareholder has less than a majority of voting rights – 
whether she is a CS or CMS controller – she is now exposed to the potential threat of 
a hostile takeover, although the possibility is low if the level of her voting rights is 
near 50%.  Then, a controller may be interested in a stronger anti-takeover device 
such as a poison pill and urge the government or the legislature (or even the judiciary) 
to adopt a new law that allows the implementation of a pill in a target company.    
 
(c) A Tale of Two Cities – Tokyo (Livedoor) And Seoul (SK Group)     
                                                 
84 Id.  See also Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 785 (2003). 
   
85 http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/ (last visited on Dec. 13th in 2010). 
  
86 The Takeover Code (explaining that “Control means an interest, or interests, in shares carrying in 
aggregate 30% or more of the voting rights (as defined below) of a company, irrespective of whether 
such interest or interests give de facto control.”)  
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In this respect, it is worthwhile to introduce two takeover attempts in Japan 
and Korea where business groups are dominant players in their economies and where, 
until recently, hostile takeovers were almost nonexistent.  In February 2005, a 
Japanese Internet service provider Livedoor (CEO was Takafumi Horie) initiated a 
takeover bid against Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. (“Nippon Broadcasting”) 
when Livedoor owned about 38% of Nippon Broadcasting’s stock. 87   Nippon 
Broadcasting was a subsidiary of Fuji Television Network, Inc. (“Fuji TV”), the 
virtual headquarters of the Fuji Sankei media group.  Interestingly, however, Nippon 
Broadcasting held 22.5% of Fuji TV’s shares, while Fuji TV held only 12.4% of 
Nippon Broadcasting’s shares.88  Therefore, Livedoor’s (or Horie’s) bid shattered the 
control structure of the entire Fuji Sankei Group, which was connected through intra-
shareholding among affiliated firms.  As a defense measure, Nippon Broadcasting 
considered issuing warrants to Fuji TV in order to strengthen Fuji TV’s control 
position and dilute Livedoor’s stake.89  Then, Livedoor sued to enjoin this defensive 
measure, and the courts (Tokyo District Court and the High Court) ruled in favor of 
Livedoor. 90   As a result, Livedoor obtained a controlling interest in Nippon 
Broadcasting.  Later, however, this battle for control was resolved peacefully – 
                                                 
87 Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware?: The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2179 (2005). 
 
88 Id. at 2178. 
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Livedoor sold its Nippon Broadcasting shares to Fuji TV, and in return Fuji TV 
obtained a fractional stake in Livedoor for a capital infusion.91 
A more dynamic episode took place in Seoul, Korea.  Controlling family 
shareholders in Korean chaebols (business groups) use intra-shareholding for their 
control.  In April 2003, Sovereign Asset Management Limited (“Sovereign”) acquired 
14.9 % of the outstanding shares of SK Corporation (“SKC”), the largest oil refiner in 
Korea.  SKC was important strategically because it was the de facto holding company 
in SK Group and a large shareholder of SK Telecommunication (“SKT”), the largest 
telecommunication company in Korea.  According to the Telecommunication 
Business Act in Korea, if Sovereign (a foreign fund) had acquired 15% of SKC’s 
stock, SKC would have been deemed as a foreign entity and would have lost its 
voting power on SKT.  Then, the entire SK Group would have been virtually 
collapsed because complex chains of intra-shareholding could have been destroyed 
between SKC and SKT.  In other words, with its $140 million purchase of SK’s 
14.9 % stock, Sovereign would have had the power to dismantle the entire SK Group, 
whose assets were worth more than $50 billion.  After a series of fierce control 
contests, Sovereign sold its shares of SKC for a profit of roughly $900 million. 
In this “tale of two cities,” Takafumi Horie, Livedorr’s CEO, was a Japanese 
citizen, whereas Sovereign was a foreign entity.  In Japan, however, from the 
perspective of the traditional Japanese business community, the presence of a 
“maverick,” such as Horie, was deemed to be the result of globalization (more exactly, 
Americanization), and Japanese authorities became seriously concerned about more 
hostile takeover attempts from abroad.  For example, Keidanren (a powerful big 
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business lobby) called for developing defensive measures to prevent “foreign 
predators” from taking control in Japan.92  In response, the Japanese government 
postponed a planned corporate law amendment that would give foreign business 
entities more leeway in M&A.93  In Korea, after SK Group’s experience, politicians 
and the business community seriously discussed implementing a poison pill in its 
corporate law.  They argued that it was unfair that Korean corporations were exposed 
to hostile takeover battles while foreign entities had full defensive measures including 
the pill.   
 
 
IV. A PILL – IS IT COMPATIBLE WITH AN IMPORTING 
JURISDICTION?    
 
The previous Part reviews why the controlling shareholder regime considers 
adopting a poison pill in its legal system by importing from Delaware jurisprudence.  
One of concerns as to this legal transplantation is that a poison pill is only one 
component of the entire Delaware takeover mechanism that consists of various legal 
and economic infrastructures that many jurisdictions outside the United States do not 
have.   
              
1. The Composition And Nature of the Board 
 
                                                 
92 Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 81 at 92. 
  
93 Id. at 92.  
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One of the lynchpins to support the legality of a poison pill in Delaware is the 
existence of a board with a majority of outsiders, which can be an independent 
monitor in relation to management. 94   Is there a similar board in a controlling 
shareholder jurisdiction, which considers importing a poison pill? 
 
(a) Is a U.S. “Independent” Board Truly Independent? 
It is argued that one of the most dramatic changes in the U.S. corporate 
governance since the second half of the 20th century is the emergence of a monitoring 
board (rather than an advisory board) with a majority of “independent” directors.95  
The U.S. corporate law (or Delaware law and doctrines) has assumed that executives 
are in charge of day-to-day management.  Although shareholders are residual 
claimants and “owners” of a corporation, on an individual basis they do not have the 
power or incentive to monitor executives.  In response to this concern, the idea of an 
independent board emerged as a corporate organ monitoring executives on behalf of 
shareholders.  Thus, a board with a majority of outside directors was designed to 
solve the collective action problem that dispersed shareholders’ influence as well as 
to lessen managerial agency costs by disciplining executives.  As a result of the 
popularity of this notion, directors in the typical U.S. board have become less 
associated with corporate insiders – while most public corporations had a majority of 
inside directors in the 1960s,96 the average board consisted of nine outside and only 
two inside directors at around 2000.97   
                                                 
94 See e.g., Unocal; Moran. 
  




The recurring problem, however, is that “outside” directors are not necessarily 
(or automatically) “independent.”  Even in the United States which many 
commentators have lauded as the jurisdiction of the best corporate governance, an 
“independent” board can be easily abused as a rubber stamp for a CEO and top 
executives.  This concern is associated with the fact that outside directors are 
nominated by incumbent management (even if a company has an independent 
nomination committee) – in fact, outside directors are often friends of a CEO or at 
least someone in the same social circle that the CEO belongs to.   
For example, in Smith v. Van Gorkom (“Van Gorkom”)98 Trans Union board 
was found to breach the duty of care under the gross negligence standard because the 
board approved a CEO’s decision to sell the corporation blindly and uninformed.  In 
fact, Van Gorkom is a very controversial case – the decision was 3-2, which was 
unusual to the general tendency of unanimity in Delaware Supreme Court.  On the 
one hand, some commentators believe that the case properly emphasizes the 
significance of the decision-making process in a board room.  On the other hand, 
others argue that Van Gorkom is “one of the worst decisions in the history of 
corporate law…”99  Although it is not my purpose here to participate in this debate, 
an intriguing feature in Van Gorkom is that four out of five “independent” directors 
                                                                                                                                           




98 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
  





were chief executives of major corporations100 – arguably they might have been too 
sympathetic to a retiring CEO and have agreed with him without reliance on enough 
information, skipping due process for discussing the acquisition from the standpoint 
of shareholder welfare.  In addition, the independence of U.S. “independent” directors 
is sometimes doubted due to personal ties between “independent” directors and 
executives, although the directors by themselves are financially disinterested.  This 
skepticism is exemplified in In Re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation 101  
(“Oracle”).102  Furthermore, it is needless to say that the economic debacles of Enron 
and WorldCom raised many questions on the independence of U.S. outside 
directors.103   
In sum, it is correct that a typical U.S. board is not independent in absolute 
terms.  However, the board has continuously improved the quality of independence as 
time goes by.  Then, turning towards a controlling shareholder jurisdiction which 
considers importing a pill system, is a typical board independent there, and to what 
extent is it independent, compared to its counterpart in the United States?  
 
(b) International Comparison – Who Do Outside Directors Deal with?    
                                                 
100 Among ten directors who served on the Trans Union Board, five were insiders and the other five 
were outsiders.  “Of the outside directors, four were CEOs and one was the former Dean of the 
University of Chicago Business School.” Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. 858 (Del. 1985).         
 
101 In Re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. 2003). 
  
102 In Oracle, the Delaware Chancery Court determined the independence of the special litigation 
committee (“SLC”) of Oracle, which was set up in response to a derivative action that alleged illegal 
inside trading by Oracle’s directors and officers.  The court found that the members of the SLC, both 
of whom were professors at Stanford University, and the directors who were accused of insider trading 
were connected via the network of Stanford; (i) one accused director taught one of the SLC members; 
and (ii) two others of the accused made significant contributions and donations to Stanford. Eisenberg, 
supra note 20 at 980-981. 
    
103 Discussion with Professor Merritt B. Fox.  
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As opposed to the state of affairs in the United States, many boards in a 
controlling shareholder jurisdiction are not comprised of a majority of outside 
directors – sometimes, there is no outside director at all if corporate law and securities 
regulation do not require their presence.  Even if outside directors constitute a 
majority, the quality of independence of a typical board in a controlling shareholder 
system is likely to be lower than in the United States.  Why? 
Most of all, outside directors are virtually nominated (and elected) by a 
dominant shareholder who holds voting control – in addition, since many outsiders 
have financial and non-financial incentives to be re-nominated (and thus reelected), 
they go along with a controller.  It is true that in practice, many outside directors are 
nominated by a CEO in a typical U.S. corporation as well.  Nonetheless, a board with 
outsiders in a controlling shareholder system is subject to more serious structural bias 
due to the inherent characteristics of the ownership structure.  
Let us think about the nature of power-play in a U.S. widely-held company 
first.  A typical U.S. CEO is a “consul”104 – she is the most powerful person in a 
company, but her tenure is limited.  Under this polity, outside directors are basically a 
consul’s political “colleagues” (although inferior) and act in the rational anticipation 
that a CEO will step down at some point.  It is true that in a hostile takeover situation, 
a board is on management’s side and rarely welcomes an external enemy that is 
almost invariably a common threat to the board as well.  The same board, however, is 
relatively active in disciplining management as to issues that fall outside a corporate 
control contest.  Such check and balance systems operate more often when a vast 
                                                 
104  See Sang Yop Kang, Reenvisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling 
Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other (working paper).    
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majority of shareholders are discontent with the ongoing projects and visions of a 
company, which are reflected in the stock price.  Put differently, outside (and 
sometimes even inside) directors challenge a CEO internally and sometimes fire her 
when management’s performance is disappointing.   
Then, what about the nature of power-play in a typical company in a 
controlling jurisdiction?  First, it should be noted that the tenure of a dominant 
shareholder is deemed infinite because family dynastic succession is widely 
anticipated.  Outside directors rationally understand that it is extremely difficult to 
overturn the dynasty.  Accordingly, a controller wields power to the full extent, and a 
well-functioning system of checks and balances is virtually nonexistent.  Unlike an 
aforementioned CEO who is “consul,” a dominant shareholder is an “emperor.”105  
Thus, directors are best described as “retainers” rather than political “colleagues.”  
Under these circumstances, an “independent” board, if any, exists in name only.  
Most of all, the board is not able to challenge and ultimately fire a dominant 
shareholder.  This is obvious when we think who a dominant shareholder and a CEO 
are.  A dominant shareholder is basically a “shareholder” with voting control; thus, 
her capacity as a controller has nothing to do with a board’s decision or approval; in 
other words, a board is not able to fire a dominant “shareholder” and a dominant 
shareholder can be removed only by the voluntary sale of her stock in the market.  In 
contrast, a CEO is a corporate “officer” who is appointed by a board that has a legal 
power to remove her.         
Of course, a controller may hold an official position such as a CEO in a 
corporation.  In such a case, it may be legally possible that a board can fire her from a 
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CEO position.  But, given that a controller has the power to replace the entire board 
via her voting power, such a revolt is futile.  Interestingly, a dominant shareholder 
may have incentive not to hold any official post in a corporation.  Why?  Having an 
official post such as a CEO has little to do with a controller’s power – a dominant 
shareholder in a controlled-corporation is powerful not because she is a CEO but 
because she is a controller.  In contrast, when a dominant shareholder holds any 
official role in a company, she is more exposed to legal liabilities.  A controller 
without an official title may lose psychic utility generated from self-esteem and social 
prestige.  However, she can recover it by granting herself an unofficial designation 
such as a chairperson in a corporation (not chair of the board) which does not carry 
legal responsibility but satisfies a controller’s desire for honor.        
Realizing this problem, authorities in Korea amended the Commercial Code to 
create a provision on the de facto directorship, targeting dominant shareholders who 
do not hold official titles but wield full control in business groups.106  According to 
this provision, a person is liable for transactions if she is construed to be a de facto 
director who is able to instruct corporate transactions.  Nonetheless, it is well known 
that this provision is not very practical, since a plaintiff must demonstrate that a 
controller is the person who directs particular orders in business transactions behind 
the scene, which is an extremely high bar for a plaintiff.                   
 
(c) Reputational Constraints 
 It is often argued that a U.S. outside director has reason to oversee 
management more actively since she cares about her reputation; when a director is 
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recognized in the corporate governance market as a skillful monitor, she will have 
more opportunities to have multi-directorships; as a result, she benefits in pecuniary 
terms.  This hypothesis is plausible, if not perfectly convincing, in the United States 
and has gained some support in academia and practice.  However, the extra-legal 
mechanism based on concern for reputation might not be successfully copied in some 
controlling shareholder jurisdictions.  
To begin with, it is noteworthy that the mechanism of reputation – in the 
United States as well as in a controlling shareholder jurisdiction – constrains an 
outside director in two opposite directions, according to the “audiences” they face.  
On the one hand, a director cares about the general word-of-mouth in the capital 
market, and aims at public investors who seek a higher return by correcting agency 
problems.  On the other hand, the same director is concerned about her reputation in 
another audience group, a business circle.   
The problem is that the feedback from business elites to a director is more 
salient in a controlling shareholder system, in particular the CMS, than in the United 
States because of the very nature of ownership structure.  A CMS economy is 
dominated by a handful of large business groups (and as a result, a handful of 
dominant shareholders); as a result, controllers constitute monopsony in the labor 
market for outside directors; once an outsider is stigmatized as a “maverick” who is 
recalcitrant toward a controller in one business group, her reputation would spread 
rapidly among other controllers and business groups; given that public investors are 
powerless vis-à-vis dominant shareholders, such an outside director has a high chance 





The independence of U.S. outside directors is not perfect.  However, a typical 
U.S. board is required to have relatively sound “independence.”  Most of all, in the 
United States, the legitimacy of defensive devices including a poison pill is materially 
enhanced by the independent directors’ review as seen in Unocal and Moran107  – 
therefore, an independent board is nearly a necessary condition to a pill.  Even Van 
Gorkom and Oracle, which illustrate the weakness of U.S. “independent” boards, 
simultaneously indicate how much the U.S. judiciary cares about the independency of 
boards.  In addition, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. (“Weinberger”),108 the Delaware 
court emphasized the independence of a committee in self-dealing arrangements 
between a controller (a parent) and a subsidiary.  Such constraint of a dominant 
shareholder is rarely observed in many countries outside the United States.   
Further, boards of many controlling shareholder jurisdictions are subject to 
serious structural bias.  In particular, the ownership structure itself and reputational 
framework in such countries compromise the board’s independence more 
significantly.  Under these circumstances, the legitimacy of a poison pill – if it is 
imported – would not be well supported under Delaware jurisprudence.  The 
Delaware court’s lenient position as to a target company’s reliance on the “just say 
                                                 
107 For example, the Moran court stated, “In addition, the directors must show that the defensive 
mechanism was “reasonable in relation to the threat posed”… Moreover, that proof is materially 
enhanced, as we noted in Unocal, where, as here, a majority of the board favoring the proposal 
consisted of outside independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing 
standards...” Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
        
108 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).   
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no” pill is based on the court’s confidence in a board’s relative independence and the 
court’s ability to correct the nature of a board if it is not sufficiently independent.   
 
2. The Judicial System in a Controlling Shareholder Regime 
 
A controlling shareholder jurisdiction may adopt a pill, arguing that it needs 
an effective defensive device in order to lessen the adverse effects that hostile 
takeovers may bring in its economy – but those who opposed adopting a pill might be 
concerned with protection of the interests of shareholders and prospective acquirers.  
Perhaps, the adoption of the pill would not damage the interests of all relevant parties 
in takeover battles as long as the institutions of legal enforcement in the jurisdiction 
follow the general principles of Delaware takeover jurisprudence.  However, this is 
not easily achievable in many controlling shareholder countries.    
The Delaware judicial system has been touted as efficient in dealing with 
corporate governance matters; it has a highly regarded court which specializes in 
corporate cases, acting without a jury; 109  judges are experienced and versed in 
business trends, substantive corporate law and litigation; 110  courts – both the 
Chancery Court and Supreme Court – are expeditious in making decisions.111  At the 
same time, Delaware has enjoyed another benefit, the “network effect” – as the 
number of consumers increases, each consumer’s utility increases.112  Since Delaware 
                                                 
109 Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). 
   
110 Id. 
   
111 Id.   
 
112  See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
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is by far the leading state in terms of venue of choice of incorporation, its judiciary 
experiences a great deal of litigation among corporations, so that legal doctrines are 
interpreted in a more sophisticated way and results in similar cases are relatively 
predictable.113  As a result, Delaware corporations, consumers of the corporate law 
adjudication, are able to make their business transactions proceed in a more stable 
way and avoid “unfair surprises” in potential legal cases.       
In contrast, it is doubtful that most controlling shareholder countries have 
efficient judicial systems like the Delaware courts.114  Most of all, since the market 
for corporate control has been virtually nonexistent in these countries, judiciaries do 
not have a network effect of their own.  Alternatively, these countries may consult 
Delaware takeover doctrines and case laws to solve challenging legal problems 
associated with a poison pill.  An inherent risk of this stopgap is, however, that 
applying Delaware doctrines without taking into consideration key differences in 
underlying circumstances in such countries would create incompatibility.     
Judges in many countries rotate periodically and cover various legal areas 
(such as criminal, contract, torts, administration, and family laws) in their career 
because they need to have at least some knowledge of as many cases as possible to 
supervise their juniors when they are promoted to higher positions.  Under these 
circumstances, having expertise in one particular subject of law (e.g., corporate law) 
is systematically impractical.  In other words, judiciaries in many countries prefer 
                                                                                                                                           
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). 
 
113  As to the network effect the Delaware judiciary benefits, See generally, Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). 
  
114 In this Article, for the simplicity, I rule out the possibility that courts in such countries are corrupt, 
although this possibility is a proper concern in some countries. 
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generalist judges to specialist ones.  In addition, some jurisdictions do not require a 
judge to have any experience as a lawyer – hence, a judge can start her career in the 
judiciary in her mid-20s without any exposure to real business transactions.  Such a 
system may have its own merits – however, if we limit our discussion to a court with 
expertise in complicated business and takeover cases, the system is not well equipped.      
Moreover, timing is often of the essence in most business transactions.  Thus, 
business people need a judiciary like the Delaware courts that expedite cases and 
resolve uncertainties surrounding transactions quickly.  Unfortunately, courts in most 
countries are not fast, so parties in suits are often concerned about whether they 
should bring suits in the first place.  For example, the Indian judiciary, which shares a 
common law heritage with its counterpart in the United States, is overwhelmed by 
delays, so that it is not uncommon for a typical dispute to be resolved in 10 or more 
years. 115   With this delay, even the best statutes and case laws are not able to 
meaningfully protect the interests of injured parties.  
               
3. Does a Ballot Box Safety Valve Work in a Controlling Shareholder 
Regime? 
 
 As discussed, Delaware corporate law provides a few safety valves to the pill 
– the protection of the shareholder franchise (Blasius) and a board’s duty to act as 
auctioneer in certain circumstances (Revlon).116  These two safety valves, in fact, 
                                                 
115 John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics; the Case of India, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
491 (2009).  
     
116 Armour et al., supra note 29.     
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support the legality of a poison pill.  Are there safety valves in a controlling 
shareholder regime when the poison pill is introduced in its corporate law? 
      
(a) Delaware Does Not Allow “Just Say Never”117 
 Time opined that a target board can just say no to a hostile bid by refusing 
flatly to redeem a poison pill.118  However, the shareholders have recourse in the face 
of a board sitting on a pill – they are able to replace the directors in a proxy contest so 
that new directors will redeem a pill.119  In this sense, even the “just say no” pill is 
not really invincible from the perspectives of a prospective acquirer and shareholders, 
as long as the voting mechanism is preserved to reflect the real intent of shareholders 
as a whole.   
However, target boards made attempts to block shareholders’ recourse to the 
ballot by inventing mutants of a standard poison pill such as a “dead hand provision” 
– in such a provision, only the incumbent directors or their designated successors 
were entitled to redeem a pill. 120  Accordingly, “…it would make little sense for 
shareholders or the hostile bidder to wage a proxy contest to replace the incumbent 
board,”121 since even a newly elected board in favor of the deal would be precluded 
from redeeming the pill.122  Explaining that the provision effectively disenfranchised 
                                                 
117 “Just say never” was coined by Professor Marcel Kahan. 
   
118 See Gordon, supra note 44. 
  
119 Id.  
 
120 Jacobs, supra note 11. 
   




shareholders who wished to elect a board committed to redeeming the pill,123 the 
Delaware court invalidated the dead hand provision in Carmody v. Toll Brothers, 
Inc. 124   In Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., another 
variation of a standard pill called a “slow hand pill” – a pill that is non-redeemable for 
six months after a change in control of the board – was invalidated as well, 125  
although the extent of deterrence to a hostile takeover was relatively weak.       
In sum, what the Delaware jurisprudence approved is the “just say no” 
defense, through which a board can buy time to persuade shareholders to agree on an 
incumbent’s business strategy.126  However, the board is not allowed to “just say 
never” 127  which makes the “ballot box safety valve” (associated with Blasius) 
powerless by tainting the shareholder referendum on a corporate control issue. 
 
(b) The CMS with a Pill – “Double Discrimination” against a Hostile Bidder    
Does a controlling shareholder regime, the CMS in particular, preserve the 
ballot box safety valve?  To begin with, it is noteworthy that interference with the 
shareholder franchise is an innate problem of the CMS ownership structure.  Why?  
                                                                                                                                           
122 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dead Hand and No Hand Pills: Pre-commitment Strategies in Corporate 




124 Toll Brothers. 
  
125 Quickturn Design Systems v. Mentor Graphics, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).  
  
126 Professors Kahan and Rock explained, “Thus, the ultimate effect of the pill is akin to “just say 
wait”: it leaves the decision on whether to accept a bid to the outside board members, but only until 
shareholders can replace the board, and in the meantime discourages defensive board actions.” Kahan 
& Rock, supra note 2.  
  
127 Professor Gordon explained that “if a board can thwart a proxy fight to redeem a poison pill through 
a “continuing director” provision in its pill, it is ‘just say never’ defense.” Gordon, supra note 44.  
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The very definition of the CMS assumes that a dominant shareholder is able to distort 
the voting mechanism – in a stylized example, a dominant shareholder holds a small 
fraction of a corporation’s economic interest (e.g., 5%) while exercising a large stake 
of voting rights (e.g., 40%) through stock pyramiding, dual class common stocks, and 
the intra-shareholding.  In the takeover context, such voting leverage mechanisms are 
in themselves strong defensive devices to a CMS dominant shareholder, even in the 
absence of a poison pill.  As discussed, this is exactly the reason why Germany 
opposed the European Takeover Directive in June 2000.  From Germany’s point of 
view, its companies with CS were at a greater disadvantage in terms of defense from 
hostile takeovers than companies from France or Scandinavian countries that 
continued to have the CMS ownership with multiple voting rights.128  
Therefore, if the “just say no” pill is allowed in a CMS jurisdiction, a 
dominant shareholder would be excessively protected from hostile takeovers via the 
mechanism of “double discrimination” among shareholders.  (i) The first 
discrimination takes place between a dominant shareholder and the rest of all 
shareholders.  It is based on the inflation of a dominant shareholder’s voting rights 
that the CMS itself legalizes.  As a result, the voting power of the rest of all 
shareholders is diluted.  (ii) The second discrimination takes place between a hostile 
bidder and the other shareholders, including a controller.  It is based on the dilution of 
the hostile bidder’s economic interest and voting rights that the poison pill will 
generate.  In the combination of these two powerful discriminatory devices, the 
principles of one-share-one-vote or equal treatment among shareholders are 
significantly tarnished.  As a result of accumulating discrimination imposed by both 
                                                 
128 Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 81 at 81.  
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the CMS and a pill, a hostile bidder’s likelihood of winning in a takeover battle is 
substantially reduced. 
 
(c)   Can a Prospective Acquirer Overcome a CMS with a Pill?       
In Delaware, boards are permitted to maintain the pill indefinitely to block a 
bid, while shareholders are protected from managerial moves to impede their voting 
against incumbent management.129  In that sense, the conflicting interests between 
management’s autonomy and shareholders’ fundamental right to vote are well 
balanced.  When the Delaware pill is imported to a jurisdiction with the CMS, 
however, such balance is no longer maintained due to the very definition of the CMS.  
Consider a numerical example.130  Suppose that there are two companies – 
one is a CMS firm (hereinafter “Company A”) and the other is a widely-held firm 
(hereinafter “Company B”) – and both have pills which are triggered when an 
uninvited bidder acquires 20% of their shares.  Both a dominant shareholder in 
Company A and a management team in Company B hold 5% of the common stock.  
In terms of voting power, however, the dominant shareholder of Company A 
exercises 40% via voting leverage, while management in Company B holds 5% 
voting rights commensurate to its cash-flow rights.  Suppose that a prospective 
acquirer considers two companies as takeover targets.  At first, it seems that a 
prospective acquirer may purchase up to 19.9% of the shares of each company 
                                                 
129 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 8 at 907. 
 
130 In this example, for the purpose of simplification, I assume that in Company A, a CMS controller 
has multiple voting shares and a prospective acquirer can obtain only stock featured by one-share-one-
vote.  In Company B, the one-share-one-vote rule is equally preserved among all shareholders 
including management.        
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before the poison pills are triggered.  In fact, however, she will realize soon that the 
acquisition of 19.9% of the shares of Company A is far more difficult than the 
acquisition of 19.9% of the shares of Company B; as to Company B’s stock, a 
prospective acquirer may purchase 19.9% of the shares out of the 95% free float in a 
widely-held company (excluding 5% that management owns); however, regarding 
Company A’s stock, she must buy 19.9% of all shares out of the 60% public float 
(excluding the 40% of votes that the controller holds).  
Even if a hostile bidder is able to acquire 19.9% of the shares of each 
company, she needs to overcome another difficulty in a proxy contest in each 
company so that her director candidates will redeem the pill.  Again, a prospective 
acquirer will realize that waging a proxy contest in Company A is far more difficult 
than in Company B; in Company A, in order to obtain control (i.e., 50.1%), the 
prospective acquirer has to have the support of 30.2%131 of the shares out of the 
remaining 40.1%132 – the effective percentage of votes that she needs from the rest 
of the shareholders is 75.3% (i.e., 30.2 / 40.1 = 75.3).  In contrast, as to Company B, 
a prospective acquirer has to gain 30.2% of the votes from shareholders out of the 
remaining 75.1%133 – in this case, the effective percentage of additional votes that a 
controller needs is 40.2% (i.e., 45 / 75.1 = 40.2).  Since management has the 
advantage in waging a proxy contest, the 40.2% hurdle is still demanding to a 
prospective acquirer.  However, a prospective acquirer still has a chance of winning.  
                                                 
131 Since the bidder currently has 19.9% of votes, she needs 30.2% more in order to gain a majority of 
votes.  
 
132 100% – 19.9% (the acquirer’s fraction) – 40% (the controller’s fraction) = 40.1% 
    
133 100% – 19.9% (the acquirer’s fraction) – 5% (management’s fraction) = 75.1% 
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On the other hand, the 75.3% bar is extremely high to a challenger, so that it is 
almost impossible for a prospective acquirer to gain control of Corporation A.   
   
(d) The CMS with a Pill – In Between “Just Say No” and “Just Say Never”    
Suppose that there is a straight horizontal line which describes the degree of 
deterrence created by a defensive device – the scale starts from the left and increases 
to the right.134  (i) On the far left side, the Interco pill – a board is required to redeem 
a pill when it faces a non-coercive bid – marks the lowest deterrence power to a 
hostile bid.  (ii) On the far right side, the “just say never” pill such as a dead-hand 
provision – the redemption of a pill is not a viable option to a challenger – marks the 
strongest deterrence power to a takeover.  (iii) The “just say no” pill upheld in Time is 
situated in the middle of those two points.  
However, if a Time pill is coupled with another strong defensive device, the 
scale of such a combination moves further to the right.  (iv) For example, the 
combination of “just say no” and an ESB carries a far stronger deterrent effect than 
that of the stand alone “just say no” pill.  (v) Similarly, the CMS ownership with a 
pill increases the deterrent power of the stand alone “just say no” pill, so that it is 
located in the middle of “just say no” and “just say never” as well.  In sum, roughly 
speaking, the deterrent power of each defensive measure is situated in the following 
                                                 
134 Thus, the end of left represents a defense device with the least deterrence effect, and the end of right 
represents a defense device with the most deterrence effect. 
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order (from weakest to strongest); the Interco pill – the Time pill (“just say no”) – the 
Time pill plus either an ESB or a CMS – the Toll Brothers pill (“just say never”).135              
 
 
(e) The CMS with a Pill – Could It Damage Blasius?     
As Chancellor Allen famously stated in Blasius, “The shareholder franchise is 
the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”136  
Therefore, even if Delaware courts are highly deferential to the board (and 
management) and do not second guess business judgments made by a board, they are 
more intrusive when the primary purpose of a board’s conduct is to interfere with the 
shareholder franchise.  As to the inquiry whether using a combination of a pill and an 
ESB amounts to undermining the shareholder franchise, reasonable minds can 
disagree.  Nonetheless, it is true that the board with such a combination is more able 
to abuse its discretionary power to perpetuate itself.  In that sense, a pill with an ESB 
is less likely to be consistent with the tenet of Blasius, but it is not definitely 
inconsistent with Blasius.  
When a jurisdiction allows the CMS, the legal legitimacy of such an 
ownership system is not a question (although economic legitimacy is questionable).  
However, a combination of a pill and the CMS will generate consequences similar to 
a combination of a pill and an ESB, since the built-in nature of the CMS – which 
provides a controller with multiple votes – distorts the shareholder referendum.  In 
                                                 
135 Currently, Interco (which weakened a board’s discretion under the certain circumstances) and Toll 
Brothers (which practically denies the shareholder franchise) are invalid in Delaware, although it is 
possible that a target may voluntarily follow Interco by redeeming a pill in response to a non-coercive 
bid. 




principle, an original Delaware pill is legally upheld by the possibility that 
shareholders can indirectly (not by themselves but by electing a board) redeem it by 
replacing a board.  Accordingly, the legal legitimacy of the combination of a pill and 
the CMS is questionable since the ballot box safety valve is tainted.   
To make things worse, a dominant shareholder in a CMS may implement a 
staggered board in addition to a pill unless setting up a staggered board is not 
permitted.  This three-headed dragon has deterrent effect as the “just say never” pill.  
Therefore, once a pill is allowed in this jurisdiction without careful assessment of 
the accumulative effect caused by the CMS and an ESB, the market for corporate 
control will be almost entirely stifled.   
 
(f) Summary      
Nonetheless, it does not say that any additional defensive measure is 
unnecessary or harmful.  In other words, although adopting the Delaware’s “just say 
no” pill blindly leads to “too much” deterrence against hostile takeovers in a 
jurisdiction, the importing jurisdiction’s present defense system without the pill may 
generate “too little” deterrence compared to other jurisdictions that allow the pill.  
Thus, if the jurisdiction needs new defensive measures, it should carefully review 
whether the combined effect of newly-adopted and existing defensive measures 
should be “proportional” under the current climate and institutions.  For example, as a 
less powerful anti-takeover device, the Interco pill may be considered.     
In addition, it is worth noting that a CMS based on intra-shareholding is a 
relatively weak ownership structure compared to that based on either stock-
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pyramiding or dual class common stocks.  As seen in the Livedoor and SK Group 
episodes, if a hostile bidder is able to find a weak intra-shareholding chain within a 
business group, the entire group’s control structure could collapse.  This might be 
another aspect that should be taken into account in determining the proportionality of 
an anti-takeover legal system in a jurisdiction that considers importing a defense 
measure.      
 
4. Would Revlon Protect Non-controlling Shareholders in a Controlling 
Shareholder Regime?  
 
In addition to the ballot box safety valve, recall that there is another safety 
valve to the “just say no” defense.137  According to Revlon, when a corporation enters 
into the Revlon mode – sale of a corporation, changes in long-term strategy in the face 
of a bid, or fundamental change of control – the board should act as a neutral 
auctioneer among bidders rather than as a corporate defender.  Therefore, the board is 
not able to flatly refuse a shareholder-wealth enhancing bid.  Perhaps one may argue 
that if a controlling shareholder jurisdiction imports the Revlon duty when it adopts 
the pill in its legal system, non-controlling shareholders would be more protected, at 
least when a controller incurs the Revlon duty.  However, there are limitations of 
Revlon’s application to developing countries with the controlling shareholder regime.     
To begin with, there are two types of controlling shareholders in developing 
countries.  (i) On the one hand, some controlling shareholders expropriate 
                                                 




substantially all corporate value at the expense of non-controlling shareholders 
through a one-time transaction, just as a government can impose prohibitive taxes on 
its people.  Accordingly, such controllers will leave corporations as shells, since the 
corporation has nothing left to take.  I call them “roving” controllers.138  (ii) On the 
other hand, other controllers extract from non-controlling shareholders based on a 
long term plan.  They transfer a fraction of corporate value through ongoing 
transactions periodically, just like a rational government levies sustainable taxes on 
its people.  Accordingly, such controllers will stay within corporations for a long time 
(mostly, they rely on family succession).  I call them “stationary” controllers.139       
A “roving” controlling regime is the worst ownership system in terms of 
investor protection, since inefficient enforcement allows controllers to pillage 
although law-on-the-books declare protection of non-controlling shareholders. 140   
Suppose that a jurisdiction dominated by “roving” controllers legalizes a poison pill 
which is subject to Revlon.  Under these circumstances, dominant shareholders would 
do “cherry picking” in the corporate law and practice; although the Revlon duty is 
stipulated in law-on-the-books, controllers do not have to follow the duty because it is 
rarely enforceable in corporate anarchy that is dominated by roving controllers; at the 
same time, roving controllers will place the poison pill in corporations when they 
need it.  
                                                 
138 See Sang Yop Kang, Controlling Shareholders – Roving or Stationary (working paper).  Originally, 
Professor Mancur Olson coined roving and stationary bandits to explain the evolution of political 
system. Mancur Olson, Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 567 (1993).  I apply Olson’s logics of political economy to corporate governance scholarship.    
 
139 Kang, supra note 138. 
     
140 In such a jurisdiction, government agencies often collude with business tycoons, and even courts 
may acquiesce to or blind themselves to suspicious transactions by corporate insiders. 
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In a jurisdiction with a vast majority of “stationary” controllers, Revlon duty is 
also unlikely to be applicable.  One reason is the combination of inefficient 
enforcement and the possibility of “cherry picking” as discussed above.  Another 
reason derives from the nature of a “stationary” controller – a corporation is not likely 
to be put up for sale, break-up, or go through a change of control in an M&A market 
since a stationary controller by definition is going to stay in a company infinitely 
through family succession. 141   Since Revlon mode would rarely be triggered, 
generally (if not always) the Revlon principle would be only a decoration in the legal 
system.  Even in the United States, it is noteworthy that reliance on Revlon is not very 
conducive to a prospective acquirer and shareholders who oppose management’s 
refusal of an outside bid. 
 
5.  Summary 
 
In this Part, my point is that a poison pill should not be treated as an isolated 
island but a part of the large continent of the Delaware takeover law system.  
Accordingly, the legality of a poison pill should be supported in the context of other 
legal and socio-economic institutions such as (i) a relatively well-functioning 
independent board, (ii) an efficient judiciary and enforcement mechanism, (iii) the 
ballot box safety valve, and (iv) investor protection.  In addition, without economic 
incentive devices (that I will explore further in the next Part) that compensate existing 
corporate insiders, the poison pill is likely to be abused as an entrenchment tool as 
                                                 
141 Of course, I do not rule out every possibility that a stationary controller would put up a corporation 
in the market for corporate control for sale, break-up, or change of control.  However, the probability 
seems very low to a stationary controller.    
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long as it is adopted in the form of “just say no.”  Nonetheless, a less powerful anti-
takeover device (for example, the Interco pill) might be more suitable in a controlling 
shareholder jurisdiction, depending on its socio-economic and legal infrastructure.        
 
 
V. THE POISON PILL, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, AND THE 
SALE OF CONTROL  
 
In the United States, the evolution of executive compensation since the 1990s 
has transformed the pill from an entrenchment device to a negotiation tool, at least to 
some degree.  This is how the market for corporate control has still survived despite 
the pill’s strong deterrent effect against a hostile bid.  Can we expect the same 
phenomenon in a controlling shareholder jurisdiction, if the pill is incorporated in the 
legal system? 
      
1. Severance Fee And Friendly Deals 
 
This Section explains how different severance fee practices affect corporate 
insiders’ incentive and reactions toward acquisition bids from outside.  On this issue, 
I begin with a comparative analysis of the United States on one side and some 
controlling shareholder jurisdictions on the other side.  Then, I explore why a pill 
would generate sharply different consequences in takeovers on either side.        
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(a) The Comparative Analysis on the Executive Compensation  
In 1991, the average U.S. large firm CEO made 140 times what the average 
worker made.142  By 2003, this multiple increased to over 500 times.143  In contrast, 
the average CEO-rank and file employee compensation ratio is about 20:1 in many 
countries outside the United States.  For example, Professor Eisenberg explains that 
the average Japanese CEO makes 16 times the pay of an average Japanese industrial 
worker and the average German CEO makes about 21 times the pay of the average 
German factory worker.144  What causes such a sharp distinction?  Perhaps, one of 
reasons is the difference in cultural norms in each jurisdiction – in many countries 
which place higher value on social democracy and egalitarianism, a huge income 
disparity is not socially and politically tolerated.145   
Hostile deals which brought controversy and fear to Corporate America in the 
1980s became suddenly quieted down, as a pill was legalized and firmly established 
in the Delaware takeover system.  However, the evolution of U.S. executive 
                                                 
142  Stephan M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides? 83 TEX L. REV. 1615, 1619 
(2004). Professor Bainbridge relied on an article, CEOs and Their Indian Rope Trick, ECONOMIST, 
Dec. 11, 2004. 
 
143 Id.       
 
144 Eisenberg, supra note 20 at 649.  Eisenberg relied on G. Crystal, In Search of Excess 27, 206-209 
(1991).  It is noteworthy that Crystal’s work was written in 1991.  As mentioned above, the U.S. CEO-
employee compensation multiple was 500 in 2003.  In that sense, it would be fair to compare 2003 U.S. 
data and 2003 data from Germany, Japan, or other countries.  At this moment, however, I do not have 
credible data to compare the compensation disparity in the United States and other countries in the 
same recent year.  In addition, my point in this Article is to show that there is a huge gap between the 
United States and other countries in terms of executive compensation rather than to show the exact 
difference of each jurisdiction’s executive compensation level.  For this purpose, I believe that 
Crystal’s 1991 work, which was quoted by Professor Eisenberg (2005), is sufficient.              
 
145 Whether U.S. executive compensation is “exorbitant” in absolute and comparative terms is an 
interesting and worthwhile topic to analyze, but it is not my purpose in this Article.  Rather, my focus 
here is how such sharp contrasts of the executive compensation level in the United States and other 





compensation made market participants adapt to the new takeover environment.  For 
example, a generous severance package which corresponds with the level of a 
gigantic executive compensation could provide incumbent management with 
incentive to leave a company when an outside bid for acquisition is offered. 146   
Therefore, friendly M&A activities filled the vacuum left by the hostile deals that the 
pill stifled.  With the evolution of executive compensation, the pill was repurposed as 
a tool for negotiation leverage to enhance the welfare of shareholders (however, many 
commentators are still suspicious of its entrenchment purpose).  
Now, suppose that a pill is placed in the corporate law system in a jurisdiction 
with a low ratio of compensation between the CEO / a rank-and-file employee.  It is 
less likely that such a jurisdiction has a practice of generous severance packages to 
departing corporate insiders.  Thus, corporate insiders have little reason to accept 
hostile bids which will deprive them of jobs, pecuniary benefits, and psychic utility 
without any compensation for such losses.  Accordingly, they use the pill in order to 
quell friendly deals as well as hostile takeovers.  
One may argue that such a jurisdiction is able to develop an executive 
compensation system just like the United States did in 1990s; the U.S. CEO-
employee compensation multiple increased from 140 to 500 (i.e., 257% increase),147 
and the market participants learned how to live with a pill by designing a severance 
package with more generous terms. 148  Of course, this argument is plausible, and 
some countries can dramatically change their pay tradition as a pill is instated in their 
                                                 
146 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2.   
 
147 [(500 / 140) – 1] x 100% = 257% 
     
148 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2.  
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takeover laws.  In contrast, in many countries, the differences in culture, traditional 
values, political arrangements, and understanding of capitalism would make it 
difficult to accept the practice of Anglo-American executive compensation based on a 
large income disparity.  Below is a detailed analysis drawn from real episodes in 
controlling shareholder economies.    
  
(b) Episodes in Executive Compensation – Germany, Korea, And The United 
States 
In 2000, Vodafone, a British telecommunication firm, acquired Mannesmann, 
a German conglomerate. 149   Although the agreement was ultimately friendly, 
Vodafone initiated a hostile bid at first.  This deal brought sensation in Europe since it 
was the first “hostile” takeover (in terms of the nature of the first bid) of a German 
firm by a foreign firm.150  One controversy surrounding this deal, inter alia, was 
associated with an “appreciation award” granted to Esser (then chief executive) and 
other managers of Mannesmann151 – in particular, Esser was granted ₤10 million 
(about €15 million).  Initially Esser had fought the Vodafone bid – but suddenly he 
“gave up resistance against Vodafone the day he knew about his compensation 
package.”152   
                                                 
149 Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 81.  
 
150 Economist, Fallout from Mannessman: Breach of Trust?, May 2, 2003.   
 
151 Id.  See also Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 81. 
 
152 Economist, supra note 150 (quoting Martin Peltzer, a lawyer in Frankfurt).   
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In the United States, the question of executive compensation is left to the 
business judgment of the board of directors. 153   Accordingly, even if some 
disgruntled shareholders bring lawsuits for monetary damage, it is difficult to imagine 
the executive compensation at issue being found in violation of corporate insiders’ 
fiduciary duty.  Surprisingly to those used to the “global” executive compensation 
standard (which is actually the American standard), however, Esser and key players 
designing the appreciation award were brought to criminal trial by a prosecutor’s 
office on the grounds of breach of trust.  The trial court acquitted the defendants.  
However, BGH (Bundesgerichtshof, the Federal Court of Justice in Germany which 
acts as a court of appeal) followed the argument of the prosecutor’s office and 
reversed the trial court’s decision.  Finally, the retrial court terminated the criminal 
trial on the condition that the accused pay a total of €5.8 million to various public-
interest organizations.154  
Another example where a top executive’s severance fee was tried in a criminal 
court can be drawn from Korea.155  During the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997, many Korean companies with liquidity problems were sold to foreign 
investors at deeply discounted prices.  In 2003, Lone Star acquired a controlling stake 
(51%) in Korea Exchange Bank (“KEB”)156, which was one of the largest nationwide 
banks in Korea.  However, the prosecutor office in Korea accused Lee Kang-Won, 
                                                 
153 Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 81.  
 
154 Id.  In particular, Esser who had received €15 million, was required to pay €1.5 million.        
 
155 See generally, Wall Street Journal, Lone Star Reaches Deal to Sell KEB to Hana Bank, Nov. 15, 
2010 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703326204575616590933846442.html).   
 
156 Cynthia J. Kim, Ex-ministry Official Acquitted of Selling KEB … at Low Price, The Korea Herald, 
Oct. 14, 2010 (http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20101014000947).   
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then chief executive of KEB, on the grounds that he intentionally made KEB’s 
financial condition look worse than it actually was in order to facilitate the friendly 
deal. 157  Allegedly, he received $1.5 million for his future services in the bank as a 
consultant, which could be construed as compensation for smoothing the deal.  After 
5 years of hardship under criminal investigation and trial, Lee was found not-guilty of 
the charge of dereliction of breach by selling KEB at an intentionally low price.158  
But he was sentenced to an 18 month-jail term because he was found guilty of 
receiving a bribe (about $50 thousand) from one of the bank’s suppliers. 
Against this backdrop, it is worth comparing the occasions of Lee (and Esser) 
on the one side with that of Michael Ovitz, a former CEO of Disney who was a main 
character in one of the most important U.S. executive compensation cases. 159  The 
banking industry in Korea, which was the 11th largest economy in the world before 
the Asian Financial Crisis, is greatly concentrated, meaning that a chief executive of a 
large bank is a highly regarded position.  Nonetheless, the absolute level of Lee’s 
executive compensation does not seem to be “proportional” from the U.S. industry 
standard.  If it had been proportional, Lee would not have risked imprisonment to 
receive “only” $1.5 million (or $50 thousand) as “bribes” to facilitate Lone Star’s 
friendly acquisition of KEB (or to give favor to a supplier).  People might take pity on 
Lee when they remember that Michael Ovitz received approximately $140 million 
                                                 
157 See generally, Wall Street Journal, Lone Star Reaches Deal to Sell KEB to Hana Bank, Nov. 15, 
2010 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703326204575616590933846442.html).   
 
158 Sung-Hyun Kim, Lone Star Case – Not Guilty in 5 Years, Money Today, Oct. 14, 2010 (written in 
Korean, http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2010101415392042484&outlink=1).     
 
159 See e.g., In re the Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. 2003).    
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from Disney in the form of severance pay after just about one year at Disney.160  
Although he departed Disney due to his inability to run the business efficiently, the 
amount that he was granted is about 100 times the amount that Lee was offered by 
Lone Star.161  Another American example from the finance industry – when Stanley 
O’Neal was ousted from Merrill Lynch for a disappointing performance in 2007, he 
departed with $161.5 million.162   
 
(c) High Compensation – Is It a Crime in Some Countries? 
Many U.S. top executives who underperform can “exit gracefully” with 
generous golden parachutes.  They are even applauded and touted as “good men” in 
particular at the time of control change because they voluntarily step down from their 
corporate positions and accept a value-enhancing M&A.  In addition, they are often 
able to reap a substantial profit from stock options when high-premium bids are 
offered.  This is a quite interesting phenomenon because (i) these departing 
executives may be “the” reason for their companies’ depressed stock prices and (ii) 
high bid prices are in fact the level of prices that stocks should be worth with 
management of average capability.  If such a pay system has been existent and well 
established in Korea, for example, Lee would not have considered accepting $1.5 
million as “bribe” to expedite a deal, as critics describe the nature of the money Lone 
                                                 
160 Id. 
 
161 This multiple might be higher if time value of money is taken into consideration.  
 
162 See e.g., Miles Weiss, Merrill Lynch’s O’Neal Departs With $161.5 Million (Update2), Bloomberg, 




Star allegedly offered to him.  In this sense, a generous golden parachute in the 
United States can be characterized as a “legally permissible bribe.”   
Of course, there is certainly “public outcry” as to the “exorbitant” level of pay 
for executives in the United States.  In countries with a strong ethos of social 
democracy or egalitarianism, there would be much more serious political resistance 
from the public against high pay for corporate insiders (e.g., a massive street 
demonstration rather than only “public outcry”) although corporate insiders in such 
countries receive a small fraction of what their American counterparts receive.  
People may ask a question – how dare a CEO who underperforms and incurs the 
change of control receive even a $1 severance pay while most employees suffer from 
massive layoffs arising from the M&A?      
In response, government agencies as well as the prosecutor’s office would 
make such “greedy” executives stand criminal trials.  As Fortune vividly described in 
the wake of the Mannesmann case, “In Germany, High Pay Is a Crime.”163  Even if 
highly-paid corporate insiders are ultimately found not guilty, they would already 
have suffered from criminal trials for more than several years, when the final rulings 
are made by courts.  In addition, their reputation will be irreversibly damaged, so that 
it is practically impossible for them to come back to the business world.  Unless a 
sufficient amount of severance pay is available, top executives have virtually no 
reason to initiate negotiation for M&As which will take their jobs without any 
meaningful consideration.  Consequently, the pill, when it is imported in a country 
with social democracy or egalitarianism, is likely to quell M&As in the domestic 
economy.      
                                                 




2. Control Premium And Friendly Deals  
                      
The previous Section focused on the role of executives’ compensation in 
M&A transactions.  Outside the United States, although some widely-held 
corporations are run by professional managers, dominant shareholders are mostly key 
players in strategic transactions.  Of course, controllers are often corporate executives 
as well, and executive compensation is an important issue to them.  But, controllers 
are more interested in control premiums when they sell corporations to a prospective 
acquirer, since the amount of money involved in the sale of control is generally far 
larger than that in an executive pay.  How does the control premium affect a 
controlling shareholder’s incentive when she considers selling control?     
 
(a) The Components of the Control Premium   
Suppose that a dominant shareholder has significant votes in a corporation 
which do not amount to a majority (e.g., 30% votes).  She is not perfectly insulated 
from a threat of acquisition without a pill – a prospective acquirer has a chance (albeit 
a small one) to take over the corporation by purchasing shares in the market.  Now 
suppose that her jurisdiction implements a pill in its legal system.  Then, it is almost 
impossible for a prospective acquirer to take over a corporation in a hostile way – the 
only viable option is to pay the dominant shareholder for the sale of control with a 
“sufficient” premium (which will change the controller’s intention about remaining in 
control).  The problem is how “sufficient” the premium should be.     
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In general, a controller has two sources of “utility” (or happiness) from 
managing a corporation – the pecuniary benefits and non-pecuniary benefits.  The 
pecuniary benefits to a controller can be divided further into two sub-categories.  (i) 
One is monetary benefits distributed to all shareholders according to their fraction of 
the cash flow – I call them “pro-rata dividends,” although these benefits are not 
necessarily paid in the form of dividends.  For example, capital appreciation of the 
stock is deemed as a pro-rata dividend (in this Article) because every shareholder is 
equally able to reap the profits.  A controller benefits in accordance with her 
economic stake in a corporation.  (ii) The other is monetary benefits that are available 
exclusively to a controller at the expense of non-controlling shareholders – I call them 
“special dividends” 164  – which a controller can take through “tunneling.” 165   A 
controller takes every special dividend irrespective of her fraction of economic 
interest in a corporation.     
It is noteworthy that the current controller is going to be paid both pro-rata 
and special dividends infinitely if she is a family controller whose heir is expected to 
inherit the control power of a corporation.  If a controller’s pro-rata dividend and 
special dividend in the first year are “DIV1” and “EXT1”, then the present value of 
all cumulative pro-rata and special dividends can be expressed as “[DIV1 / (k – g)]” 
and “[EXT1 / (k – g)]” respectively according to a valuation model based on 
discounted cash flows 166  (here, “k” is a required discount rate and “g” is the 
                                                 
164 Although I call them “special dividends,” in this Article, they are not legally allowed dividends (in 
that sense, they are “special.”)  These payments are distributed to only a controller by mostly self-
dealing transfer from a corporation to a controller.  
    
165 See Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 




sustainable growth rate of each dividend).167  Put together with the non-pecuniary 
benefits of control (“NPBC”), which is another cumulative value, the “total value of 
controlling a corporation” (“TV”) is the sum of [DIV1 / (k – g)], [EXT1 / (k – g)], 
and NPBC.  Then, the current controller will sell control only if the payment a 
prospective acquirer offers is more than TV.   
 
 
TV = [DIV1 / (k – g)] + [EXT1 / (k – g)] + NPBC 
 
Notes  
- TV: A Controller’s Total Value of Controlling a Corporation    
- DIV1 / (k – g): Present Value of Cumulative Cash Flow from “Pro-rata Dividends” 
- EXT1 / (k – g): Present Value of Cumulative Cash Flow from “Special Dividends” 




(b) What If a Current Controller Is Not Willing to Sell Control?     
Pro-rata and special dividends are monetary benefits while the non-pecuniary 
benefits (“NPBC”) are not.  The above formula for TV is based on the assumption 
that NPBC is capitalized in monetary terms.  In an extreme case (but certainly, there 
are such cases in the real world), however, the substitutability between pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits is near zero because the current controller values NPBC 
“prohibitively highly” – accordingly, the current dominant shareholder would not sell 
the control of a corporation irrespective of the amount of payment from a third party.  
For example, a controller perceives the corporation as her alter ego (which is not a 
negative vocabulary used in the case of piercing a corporate veil) or a cherishable 
                                                                                                                                           
166 See e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLE OF CORPORATE FINANCE (6th ed. 
McGraw-Hill Irwin 2000). See Kang, supra note 138 as well.      
 
167 For the more explanation, see Kang, supra note 138.      
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entity (like a child) materialized and raised by the controller’s life-long efforts.  Thus, 
she may not even imagine selling a corporation however much a prospective acquirer 
offers. 
Without a pill, a current controller (with 30% voting rights, for example) is 
exposed to the threat of any hostile takeover a prospective acquirer imposes in the 
market.  With a pill, however, the controller does not have to worry about such a 
possibility, and a transaction of control does not take place.  To such a controller, the 
only successor may be her own children who share her genes and protect her legacy.         
 
(c) What If a Current Controller Is Willing to Sell Control? – Issues Related 
to the Value of Non-Pecuniary Benefits of Control      
Now, suppose that a current controller is willing to sell control (therefore 
NPBC as well) in exchange for the corresponding premium.  Nonetheless, if there is 
no buyer who is willing to pay such a premium, a transaction of control sale does not 
take place.168  As to large corporations in particular, there are several reasons why 
there are not many potential buyers of control.  Most of all, “A typical acquirer does 
not (mostly is not able to) buy a large corporation like IBM, but a company with 
                                                 
168 Professor Merritt B. Fox explains a potential acquirer’s risk averseness in a takeover.  “A potential 
acquirer, in deciding whether it is worth paying what it would need to pay to acquire a target that the 
acquirer feels is mismanaged, must make an assessment of what the target would be worth in the 
acquirer’s hands. This assessment is inherently risky and the acquirer’s management is likely to be risk 
averse.” Merritt B. Fox, The Securities Globalization Disclosure Debate, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 567, 572 




small or mid capitalization.”169  Or, even if an acquirer can afford it, it is reluctant to 
take a high risk by purchasing a large corporation with a high premium.170   
In addition, it is possible that the relative value of the NPBC of a large 
controller is higher than that of a small controller, because NPBC is deemed to be a 
“luxury good” that only relatively wealthy consumers – generally, controllers in 
larger corporations – can consume.171  In this sense, a “unit” value of NPBC becomes 
larger as the size of corporation grows, so that, for example, a large corporation that is 
three times larger than a small corporation gives more than three times the psychic 
utility to a controller than a small corporation does.  This phenomenon of “NPBC 
synergy” makes a large corporation more expensive and less affordable to a 
prospective acquirer.     
The high value of NPBC generates another limitation to a potential buyer.  If a 
potential buyer’s own subjective NPBC is high as well, she may be willing to 
purchase control as long as she has access to sufficient financial resources.  However, 
it is more likely that the subjective value of NPBC is higher to a current controller 
than to a prospective purchaser because of the “endowment effect”; to a current 
controller, a corporation is “her own corporation” that she has built and developed for 
her entire life; thus, the current controller place more subjective value on control and 
NPBC than a third party.   
                                                 
169 Discussion with Professor Merritt B. Fox.  When I discussed Professor Fox on my Article, he 
pointed out this phenomenon generally observed in the M&A market. 
 
170 See e.g., Fox, supra note 168.  
 
171 See generally, Kang, supra note 138. 
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Moreover, if a prospective acquirer is a foreign entity, the gap between the 
subjective value of NPBC to a seller and a buyer of control would widen – thus, it is 
less likely that a prospective acquirer would purchase the control of a large 
corporation.  Suppose that a New York-based business entity considers purchasing 
the control of a large Philippine family corporation.  First, “familiarity bias” can 
impede this transaction; the value of NPBC is largely dependent on the local people’s 
perception of how great it is to run a locally reputable corporation; thus, the 
subjective value of NPBC for running a large Philippine corporation is huge to a 
controller in Philippine, but is not to a business entity located in New York, since 
people in New York are not even aware of the name of a target corporation; 
consequently, a NY acquirer will enjoy far less NPBC if it purchases control of a 
Philippine corporation.  Second, if a NY business entity is a widely-held corporation, 
it would impede the transaction further.  NPBC to a controller includes accumulative 
psychic benefits available to her for the entire life and family lines including future 
descendants.  Thus, the value of NPBC to a CEO in New York who has a limited 
tenure would be much smaller than the value of NPBC to a (family) controller in 
Philippine who has an infinite duration in her position through family succession.   
                
(d) What If a Current Controller Is Willing to Sell Control? – Issues Related 
to Egalitarianism      
The control premium is generally far higher than severance pay – for example, 
if Lee were a controller of KEB, he would not have considered selling control to Lone 
Star for only $1.5 million.  When the culture and norms of a jurisdiction do not allow 
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a large income disparity (putting aside that a large monetary compensation is legally 
allowed), such a country is not likely to allow a control premium which is available 
only to a current controller excluding the rest of the shareholders (and other 
constituencies in a corporation).  This view is strengthened by the fact that a large 
fraction of the control premium is from “special dividends” which a controller 
receives by illicit self-dealing; these special dividends might be socially endured as 
long as there is no compelling evidence for their presence; however, when the value 
of illicit self-dealing is capitalized in the corporate control market and paid to a 
current controller in the form of money, it would become a huge social and political 
problem in the jurisdiction.  Knowing this, many controllers in large corporations 
would like to remain as controllers rather than sell control.    
Accordingly, facing the de facto equal treatment rule (as similarly seen in 
Feldmann) imposed by social norms (irrespective of whether such a legal doctrine is 
existent in a jurisdiction), a control sale is to take place only if the control premium is 
equally shared with all shareholders according to their cash-flow rights.  Under that 
condition, however, a current controller would not have much reason to sell control to 
a third party in the first place. 
 
3. Does the Pill Block Sales of Control?     
  
As seen in this Part, in a country with social democracy and egalitarianism, a 
likely consequence of adopting a pill system is that corporate insiders (both 
executives and dominant shareholders) use a pill as the tool for entrenchment and 
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fiercely resist any bid.  In addition, those corporate insiders have social and political 
“justification” (which is in fact a “pretext”) to use a pill to its full extent – by resisting 
any bid, they are deemed as defenders of employees whose welfare would be affected 
adversely by an M&A.  As a result, a market disciplinary device, i.e., M&A, would 
become figurative or meaningless.   
Consequently, there are generally three alternatives when the performance of 
companies is disappointing; (i) management is permitted to let the performance keep 
deteriorated until bankruptcy, which is the worst scenario; (ii) when the situation is so 
serious and the public opinion ultimately accepts M&A as inevitable, management 
may rely on fire sales of companies at a deeply depressed price rather than high-
premium sales gained in a normal M&A; or (iii) underperforming corporate insiders 
would seek a government bailout in which they may remain or be replaced.  As seen 
in (ii), the pill does not block entire M&A.  Perhaps, a fire sale is another form of 
friendly M&A, but, it is an involuntary friendly deal and may be undesirable to a 
domestic economy.   
In a country with a weak social democracy and egalitarianism, a pill may be 
used as a tool for price negotiation (which only favors a controller).  As discussed, 
however, if the discrepancy of the subjective value of NPBC to an incumbent 
controller and a prospective acquirer is large, it is less likely that a prospective 
acquirer would purchase the control of a large corporation.  In this respect, the 
emergence of sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”) – government-sponsored entities that 
invest assets such as foreign reserves in domestic and international financial 
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markets 172  – is of importance because they may make sales of control more 
available.173  
Suppose that an SWF buys control from a controlling shareholder abroad by 
paying a high value of NPBC (thus, a high control premium), which seems to be 
“overpayment” from the perspective of a target’s stand-alone value.  Nonetheless, as 
long as the purchase of a target creates positive externalities to an entire economy of 
the home country, an investment decision of an SWF is justified on a macro-
economic basis.  In other words, assets of SWFs can be used for various industrial 
policies of governments.  In addition, it is worth noting that governments, which are 
shareholders of SWFs, are inherently inefficient monitors in terms of supervising 
economic performance, so that SWFs have more leeway to pay for the control 
premium.  Moreover, governments and SWFs often make politically motivated deals 
that have no rational economic basis.174  Hence, even if a target is not worth a high 
price, an SWF may decide (and the government will approve) to pay an exorbitant 
premium for the target.  Furthermore, the vast amount of foreign reserve may require 
SWFs to diversify their asset portfolio more broadly.  In order to avoid only piling up 
cash (or investing in low interest-bearing treasury bonds), it may be inevitable for 
                                                 
172 See Katharina Pistor, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Banks, and Governments in the Global Crisis, 
Towards a New Governance of Global Finance? 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 333 (2009); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist 
Response to the New Mercantilism. 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2008).    
    
173 During the discussion with Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt, he hinted that sovereign wealth funds are 
willing to pay high control premium for non-pecuniary benefits of control. 
    
174 See e.g., Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 172 (quoting Sen. Chuck Schumer’s statement in Financial 
Times that “So the bottom line is that we don’t know if their decisions are made exclusively on an 
economic basis.”) James Politi, Sovereign Funds Face US Threat, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008.   
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SWFs to buy control of some targets even though SWFs know that they end up 
overpaying.             
Another possibility that a prospective acquirer is willing to pay the high value 
of NPBC (thus, a high control premium) is associated with a drastic change in 
external environments.  The aforementioned example of a Philippine family 
corporation and a New York-based investment entity is useful again.  Suppose that 
the Philippines is under financial distress at the macro-level; now, from a local 
controller’s point of view, growth rate (g) in the future is expected to decrease 
significantly while the discount rate (k) soars; accordingly, her reserve price of 
control is accordingly lowered; therefore, purchasing control is more affordable to a 
prospective acquirer in New York.  In addition, an exchange rate system is distorted 
due to national financial difficulties, so that the Philippine peso becomes drastically 
cheaper than the U.S. dollar.  Under these circumstances, even if a huge gap of NPBC 
value originally existed between a seller and a buyer, a target in the Philippines 
becomes very attractive to a New York business entity for two reasons; (i) the 
depressed reserve price denominated by the Philippine peso; and (ii) the strengthened 
purchasing power of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the Philippine peso. 
                                      
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the United States, “[The] “just say no” [pill] was a much more problematic 
defense in the corporate governance world of the 1980s than it is today, with 
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differently constituted boards and different incentive compensation regimes.”175  If a 
jurisdiction outside the United States considers adopting a pill system, it should take 
into consideration whether its legal and socio-economic institutions are close to either 
the 1980s-U.S. or the post-1980s-U.S.  Without developed legal and socio-economic 
infrastructure, the pill would remain a very “problematic defense in the corporate 
governance world” of such a jurisdiction.  In that sense, the pill should be adopted 
through “bundling” (like a pair of shoes) so that when such a jurisdiction “buys” the 
pill (a right shoe), it should “buy” other Delaware doctrines (a left shoe) in relation to 
the pill. 
Market adaptation via executive compensation was another important reason 
why the pill did not squash a material fraction of M&A activities in the United States.  
A similar (or the same) consequence would not be expected in a country with a strong 
ideology of egalitarianism – thus, even most friendly deals would be crowded out 
when such a country adopts a pill system.  The pill may enhance a controller’s 
negotiation leverage, which increases her reserve price for sale of control – 
accordingly, a sale of control, another type of a friendly deal may be fomented as 
long as there is a potential buyer.  In such a case, however, most shareholders are 
excluded from sharing the benefits of a control sale when a controller depends on the 
CMS ownership.  This phenomenon will be precisely against the rationale of adopting 
the pill, i.e., protecting weak non-dominant shareholders.  Furthermore, when a 
jurisdiction complies with the equal treatment rule (either via legal requirement or 
non-legal norm), thus undercutting a controller’s incentive to sell, the newly imported 
pill system would also suppress the sale of control although some exceptions (e.g., 
                                                 





SWF involved deals and fire sales incurred by idiosyncratic or macro-level systemic 
problems) are possible. 
In sum, importing a pill would provide a jurisdiction with “too much” chilling 
effect towards a market for corporate control.  Nonetheless, it is noteworthy as well 
that the defensive system without a pill may protect control of business entities “too 
little.”  In that context, it is desirable to have an institution with expertise, impartiality, 
and efficiency to determine an allowable level of the pill’s deterrence on a case-by-
case basis.  The problem is that such a sophisticated institution is impractical to many 
controlling shareholder countries at this time.  As an interim solution, it may be worth 
considering a less preclusive defensive measure such as the Interco pill (but not 
limited to the Interco pill).  Alternatively, a new enactment, such as the Exon-Florio 
Act, may be useful (with/without a less powerful pill) as long as a drastic change of 
control in a corporation creates “national security” issues.                                       
 
 
